





EXTRA/ORDINARY MINDS: MAD GENIUS RHETORIC AND  












A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department 













        Approved by: 
        Jordynn Jack 
        Jennifer Ho 
        Jane Danielewicz 
        Karen M. Booth 










































Nora Katherine Augustine 









Nora Katherine Augustine: Extra/Ordinary Minds: Mad Genius Rhetoric and  
Women’s Memoirs of Mental Illness 
(Under the direction of Jordynn Jack) 
 
 
This dissertation examines how autobiographical narratives by/for persons with mental 
illness draw from set of cultural clichés (topoi) I call “Mad Genius” rhetoric. As popular as it is 
controversial, Mad Genius rhetoric imagines an age-old link between “madness,” or apparently 
problematic mental states, and extraordinary gifts of creativity, intelligence, and other talents. I 
ask: How is Mad Genius rhetoric taken up by real mentally ill people, especially women, in self-
referential texts? What conditions encourage authors to construct Mad Genius personae in life 
writing, and what rhetorical purpose do such personae serve? Examining these questions through 
a lens of mental health rhetoric, I build case studies grounded in four highly influential mental 
illness memoirs: Susanna Kaysen’s Girl, Interrupted, Kay Redfield Jamison’s An Unquiet Mind, 
Nana-Ama Danquah’s Willow Weep for Me, and Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation. I argue 
each author’s narration enacts a Mad Genius persona at the nexus of her severe psychic pain and 
her personal gifts, explicating both how she draws on Mad Genius topoi in her writing and the 
contextual factors that apparently encourage her to do so. Specifically, my studies explore four 
discrete Mad Genius topoi: 1) the Tortured Artist, which posits that genius leads to madness; 2) 
the Brainiac, which posits that madness confers genius; 3) the Survivor, in which madness and 
genius are thought to share a common source in external trauma; 4) the Ex-Gifted Kid, in which 
madness/genius are thought to be innate and inextricably intertwined. As a preface to my case 
studies, each chapter also analyzes Mad Genius rhetoric in some contemporary pop culture 
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archive, emphasizing both the enduring popularity of these four topoi and the centrality of 
auto/biographical narratives in their widespread circulation. Notions of personal specialness do 
seem to carry mentally ill authors through acute crises, but my readings reveal the rhetorical 
functions of Mad Genius, demystifying its enduring popularity amid broader cultural stigmas 
against mental illness. Reading these popular books as individualized responses to systemic 
rhetorical exclusion, I conclude that Mad Genius topoi are evidently effective, yet ultimately 
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INTRODUCTION:  EXTRA/ORDINARY MINDS 
If you want to start a blog that “actively promotes or glorifies self-injury or self-harm,” 
don’t do it on Tumblr (Tumblr Staff, 2012, para. 6). On February 23, 2012—five years after its 
founding in February 2007—the popular microblogging website informed its 34 million active 
users that they would soon be strictly prohibited from promoting self-harm through the images, 
text, and other media they shared with fellow users.1 In a post to the Tumblr Staff blog titled “A 
New Policy Against Self-Harm Blogs,” the parameters of this rule were clarified as follows: 
Don’t post content that actively promotes or glorifies self-injury or self-harm. 
This includes content that urges or encourages readers to cut or mutilate 
themselves; embrace anorexia, bulimia, or other eating disorders; or commit 
suicide rather than, e.g., seek counseling or treatment for depression or other 
disorders. Online dialogue about these acts and conditions is incredibly important; 
this prohibition is intended to reach only those blogs that cross the line into active 
promotion or glorification. (Tumblr Staff, 2012, para. 6)  
 
In addition to its outright ban on blogs encouraging self-harm, Tumblr shared plans for new 
Public Service Announcements to be shown above the search results for words and phrases 
commonly associated with self-harm. For example, a search for posts tagged with the term 
“anorexia” might yield this message: “Eating disorders can cause serious health problems, and at 
their most severe can even be life-threatening. Please contact the [resource organization] at 
[helpline number] or [website]” (Tumblr Staff, 2012, paras. 8-9, brackets in original). 
Why the need for these changes? Although Tumblr staff affirmed their commitment to 
free speech, they nonetheless argued that “Tumblr sometimes gets used for things that are just 
 
173 million people had joined Tumblr by the first quarter of 2013, and nearly 34 million of them 
were “active users” (users who had “used or contributed to Tumblr in the past month”) (Mari, 
2013, para. 2). In the second quarter of 2012, Tumblr had 34.2 million active users.  
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wrong” (para. 1). Indeed, given the site’s longstanding bans on hate speech, phishing, and other 
illicit activities, Tumblr reminded users that “[they] do draw some limits” regarding the content 
they tolerate on their servers (para. 1). Tumblr’s innovative microblogging format, combined 
with the anonymity and global scope of the internet, had made it an appealing forum for people 
struggling with stigmatized mental illnesses to connect with one another. But whereas Tumblr 
staff invited “dialogue” about self-harm, their stance on pro-self-harm blogs was unambiguous: 
“These are messages and points of view that we strongly oppose, and don’t want to be hosting” 
(para. 2). In sum, Tumblr staff had decided they could no longer condone self-mutilation, eating 
disorders, suicide/suicidality, or other forms of self-harm through their moderation practices. By 
deleting seemingly dangerous content and promoting supportive resources, they hoped to 
discourage their community members from hurting themselves or other people. 
For some, the notion that Tumblr ever had condoned self-harm—and moreover, that pro-
self-harm content was so prevalent on the site as to merit a response from the staff—came as an 
utter shock. Tumblr user i--do--what--i--want-blog, for one, reblogged the policy announcement 
with the comment: “Waoh, back the fuck up. There are people who are ENCOURAGING self-
harm? The fuck is wrong with people?” (2012, para. 1).2 But such reactions notwithstanding, few 
would deny Tumblr had gained a reputation in 2010s culture as a platform for young people to 
blog about mental illness. The high-profile suicide of 15-year-old Jamie Hubley (son of Allan 
Hubley, a Canadian politician), for instance, had drawn considerable media attention to Tumblr 
in October 2011. Having blogged for months about his struggles with bullying, major depression, 
and cutting—his posts “interspersed with angst-filled quotes and startling images of self-harm. . . 
 
2The spelling, punctuation, and other formatting choices of all Tumblr comments cited in this 
chapter appear exactly as written in the authors’ original blog posts. 
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gathered from all over the web”—Hubley published a farewell note to Tumblr shortly before his 
untimely death (Pearson, 2011, para. 17). Four months after that, a widely-read Huffington Post 
article profiled the rise of “pro-anorexia” blogs on Tumblr, depicting “a secretive community of 
teenage girls who celebrate ghoulish thinness, relish photos of emaciated women, and furtively 
share tips about how to stave off hunger” (Gregoire, 2012, para. 2). Tumblr’s then-director of 
communications acknowledged the dangers such blogs might pose to their community, stressing 
that the staff was “not interested in Tumblr promoting the acceptability of damaging practices” 
(Gregoire, 2012, para. 47). The new Content Policy was announced two weeks later. 
Given that 46% of Tumblr’s active users in 2012 were 16-24 years old, the question on 
everyone’s minds seemed to be whether this website really could influence young people to hurt 
themselves—and the users’ own opinions on this issue varied widely (Mari, 2013, para. 3). As of 
now, the Tumblr Staff blog post that announced the new Content Policy has been shared and/or 
“liked” 25,206 times by Tumblr users. 15,951 of those notes (including 1,731 text comments) are 
still publicly available, and I personally read and labeled the comments according to six themes: 
1) generally supportive of the policy, 2) generally opposed to it, 3) ambivalent and/or skeptical 
about it, 4) expressing unawareness or indifference concerning self-harm blogs, 5) offering meta-
level commentary (e.g., soliciting others’ opinions), and 6) unintelligible to me (e.g., written in a 
non-English language).3 Some Tumblr users have written essay-like responses to this policy, so 
my labels do occasionally overlap: for instance, numerous comments voice the authors’ concerns 
about the enforcement of this policy while also vigorously endorsing it. And by my count, an 
 
3Why can I only read 15,951 notes? Thousands of Tumblr blogs have been deleted—by the user 
or by Tumblr (due to inactivity)—in the eight years since this policy was posted. Additionally, a 
significant number of the notes on this post are inaccessible to me because they are posted to 
private blogs, which are only viewable by followers the author has approved. 
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overwhelming majority of user comments do endorse Tumblr’s crackdown on pro-self-harm 
blogs. 75% (1,291 comments) clearly support the ban, often using phrases like “thank god,” “it’s 
about time,” “long overdue,” or simply “finally!” Apparently, these bloggers shared the belief 
that pro-self-harm blogs posed a serious threat to Tumblr’s users—or at the very least, they 
confirmed to Tumblr staff that they would prefer not to see self-harm content on the site. 
But not everyone was pleased to hear of Tumblr’s ban on pro-self-harm blogs, nor were 
Tumblr’s users entirely optimistic about the efficacy of this action. Of all user responses to the 
policy announcement, 11% (192 comments) oppose the ban, and 19% (332 comments) convey 
some degree of ambivalence regarding its aims and scope. The two most common complaints 
are, by far, that it unduly restricts users’ freedom of speech and that it risks worsening the plights 
of the very people it was intended to help. Indeed, a comment from user pizzaworms argues that 
whereas there are “VERY, VERY FEW ‘PRO-ana’ blogs” on Tumblr, “there ARE thousands of 
blogs run by people with eating disorders who otherwise have no other outlets and it is sick and 
cruel to take away the one thing they have that lets them express themselves” (2012, para. 4). As 
pizzaworms’s criticism implies, a major point of contention in Tumblr-wide discussions of the 
self-harm blog policy—and in all debates about free speech, perhaps—is whether and when one 
person’s speech can be construed as a credible threat to another person’s safety. Irrespective of 
their positions on self-harm, comments on the policy post are noticeably united in their confusion 
as to how, exactly, Tumblr plans to define “blogs that cross the line into active promotion or 
glorification” (Tumblr Staff, 2012, para. 6). Or as user laurarexie puts it: 
I think tumblr needs to be quite careful in deciding what promotes and what is 
simply expression. What to one person might seem like somebody simply keeping 
track of and describing their illness in detail may be seen by somebody else to be 




Tumblr’s stated goal was to rid its servers of blogs that glorified self-harm, thus urging users to 
seek treatment for mental illness instead of turning to dangerous coping mechanisms (or suicide). 
But the staff never intended to purge the site of all references to self-harm—like many of their 
users, they valued Tumblr’s therapeutic potential as a forum for sharing personal stories about 
mental illness. So, where is the line between promotion and expression? Therein lies the paradox 
of this policy. It seems Tumblr wanted to allow users to find meaning in their experiences of 
mental illnesses without suggesting that mental illness is, itself, particularly meaningful. One 
need not argue such a task is absolutely impossible in order to observe that it is very, very hard. 
Ultimately, a quip from user mashedpotatoesandcellophane seems to state the opinion of many 
Tumblr users: “I’m glad I don’t have to make important internet decisions” (2012, para. 1). 
 This doctoral dissertation began with a question: What does it mean to “romanticize” 
(or “promote” or “glorify”) mental illness, and why do people write and read narratives in which 
mental illness is romanticized? No single answer to this exists, of course, and an exhaustive list 
of explanations lies beyond the scope of this project. But in time, my research has been guided 
by my observation that autobiographical narratives of mental illness—whether posted to modern 
social media platforms, dictated to twentieth-century social scientists, fictionalized in canonical 
modernist literature, or whatever—are suffused with a set of topoi I collectively refer to as “Mad 
Genius” rhetoric. As popular as it is controversial, Mad Genius rhetoric envisions an age-old link 
between “madness,” or apparently problematic mental states (now often classified as psychiatric 
disorders), and exceptional gifts of creativity, wisdom, intelligence, beauty, or other talents. 
When we say someone is romanticizing mental illness, that is often what we mean: they are 
suggesting people who have experienced severe psychological distress are capable of thinking, 
feeling, knowing, and/or doing remarkable things that non-mentally ill people cannot. 
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Since antiquity, stories of eminent people who supposedly suffered from “madness” (e.g., 
artists who died by suicide) have been circulated as proof of a link between mental illness and 
extraordinary talent. In the 1960s, Western medicine was flooded with criticisms from doctors, 
sociologists, and political activists who cast psychiatry as a system for suppressing exceptional 
individuals. Feminist scholars since the 1970s, in particular, have often appreciated female 
madness (typified by literary “Madwomen”) as a symbol of women’s stifled creativity under 
patriarchy. Now hundreds of contemporary scientists have written thousands of pages claiming 
to prove the existence of Mad Genius, showing correlations between their research subjects’ 
psychiatric histories and scores on psychometric tests. Still, dissenters to Mad Genius rhetoric all 
across the academy emphasize that idealized notions of “madness” neither accurately reflect the 
experiences of real people with psychiatric disabilities nor provide any realistic means by which 
to relieve their pain. Mad Genius rhetoric carries risks: it seems to assume a universal human 
psychology, discredit the achievements of so-called gifted persons, and devalue mentally ill 
individuals who choose to seek treatment. Moreover, the historic oppression of women and other 
marginalized groups in psy- science fields—through theories and practices that have over-
diagnosed them with labels of “madness” yet categorically denied them those of “genius”—
certainly complicates any efforts to study Mad Genius in an empirical manner. If Mad Genius is 
real, regrettably few conclusions can be drawn about its uses (so to speak) if the concept is not 
adequately analyzed through a lens of gender, race, class, and other intersections of identity.  
This project intentionally suspends the question of whether Mad Genius really does (or 
should) exist, instead investigating why and how it exists from a rhetorical perspective. I want to 
understand: How is Mad Genius rhetoric taken up by real mentally ill people, especially women, 
in autobiographical narratives inspired by their disorders? What sociocultural factors motivate 
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women with mental illness to construct Mad Genius personae in life writing, and what rhetorical 
purpose do such personae serve? Examining these questions through a lens of mental health 
rhetoric research (MHRR), I build case studies grounded in four of the most famous mental 
illness memoirs published during the modern American memoir boom: Susanna Kaysen’s Girl, 
Interrupted (1993), Kay Redfield Jamison’s An Unquiet Mind (1995), Nana-Ama Danquah’s 
Willow Weep for Me (1998), and Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation (1994). I argue each of 
these memoirs constructs a Mad Genius persona at the nexus of the author’s severe psychic pain 
and her personal gifts, explicating both the ways in which she draws on Mad Genius topoi in her 
writing and the contextual factors that apparently encourage her to do so. Specifically, my 
chapters explore four discrete Mad Genius topoi, which I identify by the following shorthand 
terms: 1) the Tortured Artist, which posits that genius leads to madness; 2) the Brainiac, which 
posits that madness confers genius; 3) the Survivor, in which madness and genius are thought to 
share a common source in external trauma; 4) the Ex-Gifted Kid, in which madness/genius are 
thought to be innate and inextricably intertwined. Notions of personal specialness do seem to 
carry these authors through acute crises, but my readings reveal the rhetorical functions of Mad 
Genius, demystifying its enduring popularity amid broader cultural stigmas against mental 
illness. Reading these best-selling books as individualized responses to systemic rhetorical 
exclusion, I conclude that Mad Genius topoi are evidently effective, yet ultimately unsustainable 
frameworks through which to cope with severe psychic pain. 
In the sections that follow, I trace the major intersections of literature, psychiatry, and 
rhetoric scholarship that have informed my methods and methodology in this dissertation. In 
particular, I survey a few sociological perspectives on Mad Genius rhetoric—to preface the more 
extended analyses offered in my body chapters—and review existing academic research that 
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addresses the epistemological significance of mental illness memoirs. Next, I draw on an existing 
conceptual model for analyzing mental illness narratives from a rhetorical perspective, situating 
my critique of Mad Genius rhetoric within ongoing MHRR discussions about the extreme 
stigmatization and rhetorical exclusion of persons with mental illness. Finally, I present the 
macro-level structure of my argument, summarizing the key features of each body chapter as 
they individually and collectively illuminate the functions—but also the limitations—of Mad 
Genius rhetoric as a means of coping with mental health stigma. 
On Madness, Genius, and Mad Genius 
Although this project analyzes the rhetorical aspects of Mad Genius, focusing on its 
meanings to mentally ill people themselves, there are many possible reasons for this concept’s 
cross-cultural/historical popularity. At its core, Mad Genius rhetoric seems to mimic a common 
sociological phenomenon in which stigmatized traits are associated with complementary positive 
traits—mentally ill individuals might be ascribed special mental gifts just as (e.g.) gay men, 
ostracized for their presumed effeminacy, are also often ascribed special talent in traditionally 
feminine spheres. Erving Goffman’s foundational 1963 study, Stigma: Notes on the Management 
of Spoiled Identity, offers numerous insights into the social functions of Mad Genius. While 
discussing the attitudes of “normals” towards stigmatized persons, Goffman notes that although 
“we tend to impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the original one,” we also 
usually “impute some desirable but undesired attributes, often of a supernatural cast, such as 
‘sixth sense’ or ‘understanding’” to the same individual (1986, p. 5). In Goffman’s view, humans 
operating within a framework of social stigma will all but automatically assume that negative, 
“subhuman” traits are offset by some other positive, superhuman (“supernatural”) traits in the 
stigmatized person. As I said above, these positive traits are often complementary to the original 
stigma—for instance, Goffman cites scholarly research on the “unique judgment” attributed to 
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blind persons due to their reliance on “special channels of information unavailable to others” (p. 
5). These positive traits do not negate the stigma, but they provide societies with a means of 
assigning significance to human misery that might otherwise seem random—a stigmatized 
person’s “trials” may instead be understood “as a blessing in disguise, especially because of what 
it is felt that suffering can teach one about life and people” (p. 11).  
Goffman’s theories indicate that both normals and stigmatized persons are complicit in 
promoting the belief that stigma is a “blessing” that, even as it causes great distress to the 
stigmatized person, also confers special abilities (e.g., access to special psychic realms). Clearly, 
the notion of a complementary gift linked to stigma allows normals to feel less dissonance over 
their rejection of stigmatized persons, releasing them from the burden of either challenging the 
roots of stigma or reducing its harmful effects. And for stigmatized persons themselves, the 
therapeutic functions of viewing stigma as a blessing are also apparent. These stereotypes offer 
what Payne (1989) would call a “consolation” approach to therapeutic rhetoric: if stigmatized 
traits “cannot be repaired or completely undone,” then at least they can be “consolingly 
interpreted in ways that make the consequences less painful, easier to accommodate, or even 
valuable according to some alternate set of priorities” (p. 152). For instance, as the disabled 
subject of one case study cited by Goffman writes, “it wasn’t only suffering: it was also learning 
through suffering. I know my awareness of people has deepened and increased. . . . I could not 
have learned that dashing all over a tennis court” (1986, p. 11). When stigmas are linked to 
extraordinary talents, neither normals nor stigmatized persons are disputing the notion that the 
latter are not “normal”—what matters is whether their abnormality is viewed as wholly bad, 
wholly good, or some mixture of the two. Applying Goffman’s theories to Mad Genius rhetoric, 
then, one could conclude this concept proliferates (at least in part) because, although it eases 
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humans’ guilt and pain vis-à-vis the oppression of mentally ill people, it poses no serious threat 
to the power structures that create and maintain that oppression. 
Susan Sontag’s influential 1977 work, Illness as Metaphor, hints at another important 
social function of Mad Genius rhetoric. Sontag argues that the tendency to link (some) deadly 
illnesses to positive personality traits stems from a universal human “need to express romantic 
attitudes about the self”—and importantly, that tendency is especially strong when said illnesses 
have no obvious external causes or cures (p. 35). Whereas tuberculosis was romanticized in past 
centuries, Sontag writes, “in the twentieth century, the repellent, harrowing disease that is made 
the index of a superior sensitivity, the vehicle of ‘spiritual’ feelings and ‘critical’ discontent, is 
insanity” (p. 35). Indeed, Sontag suggests that romantic visions of “insanity” are not historically 
unique, but rather closely resemble a previous “act of distortion” in Western culture (i.e., the 
social construction of tuberculosis) (p. 35). And just as “the myth of TB” faded with increased 
scientific knowledge of the disease and more effective treatments, Sontag’s arguments imply that 
“insanity,” too, will cease to be romanticized when it is no longer shrouded in mystery (p. 35). 
Thus according to Illness as Metaphor, Mad Genius rhetoric could be seen as the product of “a 
modern idea of individuality” (p. 30)—specifically, the notion that “people [are] made singular, 
made more interesting by their illnesses” (p. 31)—and humans’ fear of the unknown. Put 
differently, Mad Genius is just one of many possible expressions of human individualism, and it 
is only because we do not understand mental illness that we are able to romanticize it. 
In highlighting the mysteriousness of some illnesses as a key determinant of cultural 
discourse about them, Illness as Metaphor points to one of the biggest challenges scholars must 
face when theorizing about Mad Genius. Surely it is productive to study mental illness through 
the lens of stigma, yet “stigma” by definition refers to a disadvantageous mark that is—if not 
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literally written on the body—recognizable by the dominant culture. Mad Genius rhetoric, on the 
other hand, seems to cope with an unclear disadvantage by linking it to an unclear advantage. By 
this I mean, the human mind is fallible in its attempts to measure itself: there is no consensus in 
any academic field regarding the exact definition, causes, or effects of either mental illness or 
mental gifts. As I discuss further in this project’s second case study, attempts to establish a 
scientific link between psychiatric diagnoses and metrics of mental aptitude are fraught with 
methodological problems. Even if it is possible both to define madness/genius and to prove that 
the two are correlated, doing so would not prove that one causes the other, nor would it confirm 
the direction of that relationship (i.e., which one causes the other). Indeed, it is noteworthy that 
Becker’s (1978) analysis of Mad Genius—the only book-length work known to me that studies 
Mad Genius from a sociological perspective—frames the so-called “Mad Genius controversy” as 
a “change in the dominant conception of genius” rather than a reflection of societal attitudes 
towards madness (p. 13, italics mine). Similarly, Schlesinger’s (2012) inflammatory book The 
Insanity Hoax frames Mad Genius as an attack on creative people, arguing its vision of artists as 
“simultaneously envied for their brilliance and pitied for their handicaps” (p. 10) dangerously 
“devalues the artistic product” (p. 11). As one would expect, both of these scholars’ findings 
differ greatly from those of scholars who interpret Mad Genius rhetoric as a societal response to 
mental health stigma (or those who view Mad Genius as a scientific reality). 
How can one clarify the relationship between madness and genius—let alone the 
significance of Mad Genius rhetoric—if both labels are essentially subjective and rely heavily on 
self-report for diagnosis? It is due to these labels’ ambiguity that I use “Mad Genius rhetoric” as 
an umbrella term for a vast range of communications that posit varying connections between 
“bad” and “good” mental phenomena. Like Becker, I take an “agnostic” approach to Mad Genius 
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rhetoric, aiming to “describe patterns of. . . beliefs pertaining to mental illness without having to 
endorse or reject them” (1978, p. 15). This project is predicated on the basic truth that people do 
(and will) believe in Mad Genius, irrespective of any empirical research on the matter. They 
believe it because they want to, and they can: Mad Genius endures, not in spite of the fact that it 
cannot be proven, but precisely because it cannot be disproven. As stated above, my intention is 
to explore why and how humans circulate Mad Genius rhetoric, emphasizing how they may 
influence others’ attitudes and behaviors in relation to mental health as a result. There are very 
few scholarly studies that examine Mad Genius from a sociocultural perspective—even fewer 
that investigate what it means to mentally ill people themselves. Despite the apparently broad 
appeal of Mad Genius rhetoric, MHRR often assumes that cultural stereotypes about mental 
illness are mostly perpetuated by non-mentally ill individuals. Perhaps this was true when 
persons with mental illness had little-to-no voice in mainstream society, but given the increased 
availability of personal accounts of mental illness since the late-twentieth century, it is now 
possible to analyze how Mad Genius rhetoric both shapes and is shaped by such texts. Hence, to 
contextualize the methods I employ throughout this project—namely, rhetorical analysis of 
autobiographical writing—I now turn to a review of existing research on mental illness memoirs. 
Interdisciplinary Scholarly Analyses of Mental Illness Memoirs 
In this section, I briefly discuss a range of representative scholarship by researchers and 
clinicians who have studied the significance of mental illness memoirs in their respective fields. 
To be clear, my focus is on studies that compare multiple books by separate authors—rather than 
those that analyze a single book and/or author—and attempt to make generalizations about the 
epistemological value of mental illness memoirs as a class. Although the authors whom I quote 
directly are identified by their disciplines, I organize their claims according to three key themes: 
humanistic significance, medical significance, and rhetorical significance. I find this last theme, 
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rhetorical significance, to be the least thoroughly explored in existing scholarly literature about 
mental illness memoirs. But although they are not always recognized as such, creative non-
fiction memoirs are inherently rhetorical, making arguments about the authors’ identities and life 
stories. Chiefly interested in the relationship between mental illness memoirs and the authors’ 
sociocultural contexts (specifically, Mad Genius rhetoric), I discuss how current MHRR lays 
groundwork for the methods of rhetorical analysis I employ in my project’s four case studies. 
Humanistic Significance: Self-Knowledge and Expression 
Scholars analyzing mental illness memoirs often focus on the powerful meanings these 
texts hold for their authors, regardless of their reception by popular audiences. As sociologists 
Westerbeek and Mutsaers (2008) observe, “the authors of published autobiographical texts are 
experienced writers and often have careers in journalism, fiction, or science” (p. 31). A highly 
successful memoir is rarely the author’s first (or last) written project, and someone who succeeds 
in writing and publishing memoir is, by definition, a professional writer. Hence, these authors are 
thought to be uniquely motivated and qualified to write about mental illness—and in doing so, 
they stand to gain numerous personal and professional benefits (Westerbeek & Mutsaers, 2008). 
In keeping with common scholarly perspectives on memoir and life narrative, then, the feat of 
composing a memoir about one’s mental illness has been associated with the affirmation of one’s 
subjectivity (Stern, 2003; White, 2008), the exploration of selfhood and identity (Bullard, 2002; 
Cheever, 2000; Marshall, 2006), the cathartic purge of previously buried memories and emotions 
(Russell, 2007; Williams, 2011), and various other forms of self-enlightenment. By contrast, 
literary critic Zimmerman (2007) argues that depression memoirs only claim to impart wisdom 
about the human psyche while actually falling short of doing so: in struggling futilely to describe 
their illnesses, authors are “reenacting the failure of meaning at depression’s center” (p. 466). 
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Does the humanistic value of mental illness memoirs extend beyond their ability to model 
identity formation and the narrativization of human lives? One would think so, but scholarly 
attention to these texts as aesthetic objects—for instance, through close readings of their content 
and forms—is quite limited.4 Given that memoirs are sometimes contrasted with other life 
writing genres (e.g., auto/biography) on the basis of their literary merit, some studies do analyze 
individual mental illness memoirs alongside works of fiction with little-to-no differentiation 
between the two (see Baker et al., 2008; Bridgford, 2012; Caminero-Santangelo, 1998; Lee, 
2017). But purely fictional texts still dominate the field of literary studies: of all the scholarship I 
have read that cites mental illness memoirs, research by literary critics only comprises about one 
quarter. It is the so-called truthiness of the memoir genre—its attempts to represent real people in 
the real world—that forms the basis of many scholars’ interest in these books. Moreover, given 
the many gaps in modern psychiatric knowledge, it seems valuable for analyses of mental illness 
memoirs (in particular) to situate the events of the “plot” within the specific real-life contexts in 
which they occurred. In considering how these texts depict the symptoms, diagnosis, and 
treatment of serious psychiatric conditions, scholars seek to tap their practical utility. 
Medical Significance: Education and Interventions 
The transmission of “true” information about mental illness from writer to reader through 
the memoir genre may, directly or indirectly, be beneficial to allied health fields. Since the early 
days of the memoir boom, health and medical researchers have valued mental illness memoirs 
for their capacity to educate lay audiences about the science behind psychiatric diagnosis and 
treatment (Clifford et al., 1999; Sommer et al., 1998). Scholars who hold this view pointedly 
 
4This is not to say that no memoirs are ever recognized as literature and analyzed as such. I only 
want to observe that memoirs about mental illness, for the most part, have not been. 
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deemphasize the aesthetic qualities of a given memoir to consider it as a type of case study—the 
reader’s mission is to mine the book for helpful facts about mental illness. For instance, social 
psychiatrist Whitley (2012) notes that because memoirs “regularly point to positive aspects of 
mental health care,” they are able to circulate information about treatment options in a manner 
that is both accessible and inspiring to readers with little prior knowledge (p. 358). Additionally, 
medical anthropologist Armstrong (2012) argues that memoirs contain unique insights into 
patients’ “information needs and information preferences”—that is, the facts about illness and 
treatments that patients in recovery actually want and need from their doctors—thus clinicians 
can improve their communication skills by reading these stories (p. 341). When memoirs are 
viewed as clinical tools, information seems to be extracted from them in a fairly straightforward 
fashion: patients can read memoirs to learn about their own illnesses; friends and family of 
patients can learn about their loved ones’ conditions; clinicians can learn about diverse 
manifestations and treatments of a given disorder; non-ill persons can read memoirs for their 
own personal edification (McAllister et al., 2014). Fittingly, several scholars have also suggested 
that memoirs be taught in abnormal psychology courses (Norcross et al., 2001; Segrist 2008). 
Beyond these data-driven applications of mental illness memoirs, numerous researchers 
praise such books for educating readers about the subjective experience of mental illness, 
including its long-term and/or secondary effects (Armstrong, 2012; Donohue-Smith, 2011; 
McAllister, 2014; Whitley, 2012). It is suggested that, because science writing values emotional 
detachment for the sake of minimizing bias, the “human” quality of mental illness is absent from 
more strictly scientific texts. Memoirs, on the other hand, can convey “the suffering, the distress, 
the devastating effect on the family, the loss of status and the insidious impact of stigma” that 
characterizes many psychiatric conditions (Whitley, 2012, p. 357). Surely, the medical relevance 
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of feeling another person’s feelings is less easily observable than that of (e.g.) reading about the 
neurological processes that cause those feelings, but memoir-induced empathy may have a more 
immediate impact on the well-being of mentally ill persons. McAllister et al. (2014), a team of 
psychiatric nursing scholars co-authoring with a memoir expert, argue that depictions of real 
people’s recoveries in the memoir genre can bring “the benefits of universality, empathy, hope, 
and guidance” to patients and loved ones who do not personally know anyone else who has been 
treated for mental illness (p. 553). As this statement suggests, scholars researching the medical 
significance of mental illness memoirs do tend to appreciate these books more for their tales of 
triumph over disease than for their depictions of disease itself (i.e., of extreme psychological 
distress). However, that trend may be as much a consequence of generic conventions as it is of 
those scholars’ values. Feminist scholars Gilmore (2010) and Muzak (2009) both observe that 
mental illness memoirs, like all memoirs, usually feature linear narratives with happy endings—
even at the expense of more accurate and nuanced records of the authors’ experiences. In their 
suggestions that such narrative choices are strategic on the part of authors and publishers, these 
scholars subtly call attention to the rhetorical dimensions of this genre. 
Rhetorical Significance: Culture and Strategies 
McAllister et al. (2014) identify two key challenges that must be resolved for the use of 
mental illness memoirs in clinical settings to be viable: 1) books should be systematically vetted 
to ensure that readers only access the most valuable content, and 2) the processes of assigning 
and discussing readings should be closely observed, tested, and standardized (pp. 556-57). In 
other words, these scholars want a means by which to measure the benefits of any given memoir 
both in theory (pre-reading) and in practice (mid-/post-reading). Although McAllister et al. focus 
primarily on assigning memoirs to patients in psychotherapy programs, their recommendations 
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seem applicable to any context in which someone hopes to use a mental illness memoir to bring 
about some positive outcome. Once again, the challenge lies not in deciding what to do—for 
who would argue patients should be assigned worthless texts?—but rather in deciding how to do 
it. It is therefore crucial to note that, for many psy- science researchers and clinicians, the value 
of a mental illness memoir ultimately hinges on its ability to persuade. Offering both scientific 
and experiential knowledge interwoven with an enjoyable, accessible story, these books are 
uniquely positioned to sway clinicians, friends/family of patients, and even the general public to 
change their beliefs and actions concerning mental health such that they may better serve the 
interests of persons with mental illness. Moreover—and most importantly, for many scholars—
mental illness memoirs hold the promise of identifying new patients and propelling them towards 
recovery: they can convince readers with mental health issues to seek treatment (Clifford et al., 
1999; Donohue-Smith, 2011; McAllister et al., 2014; Sommer et al., 1998; Whitley, 2012). 
That the central purpose of mental illness memoirs should be to improve the lives of real 
people with mental illness—especially by promoting recovery—is a position shared by virtually 
all of the researchers I cite in this review. That being said, scholars diverge in their opinions as to 
what kind of content is most persuasive to readers and, relatedly, the extent to which authors 
can/do deliberately use rhetorical strategies in their writing. According to McAllister at al., for 
example, it is problematic to expose mentally ill people to memoirs that discuss harmful “myths” 
about their disorders (e.g. that anorexia is a “teenage, middle-class, female disease”): instead of 
being persuaded to come forward and seek recovery, readers may be even more discouraged by 
their increased awareness of stigma (2014, p. 557). Psychologists Thomas et al. (2006), however, 
suggest that memoirists who emphasize the most unpleasant aspects of mental illness can help to 
“increase feelings of vulnerability to negative. . . outcomes” on the part of mentally ill readers (p. 
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419). For these scholars, the enormous popularity of the memoir genre—and data showing that 
mass media do affect consumers’ health behaviors—means “memoirists may be poised to exert 
considerable influence” on readers (p. 418). In revealing the permanent, life-altering effects of 
prolonged periods of illness, popular memoirs may “serve as a deterrence” to readers who would 
otherwise resist treatment (Thomas et al., 2006, p. 419). By the same token, then, Thomas et al. 
caution against circulating memoirs that “conflate psychopathology with desirable attributes” or 
“depict ‘sufferers’ as holding coveted forms of social capital,” asserting that vulnerable readers 
may “come to view their own [symptoms] not only as more normative. . . but also as more 
positive or glamorous” (p. 424). Although they find “most memoirists cite altruistic motivations 
for writing their books,” Thomas et al. affirm that the actual impact of a mental illness memoir 
depends upon the author’s writing choices, the audience’s values, and so on (p. 418). 
Interestingly, Thomas et al. indicate that the glamorization of mental illness in some 
memoirs is “inadvertent” on the authors’ parts, finding that such texts are mostly (if not solely) 
detrimental to persons who already exhibited some degree of mental illness prior to reading them 
(2006, p. 419). On the other hand, a small number of scholars position memoirists as quite active 
participants in their books’ portrayals of mental illness, illuminating how these authors use 
specific language and narrative choices to influence their readers’ opinions (Pryal, 2010; White, 
2008; Young, 2009). Social worker Young (2009) performs close readings of four different 
mental illness memoirs, explaining how the authors portray themselves as “accomplished, self-
possessed, and socially integrated” persons in order to refute “the established cultural discourse 
of mental illness as limitation” (p. 52). Communications scholar White (2008) argues that mental 
illness memoirs by women, in particular—which she reads through Smith’s (1993) concept of 
“autobiographical manifesto”—use memoir as a discursive “tool for resistance. . . . against the 
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stigmatization of mental illness” by consciously politicizing the authors’ experiences and calling 
for social change (p. 7). Finally, MHRR scholar Pryal (2010) analyzes how mentally ill authors 
build ethos in autobiographical writing, noting four specific rhetorical strategies as conventions 
of the “mood memoir” genre (p. 479). For Pryal, these conventions are directly tied to mental 
health stigma: because mentally ill people are categorically denied credibility on the basis of 
illness, their memoirs cannot shift readers’ views about mental illness unless/until they persuade 
readers of their rhetorical authority. Pryal’s study is distinct in that, among all scholarly analyses 
of mental illness memoirs, it is the only one I know of that explicitly attends to their rhetorical 
significance. It is also the only one that alludes to Mad Genius, connecting it to a strategy Pryal 
calls “laying claim” (“simple name- or statistics-dropping”): “the creative genius trope is a 
powerful source of authority, one that most mood memoirists employ” (2010, pp. 496-97). 
Future Directions for the Study of Mental Illness Memoirs 
As noted by Thomas et al. (2006) above, most mental illness memoirs do state the 
authors’ desires to serve some greater good by publishing their life stories. I do not doubt that 
learning factual, optimistic information about recovering from mental illness through a widely-
accessible memoir is beneficial to some audiences. However, memoirists’ descriptions of more 
ambiguous and/or subjectively enjoyable aspects of their illnesses must play a role in the 
significance of their stories, too. Whereas mental health professionals organize their readings of 
mental illness memoirs around the central goal of getting patients into treatment, it is clear that 
mentally ill authors (and readers) do not always share that goal. That is, people with mental 
illness do not necessarily assume that eliminating mental illness is the purpose of their work. 
Preliminary research by White (2008), Young (2009), and Pryal (2010) suggests it is authors’ 
hopes of transforming cultural discourse around their illnesses (i.e., ending stigma, not ending 
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illness per se) that drives their language and narrative choices. But in the context of Mad Genius 
rhetoric, perhaps such an undertaking—to end mental health stigma by writing a memoir—is 
even more complicated than it is implied to be in current scholarship. Just as Tumblr struggled to 
delineate between discussing mental illness and “promoting” mental illness on its users’ personal 
blog posts, mentally ill memoirists and readers may be hard-pressed to build arguments against 
mental health stigma that do not, in effect, argue for mental illness in the process. When does 
destigmatization find its basis in empathy and identification (“I’m not so different from you—
I’m just as good”), and when does it verge on radical individualism and chauvinism (“I am 
different from you—I am better”)? In the present project, I seek to build on other scholars’ 
methods of analyzing mental illness memoirs by clarifying both the negative and, indeed, the 
positive messages these books convey about mental illness. As I discuss in the sections below, a 
rhetorical approach enables me to analyze how mentally ill authors’ experiences interact with 
their sociocultural contexts, thus illuminating their memoirs’ possible effects on their audiences. 
Telling the Whole Story: Rhetorical Analysis of Mental Illness Memoirs 
To study mental illness memoirs from a rhetorical perspective, garnering their unique 
insights into the concept of Mad Genius, this project should account for the multiplicity of 
factors that shape each author’s story. The most pertinent model I have found for my method in 
this dissertation is by Donohue-Smith (2011), a scholar of developmental psychology and 
psychiatric nursing who has developed “an ecologically-based conceptual model” to be used as a 
“framework for systematic analysis of the mental illness memoir” (p. 138). In Donohue-Smith’s 
view, the creative, narrativized, and overall constructed nature of memoirs makes them distinctly 
different from medical case studies and other verbal/oral media commonly used to study mental 
illness. For this reason, “telling the whole story” of a mental illness memoir means paying close 
attention, not just to basic facts of the plot such as “the narrator’s personal characteristics (e.g. 
 
 21 
age, socioeconomic status, intellectual ability)” or “the qualities of the symptoms (e.g. type, 
severity, age of onset, frequency),” but also to possible interactions between these facts over the 
course of the author’s life (Donohue-Smith, 2011, p. 142). As shown in Figure 1, the factors that 
significantly shape the writing of a mental illness memoir might be divided into five categories: 
“Client and family characteristics,” “Community/neighborhood characteristics,” “Therapist 
characteristics,” “Agency characteristics,” and “Cultural and societal influences” (Donohue-
Smith, 2011, pp. 145-46). To assist in generating observations about a given memoir, Donohue-
Smith also provides what she calls a “checklist of factors” or “inventory of influences” that may 
fall under each of these five categories (p. 138; see Appendix for complete inventory). Although 
“the salience of specific themes or model elements may vary” across different texts—the items in 
the inventory are common, but they are not universal—Donohue-Smith encourages “learners. . . 
to consider as many elements of the model as possible” (p. 141). It is just as important, of course, 
to notice what authors do not discuss in their books as it is to notice what they do. 
As a scientist and clinician, Donohue-Smith has limited interest in the humanistic 
significance of mental illness memoirs, locating these texts’ value primarily in their ability to 
educate psy- science students about the subjective experience of mental illness. In her study, the 
task of analyzing memoirs is compared to that of listening to patients’ disclosures in therapy: 
If sufferers must be able to tell a meaningful story to be considered “well,” 
clinicians must have a clinically valid and reliable strategy for creating their own 
meta-narrative, one that deconstructs and reinterprets the story told by the client 
without distorting or disregarding the client’s voice. (p. 138) 
 
While Donohue-Smith does not articulate her claims in rhetorical terms, the “meta-narrative” 
process to which she refers—one of breaking stories down into their constitutive parts and 
reinterpreting them in light of key contextual factors—clearly entails a type of intellectual labor 
similar to rhetorical analysis. She stresses the importance of audience, noting that memoirs 
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 published for a “mass public” differ greatly from oral narratives shared directly with a therapist: 
“Each story has a real or imagined ‘listener,’ and the narrative may differ in both form and 
content, depending on the audience” (p. 143). Additionally, while discussing the many “internal 
and external barriers” mentally ill authors must surmount in order to write “in a way that is 
authentic, yet ultimately affirming,” Donohue-Smith contrasts memoirs that are written mostly to 
inform readers with those that may be written to persuade (p. 138). In Donohue-Smith’s view, 
mentally ill authors are at times inclined to spread unreliable information through their memoirs, 
writing “counter narrative[s]” for the purpose of “rejecting the illness label” and lodging “a 
defense of the maladaptive behaviors that [others] view as problematic” (p. 139). It is due to 
these overtly rhetorical aspects of mental illness memoirs, then, that Donohue-Smith advises her 
readers that “caution should be used” when learning from these books: although a memoir can be 
Figure 1 
The Trajectory of the Mental Illness Narrative: A Conceptual Model 
 
Note. This figure was produced by Donohue-Smith (2011) to be used in conjunction with her more detailed “Inventory of 
Influences on the Mental Illness Narrative” (see Appendix). 
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a powerful educational tool, it is “even more valuable when accompanied by a careful 
examination of the factors. . . affect[ing] the construction of the narrative itself” (p. 138). 
Of all the factors in Donohue-Smith’s inventory of influences, the category most relevant 
to my research on Mad Genius rhetoric is “Cultural and societal influences.” This category 
includes “General societal attitude toward mental illness and treatment,” “Representations of 
mental illness in the popular media,” “Dissemination and application of research findings,” 
“Mental health/mental illness as national funding priory [sic] receiving,” and “National standards 
for insurance companies in treating mental illness” (p. 146). Three items listed under “Patient 
characteristics”—“Perceptions and interpretations of their symptoms,” “Individual beliefs about 
the nature of mental illness,” and “Strengths: (e.g. . . . intellectual ability, other skills/talents, 
education)”—are also closely related to my project. Needless to say, these factors are highly 
interdependent on each other and other inventory items. Scientific research affects both societies’ 
and individuals’ attitudes about mental illness, which in turn influences the kinds of healthcare 
policies they support, which impacts the availability of treatments, which shapes how mental 
illness is depicted in mass media, and so on. But according to Donohue-Smith’s model, “Cultural 
and societal influences” is the most macro-level category under which all other factors are 
eventually subsumed—this category holds the most persuasive power by far, and for this reason, 
it is also the most complex. Humanity’s beliefs about mental illness are simultaneously quite 
diverse (from person to person) and yet remarkably rigid: “Attitudes toward the mentally ill may 
be difficult to alter, since they can be less rooted in science than in values, cultural practices, 
even witchcraft” (Donohue-Smith, 2011, p. 139). In other words, it is not clear what exactly 
solidifies a person’s views of mental illness, but it is clear that scientific knowledge does not 
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suffice. Given the basic mysteriousness of the human mind, our judgments of mental traits and 
states are always already contingent on our own personal experiences and values. 
Although mental illness is often perceived as a scientific phenomenon, to study mental 
health rhetoric (through the memoir genre, in this project), one must realize that science alone 
does not dissuade people from thinking negatively of mental illness—but neither, I wish to 
emphasize, does it dissuade people from thinking positively of mental illness. As Donohue-
Smith notes, cultural artifacts “participate in creating the ‘dominant cultural narrative’ of mental 
illness,” and that narrative is essentially ambivalent: “Media representations may increase stigma 
through negative portrayals (e.g. Psycho) or may glamorise or promote maladaptive behavior, as 
has [been] noted [by others]” (p. 142). If popular media both reflect and influence societies’ 
attitudes towards mental illness, then it is no wonder they are often accused of romanticizing 
psychiatric symptoms—for it is apparent to any scholar who studies mental illness narratives that 
the authors often “perceive some aspects of their disorder[s] as positive or even pleasurable,” and 
that fact is captured in their writing (Donohue-Smith, 2011, p. 139). The “maladaptive behavior” 
(i.e., madness) they promote is that which they associate with special “clarity,” a “heightened 
sense of interpersonal power,” “impossible dreams made real,” and other extraordinary abilities 
(i.e., genius) (Bloch, 1996, as cited in Donohue-Smith, 2011, p. 139). Importantly, Donohue-
Smith’s comments here suggest a sort of cyclical relationship between mentally ill persons’ 
private experiences of their symptoms and what she calls the “dominant cultural narrative” of 
mental illness. Popular media may influence someone’s perceptions of their condition as a source 
of special powers, but a person’s subjective pleasure may also move them to write (or speak, or 
otherwise communicate) positively about mental illness in a public forum—and both of these 
facts can be persuasive to general audiences. Once again, Donohue-Smith points to the rhetorical 
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dimensions of memoir, cautioning against authors whose portrayals of mental illness are as 
sensationally positive as mainstream media portrayals of mental illness are unjustly negative. 
For Donohue-Smith’s purposes, it is important to note when a memoir is romanticizing 
mental illness only insofar as this may mark the author as an unreliable narrator. But for my 
purposes, Donohue-Smith’s method helps to elucidate the complex web of contextual factors that 
motivate such authors’ supposed unreliability—and the effects their narrative choices may have 
on their audiences. In drawing on Donohue-Smith’s conceptual model and inventory to analyze 
Mad Genius rhetoric in mental illness memoirs, I affirm the host of “challenges, ambiguities, and 
contradictions” that inhere in this unique rhetorical situation (Donohue-Smith, 2011, p. 143). 
While I do not operate under the assumption that Mad Genius is real—that a special link between 
mental illness and mental talents really does exist, and it is good for humans to seek knowledge 
about that link—I neither regard Mad Genius rhetoric as some sort of barrier to the true meaning 
of a given memoir. On the contrary, Mad Genius rhetoric seems to be an end in itself for 
mentally ill authors who enact it in their memoirs: it is a set of preexisting cultural narratives 
about psychiatric disorders that, when invoked, make arguments about these authors that they 
find gratifying and that their audiences can readily accept. Indeed, there is a fundamental 
difference between authors who discuss madness and/or genius versus those who discuss Mad 
Genius. The former are two distinct concepts that might coexist in one narrative, and the latter is 
a well-known cultural cliché that audiences recognize due to its inclusion in a great many 
narratives. Although mentally ill authors’ engagement with Mad Genius rhetoric may not be 
strictly intentional, it is not a coincidence. By linking their conditions to their presumed gifts and 
talents, the authors in my archive defend themselves against a range of negative stereotypes 
about mental illness—and in doing so, they appeal to readers with a variety of interests. 
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Two common rhetorical terms are useful for framing my discussion of Mad Genius 
rhetoric in the remainder of this project, and moving forward, I will use them frequently: “topoi” 
(i.e., commonplaces) and “personae.” Both of these refer to elements of a shared culture that 
rhetors can reasonably assume their audiences will recognize and accept; topoi are like culturally 
available ideas and personae are like culturally available roles. More specifically, Prelli (1989) 
defines topoi as “repeatable and acceptable themes that deal with shared beliefs, values, and 
opinions,” noting that they “have to do with situationally appropriate. . . thoughts and action” (p. 
108). These stock concepts and arguments enable rhetors to find common ground with their 
audiences, thus they can be instrumental in establishing one’s desired rhetorical persona (or 
assigning personae to others). Keränen (2010) describes personae as “stock cultural positions or 
roles [from] existing narrative frameworks that encourage certain responses over others” (p. 30), 
explicating the relationship between topoi and personae as follows: “personae may be viewed as 
symbolic condensations of role types that, when enacted, imply a host of preexisting narrative 
elements and character traits that derive from communal cultural knowledge—that is, from 
shared norms” (p. 28). Hence, an author may draw upon topoi to construct a particular narrative 
persona, but an author may also assume a familiar persona as a means of strengthening or 
claiming some associated topoi. When I refer to Mad Genius topoi and personae, I mean a set of 
stock narratives about the human mind that serve to link madness to genius (in varying ways) 
and a corresponding set of stock cultural roles that are available to mentally ill people. 
As previously stated, my case studies in this project explore four distinct formulations of 
Mad Genius topoi, arguing that the four authors in my archive draw on the Tortured Artist, 
Brainiac, Survivor, and Ex-Gifted Kid topoi (respectively) to enact these associated personae in 
the writing of their memoirs. To preface my readings of best-selling mental illness memoirs, 
 
 27 
each body chapter also analyzes Mad Genius rhetoric in some contemporary pop culture archive 
(e.g., social media posts), emphasizing both the enduring popularity of these four topoi and the 
centrality of auto/biographical narratives in their circulation. I read the memoirs in my primary 
archive as individualized responses to the systemic rhetorical exclusion of mentally ill people, 
showing in particular how they resist the notions that mental illness is chronic and incurable, that 
mentally ill people are irrational, that mental ill people are weak, and that mentally ill people are 
burdensome. As my case studies will show, the specific persona each author constructs—the 
Mad Genius topos that apparently appeals to her—can be connected to specific circumstances of 
her life story, which are in turn informed by factors at every level of Donohue-Smith’s (2011) 
inventory of influences. These authors do not argue that Mad Genius exists: they assume it 
exists, often quite explicitly, and this fact underlies each memoir’s arguments about the specific 
type of Mad Genius its author claims. But in demystifying the rhetorical functions of Mad 
Genius topoi and personae, my readings also point to the dangers of coping with extreme 
psychological distress by linking it to extraordinary talents. In short, I find that the deceptively 
therapeutic effects of Mad Genius rhetoric (for individual mentally ill persons) fail to counteract 
each topoi’s distinctly harmful implications for mentally ill people as a collective. 
Extra/Ordinary Memoirs: Summary of Archive and Chapters 
The texts that anchor my case studies in this project represent four of the earliest and 
most famous first-person, book-length accounts of psychiatric illness ever to be published in the 
United States. My interest in these texts hinges on their contrast to stories that preceded them: 
they are not fiction (or fictionalized) novels like Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar (1963) or Joanne 
Greenberg’s I Never Promised You A Rose Garden (1964); they are not third-person accounts 
written by non-ill journalists such as Flora Rheta Schreiber’s Sybil (1973) or Susan Sheehan’s Is 
There No Place on Earth for Me? (1983); they are not late-career autobiographies published by 
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persons of preexisting fame and influence like William Styron’s Darkness Visible (1990) or Kate 
Millett’s The Loony-Bin Trip (1990). On the contrary, each of the authors I examine in this 
dissertation explicitly identifies herself as someone who once sought treatment for a diagnosed 
mental illness, and her creative non-fiction book intentionally and principally organizes the 
events of her life around that identity. Whereas each woman was arguably unknown within the 
American social imaginary prior to publishing her memoir in the 1990s, in 2021 these texts 
continue to be remembered for their appearances on bestseller lists, nominations for prestigious 
awards, adaptations into (at times award-winning, Blockbuster) films, translations into numerous 
languages, and/or readerships across a wide range of popular and scholarly contexts. 
It is due to these memoirs’ influence in American culture that I find them especially well-
suited to an analysis of Mad Genius rhetoric. Rather than studying a large sample of “ordinary” 
women for the purpose of capturing latent statistical realities, I perform close readings of a small 
sample of “extraordinary” women (who are read by millions) to interpret the messages they have 
already circulated about mental illness. My research is rooted in textual analysis, thus I make no 
formal claims regarding these authors’ abilities to alter their readers’ attitudes and behaviors. I 
seek rather to clarify the arguments their stories make, directly or indirectly, for it is self-evident 
that famous memoirs affect dominant discourse about mental illness. The memoir genre’s claim 
to truthfulness ensures that readerly investment in these books differs dramatically from that in 
fiction texts: our common acceptance of the “autobiographical pact” means that, despite the 
obvious creative and constructed qualities of memoirs, readers receive them as true stories about 
real people who inhabit the same external world we do (see Lejeune, 1989). In other words, 
according to Couser (2011a), the memoir genre “seeks to exert leverage (force) on reality. . . . It 
has, or aspires to have, more traction (pulling power) than fiction” (p. 170). Autobiographical 
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writing has long been valued by social justice advocates for enabling oppressed groups to record 
untold “histories of violence” in human voices that persuasively “compel readers to negotiate 
identification and witnessing” (Gilmore, 2010, p. 659). In the wake of the 1990s memoir boom, 
the American publishing industry boasts ever more opportunities to write and consume stories of 
marginality and thereby induce empathy, action, and paradigm shifts. If the narratives circulating 
in famous memoirs both reflect and (ultimately) constitute widespread perceptions of mental 
illness, it is crucial to understand the stories they tell—and do not tell—about Mad Genius. 
To preface my chapter summaries below, I should finally note that studying personal 
accounts of mental illness against the rhetorical authority of science and medicine is even more 
critical in the wake of the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of Prozac (fluoxetine) in 
1987. The first in a class of psychopharmaceuticals now known as selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs), Prozac all but revolutionized American psychiatry in the early 1990s. In his 
best-selling pop science book Listening to Prozac: A Psychiatrist Explores Antidepressant Drugs 
and the Remaking of the Self, Kramer (1993) writes that Prozac “led to changes in the way 
psychiatrists see patients and the way patients see themselves” due to its high efficacy, few side 
effects, and “clean” operation on a specific brain chemical (p. 66). Never had there been so much 
support for the belief that mental states were determined by one’s brain chemistry, and those who 
seek treatment for mental illness in a post-SSRI world are essentially obligated to reckon with 
biological psychiatry in some fashion. To be clear, not every author in my archive has taken 
SSRIs: their books’ varying portrayals of psy- science research and biological psychiatry are 
discussed in greater detail within each body chapter. Still, I contend that the discovery of Prozac 
reverberates through all mental illness memoirs of the 1990s onwards. Scientific and social 
progress since that era, as opposed to anti-psychiatry (social constructionist) sentiments of the 
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1960s, has enabled mentally ill women to “experience madness as something more than a label 
attached to difference” and find validation of their pain under systems that historically oppressed 
them (Caminero-Santangelo, 1998, p. 51). Yet psychiatry’s growing preoccupation with biology 
erases enduring sociocultural factors—such as Mad Genius rhetoric—that still inevitably shape 
people’s subjective experiences of mental illness. To recover the context of “madness” and 
“genius” both in and out of psy- science fields, I pivot to autobiographical narratives. 
Causes or Effects: Overview of the Four Case Studies 
The first body chapter of this dissertation analyzes Susanna Kaysen’s Girl, Interrupted 
(1993), a book published in 1993 and adapted into an Academy Award-winning film in 1999, 
although it is set in the women’s ward of the famous McLean Hospital during the late 1960s. I 
proceed from a review of prominent art/artist-related topoi as documented by modern media fans 
on TV Tropes, the internet’s largest existing pop culture wiki. Collectively, cultural stereotypes 
about art/artists capture what I call the Tortured Artist topos: the notion that extraordinary gifts 
and talents lead to madness. Reading Girl, Interrupted for insights into the Tortured Artist topos, 
I show how the text connects Kaysen’s core writerly identity to her ambiguous journey into, and 
eventually out of, psychiatric illness and hospitalization. Kaysen’s portrayal of her borderline 
personality disorder as the price of her exceptionality as a gifted young woman writer—and as a 
disorder she apparently abandons when artistic fulfillment is finally feasible—can be understood, 
in my analysis, as a rebuttal to the notion that madness is chronic and incurable.  
Kay Redfield Jamison’s An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness (1995) lies 
at the center of my second body chapter. As an accomplished psychiatrist and scholar, Jamison is 
highly invested in the notion that her manic-depressive illness (MDI) has a genetic and biological 
basis; An Unquiet Mind also repeatedly, unambiguously asserts that MDI is linked to special 
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gifts and talents. The notion that madness confers genius is, in this study, designated as the 
Brainiac topos. With a glance at influential scientific research on this topos—to which Jamison 
herself has personally dedicated a great deal of her career—I show how articles published by one 
of the most widely-read pop science magazines in the world (Psychology Today) continue to 
popularize the notion that the Brainiac topos is scientific fact. Next, I explore how Jamison’s 
memoir presents a model of coping with mental illness specifically through one’s engagement 
with scientific research and theories. By depicting both madness and genius as scientifically 
tangible, verifiable traits, Jamison seems to adapt age-old Mad Genius stereotypes for credibility 
in a post-SSRI age. I suggest that her portrayal of her special talents (e.g., her professional 
productivity) as a consequence of her mental illness is closely tied to the threats her illness poses 
to her positions of power in the many academic, medical, and social institutions that shape her 
life story. Through her enactment of a Brainiac persona all throughout An Unquiet Mind, 
Jamison implicitly challenges the notion that individuals with mental illness are irrational. 
Chapter three attends to Nana-Ama Danquah’s Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman’s 
Journey Through Depression (1998), a text of slightly lesser fame than the others in this project 
but one that wields equal (or greater) influence over current cultural discourse about mental 
illness. Approaching Mad Genius rhetoric as a means of building ethos before non-mentally ill 
audiences, it is in this chapter that I draw most heavily from the academic subfield of mental 
health rhetoric—for scholars in this emerging field all but unanimously cite ethos as the foremost 
concern of mentally ill rhetors. To contextualize my discussion of Danquah’s life story, I draw 
from an archive of wildly popular, deceptively autobiographical songs by/for young women in 
the American music industry since the early 2000s, identifying the Survivor topos as the notion 
that extraordinarily traumatic experiences build extraordinarily good character. In other words, it 
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is the belief that madness and genius share a common source in external trauma. My reading 
shows how Willow Weep for Me constructs the author’s persona as a paradigmatic Survivor—in 
essence, an expert at survival—through its focus on the extremity of Danquah’s life events, the 
role of such traumas in her development of depression, and the excellent personal character she 
seems to have built along the way. Highlighting her continuous survival against the odds, 
Danquah frames her traumas as proof of her exceptional strength, thus affirming the value of her 
writing before readers she expects to associate her illness with personal weakness. 
In my fourth and final chapter, I investigate Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation: Young 
and Depressed in America (1994) alongside a century’s worth of psychology research on the 
alleged correlation between childhood giftedness and mental illness. According to the Ex-Gifted 
Kid topos, the psychological roots of madness and genius are essentially innate and inextricable: 
each one can be interpreted as both a cause and effect of the other. I trace the Ex-Gifted Kid 
topos through early 1900s research on high-IQ children, feminist psychology studies of “gifted 
girl” dilemmas during the 1970s onwards, and contemporary meme culture on Instagram and 
other social media platforms. Reading Prozac Nation for insights into the Ex-Gifted Kid topos, I 
suggest that Wurtzel’s enactment of an Ex-Gifted Kid persona in this text is a means of coping 
with both mental health stigma and, more implicitly, her experiences of societal sexism as a 
high-achieving young girl. In conflating Wurtzel’s thwarted gifted girlhood with her lifelong 
struggle with depression, Prozac Nation seems to challenge the belief that mentally ill persons 
are burdensome, even wicked people. On the contrary, Wurtzel conveys that the misery an Ex-
Gifted Kid endures is far greater than any pain they might inflict on others. 
The conclusion of this project examines the collective significance of the four preceding 
studies, pondering what is at stake (and for whom) in the widespread circulation of Mad Genius 
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rhetoric through best-selling memoirs and other popular media. Honoring the role that creative 
cultural artifacts play in countless women’s processes of recovering from mental illness—and 
reckoning with the contours of Mad Genius rhetoric that remain to be explored—I imagine a 
future in which engaging with Mad Genius rhetoric might not be so appealing to persons in 
distress. Writing and reading so-called “romanticized” accounts of mental illness probably does 
have therapeutic effects for individual persons, but this dissertation as a whole should challenge 
the notion that such widely accepted coping mechanisms are natural, inevitable, or superior to 









CHAPTER 1: MADNESS, INTERRUPTED:  
ARTIFACTS OF A TORTURED ARTIST 
 
Madness: it’s nice work if you can get it. Or at least, it used to be. In Arthur Frank’s 
foundational study of illness narratives, The Wounded Storyteller, he suggests the paradigmatic 
“madness” memoir of the 1990s initially arose from its author’s wishes—as a world-famous 
novelist—to dispel unsavory rumors about a mysterious career hiatus during the 1980s (1995, p. 
120). Indeed, William Styron’s Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness not only helped Styron 
“squelch” rumors about his supposed alcoholism and deteriorating talent (Frank, 1995, p. 120); it 
effectively revived his career, ushering in a new era of American publishing in which memoirs of 
psychological disorder could draw unprecedented amounts of money, fame, and critical acclaim 
even for previously unheard-of authors. According to Zimmerman (2007), the publication of 
Darkness Visible “marks the launching point of the depression narrative as a definable and 
culturally important literary category” (p. 465), and other authors with other mental illnesses 
quickly followed suit. There have been no apparent limits on the range of clinical diagnoses and 
personal dilemmas identified as “madness” in the history of literature, as is illustrated in the titles 
of several best-selling memoirs: Styron’s title refers to depression, but Kay Redfield Jamison’s 
An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness (1995) addresses her experiences with 
bipolar disorder, Elyn Saks’s The Center Cannot Hold: My Journey Through Madness (2007) is 
a memoir of schizophrenia, and Susannah Cahalan’s Brain on Fire: My Month of Madness 
(2012) details her diagnosis with a rare form of encephalitis. Countless other authors either 
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identify with madness in the body of their famous memoirs about mental illness or else pointedly 
explain why they decline to do so.1 What is it about madness that moves so many writers to 
claim it as their own? Or is it, as one is so often led to believe, that madness claims the writer?  
Styron wrote his story of depression in hopes of conveying the seriousness of its 
“inexplicable agony” and, consequently, challenging the stigma against those who have endured 
it (Styron, 1990, p. 84). The resulting text is positioned as an intellectual project: one that might 
“establish a frame of reference out of which one or more valuable conclusions might be drawn” 
(p. 34). But alongside its overt humanitarian and educational aims, Darkness Visible interweaves 
a vision of the illness rather less pragmatic than the narration here purports to be. Styron’s 
objections to the very word “depression,” for example, seem to issue from his belief that this 
term is not exciting enough to capture the specialness of his condition: he judges it as “bland,” 
insufficiently “evocative,” full of “insipidity,” lacking “any magisterial presence,” and “a true 
wimp of a word” (p. 37). Through criticisms that contrast the banality and passivity (not to 
mention effeminacy) of the word “depression” with the awesome power he ascribes to his own 
subjective experience of it, Styron subtly romanticizes mental illness (the titular “darkness”) 
even as he envisions his memoir rendering it more “visible.” Here and elsewhere, this landmark 
memoir reveals its author’s loyalty to an age-old cult of madness and mad people that permeates 
literary artifacts about mental illness dating back to classical antiquity. 
The notion that persons with mental illness are set apart from other humans by their 
psychic extremity is both implicit in the statements above and explicit in myriad other moments 
 
1For example, Elizabeth Wurtzel writes towards the end of Prozac Nation: “I have studiously 
tried to avoid ever using the word madness to describe my condition. Now and again, the word 
slips out, but I hate it. Madness is too glamorous a term to convey what happens to most people 
who are losing their minds” (1995, p. 294). 
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of Darkness Visible. Comparing the intensity of his emotions against those of “healthy people” 
(p. 17), Styron stresses others’ “basic inability. . . to imagine a form of torment so alien to 
everyday experience” as depression (p. 35). Clearly, he is not urging his readers to develop 
mental illness, secure this elusive imaginative ability, and thereby access exotic realms of 
experience that transcend the everyday. On the contrary, he hints that average humans—with 
average minds—are unlikely to know the exquisite misery of mental illness: 
it has been demonstrated with fair convincingness that artistic types (especially 
poets) are particularly vulnerable to the disorder. . . . Just a few of these fallen 
artists, all modern, make up a sad but scintillant roll call. . . . When one thinks of 
these doomed and splendidly creative men and women, one is drawn to 
contemplate their childhoods. . . . could any of them have had a hint, then? (p. 35) 
 
Crafting a fairly conventional endorsement of Mad Genius rhetoric—what I am terming more 
specifically in this chapter as the “Tortured Artist” topos—Styron cites a list of twenty well-
regarded artists who died by suicide between the years of 1890 and 1980. According to Styron, 
the link between artistic personality and madness is so strong it all but determined these figures’ 
fates: despite the remarkably diverse circumstances of their deaths, their suicides retroactively 
confirm to Styron that they were always doomed to die for art. Importantly, the passage’s solemn 
tone seems less reflective of his grief over these artists’ so-called falls than of his admiration for 
the great heights from which they fell: their deaths are dramatized not just because they died by 
suicide, but because they are “fallen artists,” “sad but scintillant,” and “doomed but splendidly 
creative.” Evidently, these are artists for whom life-threatening mental illness was the price of 
exceptionality, and they paid it in full. Thus Styron’s claim that it “has been demonstrated” (by 
whom, and how?) “with fair convincingness” (according to whom?) that artists are prone to 
mental illness is, finally, self-sustaining: it is Styron who reinforces the Tortured Artist topos, 
both in his assertion of its veracity and in his construction of his own Tortured Artist persona 
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throughout his memoir. It is Styron who is “convinced,” and presumably, so too will be the 
audience of Darkness Visible. After all, the madness depicted in this enormously popular book is 
not an invention of the author’s imagination—this is a true, autobiographical account. 
Inspired by some of the most popular narratives of mental illness in mid- to late-twentieth 
century American culture, this chapter examines how the Tortured Artist topos—defined here as 
the notion that genius leads to madness—is invoked in autobiographical works by “mad” writers 
as a means of reconciling their apparent artistic ability with their experiences of severe, chronic 
psychic pain. Whereas Caminero-Santangelo (1998) argues in The Madwoman Can’t Speak that 
“Madwoman” literary symbolism confers an “illusion of power . . . whose only outcome must be 
greater powerlessness” (p. 3), I suggest that Tortured Artist identity provides an illusion of 
reconciliation between genius and madness that can only lead to greater ambivalence. To ground 
my discussion, I analyze Susanna Kaysen’s 1993 memoir Girl, Interrupted, a famous account of 
psychiatric institutionalization that features a woman writer as its protagonist, though she is 
rarely recognized as such by scholars. I illuminate how this text draws on Tortured Artist 
discourse, arguing it depicts Kaysen’s psychiatric career largely as a product of her innate artistic 
ambitions. In other words, Kaysen’s madness seems to be the price she paid for her 
exceptionality as a gifted young woman who aspired to be a writer in the 1960s. 
Following an overview of Tortured Artist discourse as it is captured in a modern archive 
of pop culture topoi, I situate Girl, Interrupted both in Kaysen’s entire oeuvre and in the cultural 
milieu that shaped (and was shaped by) her best-selling memoir. Here I elucidate my choice to 
read this text as a literary artifact rather than pure fiction or non-fiction, and when I subsequently 
review existing scholarly studies of this book, I loosely divide them into analyses that read Girl, 
Interrupted as a psychiatric case study versus those that approach it as a critique of psychiatry in 
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literary form. Through close readings of Girl, Interrupted, concentrating on the relationship 
between Kaysen’s core writerly identity and her ambiguous journey in and out of mental illness, 
I illuminate how this memoir engages with the Tortured Artist topos. To conclude, I imagine 
alternatives to Tortured Artist discourse that grapple with the chronicity of mental illness, 
recognizing both the enduring comforts drawn from this topos and the long-term dangers of 
constructing madness as a symbol of extraordinary creativity. 
Eccentric, Starving, Mad, Disillusioned, Angsty, Dead: Tortured Artists in Pop Culture 
The origins of Tortured Artist mythology are, inevitably, unclear. Some would say the 
sheer ubiquity of the Tortured Artist topos in various cultures is proof that it must be true—it is 
not so much a stereotype as it is a clear historical fact. And as I discuss in my next chapter, an 
ever-growing body of research by twentieth and twenty-first century scientists has attempted to 
establish a link between (measurable) creativity and (diagnosable) mental illness. But by a large 
margin, the most common method of validating the Tortured Artist topos has been to search the 
annals of art and literary history. Believers tend to cite auto/biographical facts about real artists, 
especially records of now-famous artists who died by suicide, to support the notion that artistic 
genius predisposes one to madness. Moreover, cultural artifacts themselves—especially literary 
works—play an increasingly critical role in circulating Tortured Artist discourses. As Darkness 
Visible illustrates, narratives that are simultaneously creative and “true” can wield a great deal of 
influence over audience’s perceptions of the subject matter, particularly when those narratives 
are widely read. Both reflective and, eventually, constitutive of popular discourse about art and 
madness, autobiographical works by famous (or soon-to-be famous) writers may well be the 
most crucial artifacts of Tortured Artist identity in the American social imaginary. 
On the website TV Tropes, the broadest and most highly-trafficked pop culture wiki 
currently on the internet, thousands of users have been collaboratively editing and adding to a 
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catalog of pop culture topoi since 2004. As of June 2020, the TV Tropes catalog comprises 
29,365 discrete topos pages; subpages have been generated to detail topos appearing in 83,220 
different works by 8,639 creators (“Page Type Counts,” n.d.). Although the wiki originated as an 
index of television topos, it now invites contributions across twenty-four different media 
categories: films, comics, literature, animation, music, television, theater, video games, and 
many more (“Administrivia: Media Categories,” n.d.). As this list suggests, TV Tropes’s focus is 
on “works of art” (“Tropes,” n.d., para. 1), and its administrators identify it as a resource for 
analyzing narrative. By TV Tropes’s definition, a topos (what they call a “trope”) is “a 
storytelling device or convention, a shortcut for describing situations the storyteller can 
reasonably assume the audience will recognize” (“Tropes,” n.d., para. 2).2 Foundational to TV 
Tropes’s enterprise is the idea that “[topoi] are tools” (“Tropes,” n.d., para. 2)—neither 
inherently good nor bad, topoi are standard narrative devices that help artists tell stories their 
audiences can follow. For this reason, contributors are instructed to discuss topoi solely through 
descriptive, non-value laden language (“Administrivia: Prescriptive vs. Descriptive Language,” 
n.d., para. 1). The website strives to be “accessible and fun to read” (“Administrivia: The Goals 
of TV Tropes,” n.d., para. 3), urging users “to celebrate fiction, not bash it” (“Administrivia: TV 
Tropes Customs,” n.d., para. 8) and write “for the reader. . . . not about you or for you (“This 
Troper,” n.d., para. 1).” Above all, it is stressed that the website’s “primary purpose. . . is to 
catalog [topoi]” for fans’ learning and enjoyment, “because fans will be fans, and we are all fans 
of something” (“Administrivia: TV Tropes Customs,” n.d., para. 7). 
 
2As is increasingly common in modern parlance, TV Tropes uses the word “trope” as a near-
synonym for a cultural motif, theme, cliché, or what rhetoricians call topos. To avoid confusion 
in this chapter, I will continue to use the terms topos/topoi, marking those substitutions 
accordingly when I quote directly from the wiki. 
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I have chosen to anchor this chapter’s articulation of the Tortured Artist topos in TV 
Tropes’s wiki in order to provide a novel, comprehensive analysis of the ways in which art/artists 
are associated with madness in modern culture. In doing so, I wish to illustrate the enormous 
presence these clichés have had—and still have, even in one of the most current sources I could 
possibly consult—in the American social imaginary. By my count, TV Tropes hosts pages for at 
least eleven discrete topoi elaborating on the premise that artists are fundamentally, and often 
distressingly, different from non-artists (“Art Tropes,” n.d.).3 Two of these take a neutral stance 
on the archetypal artist’s emotional health, focusing on portrayals of artists as highly unusual 
individuals whose works are inscrutable to ordinary people. These topoi are the “Eccentric 
Artist” type—artist characters who “don’t conform to social norms” (para. 1) because “to do so 
would stifle their creativity” (para. 3) (n.d.)—and the associated stereotype that “True Art is 
Incomprehensible” (n.d.). Another topos, “Artists are Attractive,” describes the deceptively 
positive cliché “that artists. . . have higher levels of compassion/insight/patience than the 
‘average Joe’” and therefore appeal to potential romantic partners (n.d., para. 2). However, this 
topos page also clarifies that such characters’ desirability often stems more from others’ 
perceptions that they are “tortured or vulnerable” or “a rebel” than from their actual behavior 
(“Artists are Attractive,” n.d., para. 2). Not surprisingly, then, the large majority of TV Tropes’s 
art/artist-related topoi revolve around the archetypal artist’s unhappiness, and each one explicitly 
links the artist’s distress to their exceptionality. Furthermore, as I will demonstrate below, the 
examples provided by TV Tropes users almost always feature artists from “Real Life.”4 
 
3Here I wish to mention that, although I am often an avid reader of TV Tropes, I have never 
personally created or contributed to any of the pages I discuss in this chapter. 
 
4There is some inconsistency in the cataloging of “Real Life” examples on TV Tropes: some 
topos pages include “Real Life” examples alongside fiction examples under the same medium, 
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In depictions of the “Starving Artist” archetype, the artist is “talented but cash-deprived” 
because society fails to recognize their abilities (n.d., para 3). It is noted on the topos page that 
“Due to several influential artists having historically been starving artists, . . . these portrayals are 
often quite romantic” (para. 3), and the Real Life examples provided include painter Henri de 
Toulouse-Lautrec, writer Jules Verne, and musician Kurt Cobain. But according to another 
topos, one way an artist might ascend from obscurity is to do “outrageous and sociopathic things 
in public either as art, or so that people will pay attention to their art” (“Mad Artist,” n.d., para. 
2)—in contrast to the Eccentric Artist cited above, who defies social norms in mostly harmless 
ways, the “Mad Artist” archetype focuses on artists who will engage in “the most grotesque, evil 
things” in order to express their creativity (“Laconic: Mad Artist” n.d., para.1). For example, the 
“Muse Abuse” topos addresses artists who selfishly exploit their personal lives to make art even 
“to the serious detriment of the people around them” (n.d., para. 2). Dispersed across the Muse 
Abuse page are variegated examples of Real Life creators—novelist A. A. Milne, cartoonist 
Hank Ketcham, radio personality Howard Stern, and more—whose works allegedly poisoned 
their relationships with loved ones. That being said, TV Tropes’ usage of the Mad Artist topos 
entails that such a character’s madness is both evil and largely circumstantial: as “The right-brain 
equivalent to the Mad Scientist” (para. 2), the Mad Artist’s “descent into madness” is largely 
triggered by external factors (e.g., “a shunning from the community or a dismissal of his work”), 
and the consequences are deadly (para. 5) (“Mad Artist,” n.d.). Due to both the villainy of the 
Mad Artist archetype and its established lack of connection to diagnosable mental illnesses in the 
real world, TV Tropes users are prohibited from adding Real Life examples to this page. 
 
some list “Real Life” as a discrete medium with its own examples, and some split the entire 
topos page into “Fiction” (or “In-Universe”) examples versus “Real Life” examples with 
subdivisions by medium. 
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The edit history for the Mad Artist page on TV Tropes shows that it used to contain 
nearly eighty user-generated examples—some of which referred to an entire school, movement, 
or genre—of Real Life artists who supposedly embodied this topos (“History: Mad Artist,” 
n.d.).5 Unfortunately for the users who added those examples, TV Tropes bans Real Life entries 
on certain of its topos pages, including those that would assign moral value to real life contexts 
as well as those that amount to unsubstantiated gossip (“No Real Life Examples, Please!,” n.d.). 
Consequently, the entire Real Life section of the Mad Artist page was deleted by a TV Tropes 
user in 2015 because, in their words, “Real life examples would be a bit too controversial” 
(“History: Mad Artist,” n.d., edit no. 1947539). This is not to say the Mad Artist topos page 
entirely rejects the notion that artistry is linked to madness; it surely entertains that possibility, 
affirming “There is an element of Truth in Television with this [topos]” because “The list of 
creative people who have exhibited symptoms of mental illness is inexhaustible” (n.d., para. 7). 
Nonetheless, a semi-hidden text note embedded in the topos description clarifies that this topos 
“is controversial, and evidence exists that the link between creativity and insanity is 
exaggerated” (para. 7). It is further emphasized that “most Real Life Mad Artists aren’t 
violent”—nor, presumably, evil—and “They’re much more prone to Angst (para. 7). 
That artists of all varieties are destined to be “angsty” is a stereotype supported by nearly 
all the art/artist-related topoi on TV Tropes. Whereas the Eccentric, Starving, and Mad Artist 
archetypes all emphasize the artist’s devotion to their craft even while facing an indifferent 
 
5A brief sampling of this list includes painters Richard Dadd, Salvador Dali, Francisco Goya, and 
Andy Warhol; writers William S. Burroughs, Philip K. Dick, James Ellroy, Alan Moore, 
Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, Marquis de Sade, and Oscar Wilde; poets Gu Cheng, Émile 
Nelligan, and Ezra Pound; filmmakers Alfred Hitchock, Werner Herzog, and George Lucas; and 
musicians Syd Barrett, Michael Jackson, Daniel Johnston, Lady Gaga, and Kanye West (“Mad 
Artist: History,” n.d., edit no. 1947539). 
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audience, the “Reclusive Artist” archetype centers on rich and/or famous artists who isolate 
themselves from others “as a result of Artist Disillusionment” (n.d., para. 2)—that is, the artist’s 
tendency to “suffer and become quite disillusioned” with art when their so-called “dream job” 
fails to live up to their idealist expectations (“Artist Disillusionment, n.d., para. 3). In extreme 
cases of Artist Disillusionment, this topos is said to lead to “Creator Breakdown” (n.d., para. 10), 
another topos that occurs when a “creator’s real life unpleasantness is integrated into their work” 
(“Laconic: Creator Breakdown,” n.d., para. 1). The Creator Breakdown page insists that artists 
“are just like anyone else” and thus prone to universal human tragedies—some of the Real Life 
“breakdowns” listed were seemingly unrelated to the artists’ work, such as those that followed a 
family member’s death (n.d., para. 3). But on the whole, the Creator Breakdown topos page 
indicates that artists’ breakdowns are not like those of ordinary people: when artists experience 
excessive angst, “they have someone to take it out on—[their] fictional characters” (“Creator 
Breakdown,” n.d., para. 3). That is, artists can channel their angst directly back into the 
profession that “broke” them in the first place, perhaps prolonging both in the process. 
Accordingly, the Creator Breakdown description positions breakdowns as a fairly natural, even 
desirable part of the creative process, claiming “some [TV] shows have achieved their highest 
ratings. . . in the middle of a bout of Creator Breakdown,” and therefore “it would be hard to 
argue that angst can’t help you make some really good art” (n.d., para. 4). 
As on other art/artist-related topos pages in this wiki, contributors to the Reclusive Artist, 
Artist Disillusionment, and Creator Breakdown pages cite dozens of Real Life artists whose lives 
supposedly followed these patterns of suffering in order to make great art.6 Collectively 
 
6In addition to some of the artists already cited above, these pages currently list (e.g.) writers 
Arthur Conan Doyle, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Stephen King, and J. D. Salinger; filmmakers 
Darren Aronofksy, Federico Fellini, and Alan Parker; comedian Dave Chappelle; and musicians 
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normalizing—and often glamorizing—artistic angst, these topoi reify another vital topos: the 
idea that “True Art is Angsty.” True Art is Angsty posits that only creations with tragic or 
cynical content can be properly classified as art, whereas “Anything with an unambiguously 
Happy Ending is a piece of cheap boring commercial tripe or even propaganda” (“True Art is 
Angsty,” n.d, para. 2.). Simply put, if prevailing pop culture stereotypes depict an array of 
“tortured” states as the proper destiny of gifted artists, it would follow that only “tortured” 
creations deserve the highest praise and recognition. Because this topos assumes some creators 
artificially infuse their work with angst for angst’s sake (and therefore “should be mocked as 
pretentious and elitist”), this page excludes Real Life examples (“True Art,” n.d., para. 1). Still, 
the troubling real-world implications of this topos are not lost on TV Tropes users: taken to an 
extreme, its equation of existential pain with artistic ability feeds directly into the topos that 
“Dead Artists Are Better.” The belief that dead artists are praised more than living ones is, 
according to TV Tropes, supported by the fact that “this has happened in many cases” (“Dead 
Artists,” n.d., para. 2). In the case of tragic or untimely death (“dying at their peak”), specifically, 
a dead artist’s legacy is preserved because “they don’t have the time to taint their earlier 
successes. . . with divisive later works” (“Dead Artists,” n.d., para. 3). As one would expect, the 
Real Life section of this topos page lists a host of celebrated artists who died by suicide, such as 
actor Robin Williams, writer David Foster Wallace, and musician Ian Curtis. 
In sum, the pop culture fans who frequent TV Tropes have catalogued a multitude of 
topoi, creators, and artifacts that perpetuate a set of cultural clichés I am calling (altogether) the 
Tortured Artist topos. Although each topos page conveys its own nuance about the role of 
 
Karen Carpenter, George Harrison, Lauryn Hill, George Michael, Roger Waters, and Brian 
Wilson. Many of these artists are cited on multiple pages—for example, Dave Chappelle, George 
Harrison, and Lauryn Hill are cited as examples of all three of these topos. 
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art/artists in storytelling, they converge in their association of artist identity with experiences of 
extraordinary distress: together, they affirm that madness, angst, and even death are necessary 
costs of realizing one’s creative gifts. Moreover, nearly every page’s claims are supported with 
lists of real artists whose life stories apparently conform to Tortured Artist molds, and those lists 
are ever growing. For TV Tropes’s purposes, auto/biographical information about these artists 
should only matter insofar as it helps explain how audiences come to recognize Tortured Artist 
topoi and how storytellers employ them. That is, this wiki is less concerned with analyzing why 
certain topoi exist than with documenting how they exist. But in its constant addition of new 
examples or revisions to old examples—while noticeably struggling to differentiate between 
Real Life and fiction—TV Tropes illuminates the ongoing process through which media and 
reality are mutually constructed. Exposing the artifice of art, this wiki raises (but does not 
answer) questions about the evolving significance of artist biographies in contemporary culture. 
What does it mean for a real person’s life story to represent both the foundation of a supposedly 
factual, historical record and the culmination of an aesthetic, narrative cliché? 
If I expand my scope beyond this contemporary wiki, I find threads of Tortured Artist 
mythology constantly resurfacing in human arts history—the names change, but the basic 
fascination with unhappy artists endures. For example, Paul Verlaine popularized the term poète 
maudit (“accursed poet”) in 1884, honoring gifted poets who had been rejected by mainstream 
society (Burch, 1961). Psychiatrist Hans Prinzhorn’s landmark 1922 book about artists with 
schizophrenia, Bildnerei der Geisteskranken (Artistry of the Mentally Ill), influenced painter Jean 
Dubuffet’s founding of the Art Brut (“Raw Art” or “Outsider Art”) movement in 1948 (Thévoz, 
1976, pp. 34-35). The premature deaths of several young, famous musicians from 1969 to 1971 
sparked popular fascination with a so-called “27 Club,” the notoriety of which was cemented 
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after Kurt Cobain’s 1994 suicide at the age of 27 (Sounes, 2013). And as recently as 2012, 
journalist Christopher Zara published a collection of brief artist biographies titled Tortured 
Artists: From Picasso and Monroe to Warhol and Winehouse, the Twisted Secrets of the World’s 
Most Creative Minds in which he argues “The connection between pain and art—i.e., the 
tortured-artist phenomenon—is probably as old as art itself” (p. 10). None of these events proves 
that artists are, in fact, at an increased risk of developing mental illness. What they do reveal is 
popular audiences’ intense preoccupation with Tortured Artist discourse in the process of telling 
artists’ life stories. Still to be determined are the effects of this topos on the stories artists tell 
about themselves; that is where this chapter’s analysis of Girl, Interrupted intervenes. 
Susanna Kaysen’s Facts, Fictions, and Girl, Interrupted 
So prominent in late 1990s American pop culture was Girl, Interrupted that its premise 
may need little introduction. This 170-page memoir recounts a relatively brief period of author 
Susanna Kaysen’s life: the 18 months she spent in treatment at McLean Hospital, a famed 
psychiatric institution in New England, during the late 1960s. Born in 1948 as the daughter of a 
prominent economist, Kaysen was voluntarily admitted to McLean in 1967 at age 18 following 
several years of unhappiness, self-harming, and a suicide attempt at age 16. In one of the most 
memorable moments of Girl, Interrupted, Kaysen states that the psychiatrist who referred her for 
hospitalization did so after interviewing her for only 20 minutes (1994, p. 71). Unbeknownst to 
Kaysen, a doctor at McLean diagnosed her with “Borderline Personality,” an experimental 
diagnosis that would not be officially catalogued in the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) until 1980 (see Wirth-Cauchon, 
2000, p. 145). Kaysen’s treatments for this disorder included daily individual therapy, weekly 
group therapy, and a fluctuating intake of medication. It is strongly suggested toward the end of 
Girl, Interrupted that Kaysen’s acceptance of a marriage proposal was the deciding factor in her 
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doctors’ decision to release her: “Luckily, I got a marriage proposal and they let me out” (1994, 
p. 133). Her full-time residence at McLean ended in 1968 when she was 19 years old, and she 
was officially discharged from the hospital in 1969 at the age of 20. 
Decades after Kaysen left McLean, she began writing short pieces inspired by her 
recollections of the hospital, eventually enlisting a lawyer’s help in gaining access to her old 
medical records. Selections from a project titled “Toward a Topography of the Parallel Universe” 
were printed in the literary periodicals Ploughshares, AGNI, and The Boston Review during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Those stories were narrated from the perspective of unnamed female 
protagonist who had spent time in a psychiatric institution; one editor who published Kaysen’s 
work described her portrayal of the “foster-sisterhood of the mental ward” as a collection of 
“chilling, simple declarative sentences that purport to be pitiless [but] evoke . . . an enormously 
sympathetic shiver” (Kumin, 1988, p. 12). In each of these early publications, Kaysen’s stories 
were billed as fiction. But ultimately, the title “Toward a Topography of the Parallel Universe” 
would be given to the opening chapter of Kaysen’s first memoir, an explicitly autobiographical 
book. Although she had previously published two novels of modest success, Kaysen’s memoir 
was a smash hit—an early icon (and partial catalyst) of the 1990s memoir boom, a New York 
Times best-seller for eleven weeks in hardcover and sixty-one weeks in paperback (NYT Book 
Review, 1993, 2000), and the source text for a 1999 Academy Award-winning film starring 
Winona Ryder. That book is, of course, Girl, Interrupted. 
Beyond its frank discussion of a highly stigmatized topic, Kaysen’s memoir drew 
attention from popular audiences for its unconventional construction. For example, although 
Kaysen knew little about her specific diagnosis and treatments while she was at McLean, these 
facts are known to readers from the very first page of Girl, Interrupted—this shows a facsimile 
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of Kaysen’s “Case Record Folder” from the day she was admitted (p. 3), and numerous other 
private documents dated 1967 to 1973 appear throughout the text with little-to-no commentary 
from the author. These documents, Kaysen’s minimalist narration, and her noticeably dry sense 
of humor are some of her memoir’s defining qualities—readers learn almost as much about her 
fellow patients at the hospital as we do about her life before or after McLean. Girl, Interrupted is 
also remembered for its distinct narrative structure, which was atypical for an autobiographical 
text at that time. Rather than using traditional numbered chapters and recording her life story in 
chronological order, Kaysen wrote a series of non-linear vignettes ranging in length from one to 
11 pages; each one is given a distinctive, often cryptic title. Notably, one section of the book 
simply cites the diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder as printed in the DSM-III 
(p. 147-149), and the following chapter consists of Kaysen’s point-by-point response to those 
“charges” (p. 150). She suggests, for instance, that the diagnosis she received is sexist in its 
pathologization of activities “commonly associated with women” and probable judgment of 
sexually active women as “compulsively promiscuous” (p. 158). For this reason and others, as I 
will discuss further in the next section of this study, Girl, Interrupted as whole is very often 
characterized as a 1990s feminist critique of 1960s psychiatry. 
Few would dispute that Girl, Interrupted is Kaysen’s most widely celebrated work thus 
far—but although it was her first memoir, this book was hardly her first foray into literature. Nor 
was it the first (or last) of her projects to grapple with the consequences of life narrative and, in 
doing so, draw intermittently from the author’s personal experiences. Prior to the publication of 
Girl, Interrupted in June 1993, Kaysen’s fiction novels Asa, As I Knew Him (1987) and Far 
Afield (1990) had been published to fairly positive reviews, and each generated speculation 
among critics as to how much it was based on her own life. Praising the emotional intimacy and 
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verisimilitude of Asa, As I Knew Him, a novel-within-a-novel about the young narrator Dinah’s 
affair with an older married man, critic Jonathan Kirsch of The Los Angeles Times wrote: “I was 
repeatedly tempted to believe it is largely autobiographical, that Susanna Kaysen is Dinah” 
(1987, p.16). Kaysen’s second novel, Far Afield, follows an anthropology student though a year 
of his doctoral research on the Faroe Islands; this book was soon recognized as a vague sketch of 
Kaysen’s own experiences living on the Faroes with her former husband (an anthropologist) in 
the early 1970s. And in the years since Girl, Interrupted catapulted Kaysen to fame, she has 
published one more memoir, The Camera My Mother Gave Me (2001)—an account of chronic 
vaginal pain and its effects on her relationships—and a heavily autobiographical (by Kaysen’s 
admission) novel about her childhood, titled Cambridge (2014). 
Kaysen’s works vary widely in their plots and themes, but they share a common 
disinterest in strict divisions between fiction and non-fiction. Although she became famous for 
her self-disclosures about such taboo topics as mental illness and vulvodynia, in Kaysen’s 
interactions with the press throughout the 2000s, she repeatedly stressed her right to withhold 
private information from her fans (see Igo, 2018, p. 328). According to Kaysen, the self she 
presented in her memoirs was not necessarily identical to the flesh-and-blood author, and she had 
never intended to give audiences unrestricted access to her life. Comparing readers’ questions 
about her sexual practices after The Camera My Mother Gave Me to questions she received 
about her parents after Girl, Interrupted, she told one interviewer: “Sometimes I think people 
have forgotten that memoirs are books. This isn’t a CAT scan of my emotional life, it’s an 
artifact, structured and arranged by me to provoke certain emotions in you (Penguin Random 
House, 2002, para. 7; see also Igo, 2018, p. 328). Similarly, after telling another interviewer that 
all memoirs ought to be read as “artifacts,” Kaysen explained this position as follows: 
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I don’t expect memoirs to be true in every detail. . . . What makes the facts 
interesting is that they are told in a way that resonates with somebody else’s 
experience. . . . I don’t see that much difference between writing a novel and 
writing a memoir. (Winik, 2001, para. 24; see also Adams, 2005, p. 124) 
 
These are just two of many statements Kaysen has made about the veracity of the memoir genre, 
privileging its emotional impact on the audience over the author’s obligation to share as many 
facts as they possibly can. My point in citing these comments—and tracing the theme of truth 
versus fiction across Kaysen’s entire oeuvre—is not to dismiss Girl, Interrupted’s prominence in 
pop culture on the grounds that it is full of falsehoods. What I mean is that, if I suggest that this 
memoir’s depiction of mental illness carries more symbolic meaning than scientific truth, this 
should not be taken as an affront to Kaysen. On the contrary, it may be a testament to her writing 
skill. By her own intimation, Kaysen’s goal in writing Girl, Interrupted was not to “be true in 
every detail,” but rather to share her story “in a way that resonates with somebody else’s 
experience” (Winik, 2001, para. 24). Given the vast celebrity her memoir has achieved—Bass 
(2000) wrote that Girl, Interrupted was “fast replacing [Sylvia] Plath’s The Bell Jar as a must-
read for young women in high school and college” (p. B7)—it is safe to say Kaysen has 
succeeded in speaking others’ experiences, especially those of young women. 
As I am arguing throughout this chapter, it is through cultural artifacts in general and 
auto/biographical narratives in particular that Tortured Artist discourse circulates. Kaysen may 
not see a difference between the writing of a memoir and a novel, there is most certainly a 
difference between the ways that audiences read the two. My interest in this book lies at the 
intersection of its claims on truthiness and its noticeable resonance with age-old cultural 
discourses about art and madness (and gender). If it is an artifact, then its unique insights into the 
Tortured Artist topos emerge not in spite of either its embellishments on the one hand or its 
burden of truth-telling on the other—the overlap between these factors is more interesting to me 
 
 51 
than either one alone, for this overlap is precisely what allows Kaysen make the arguments she 
wants to make. I do read Girl, Interrupted as a cultural artifact, acknowledging that it is both a 
factual record of psychiatric practices and (in my analysis) a literary argument about the Tortured 
Artist topos, and both of these rhetorical situations are a consequence of the specific time at 
which it was written. As my following section illustrates, this reading intentionally departs from 
most existing scholarly analyses of Kaysen’s story. 
True or Faulty: Scholarly Context of Girl, Interrupted 
To contextualize my reading of Girl, Interrupted, it is productive to review the ways this 
memoir has been interpreted in previous scholarly work on mental health, gender, and memoir. 
As a best-selling memoir later adapted into an Academy Award-winning film, Girl, Interrupted 
has commanded a great deal of attention from popular audiences—some would even argue the 
film’s fame has eclipsed that of its source text. Indeed, although the film’s characters and plot 
differ greatly from those of the memoir, a few scholars draw primarily (or exclusively) from the 
film in discussions of Kaysen’s story (see Brickman, 2004; Chouinard, 2009; Moukaddam et al., 
2015; Wiener, 2005). Even those studies that focus entirely on Kaysen’s book often seem to be 
inspired by the film’s extensive viewership: for instance, to preface a conference paper given just 
after the film premiered, G. Thomas Couser quips, “For those who aren’t familiar with it—even 
though it is now a major motion picture starring Winona Ryder, and coming soon to your 
neighborhood theater—let me begin by briefly characterizing Girl, Interrupted” (1999, p. 1).  
It is revealing that Couser—a prominent scholar of life writing and disability studies—
never sought to publish his in-depth research on Kaysen’s memoir, although he mentions her by 
name in several later projects (see Couser, 2005, 2011b, 2016). Girl, Interrupted is frequently 
namechecked by literary and mental health scholars, but most limit their references to a sentence 
or two (see Geller & Harris, 1994, p. 326; Gould, 2008, p. 30; Pruchnic, 2008, p. 169; Seaber, 
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2016, p. 485; Schoenemen et al., 2012, p. 204; Sulzer et al., 2016, p. 8; etc.). Hence, despite the 
book’s salience in American pop culture, Longhurst (2019) observes there is still “relatively little 
in-depth critical work” on it (p. 40). The reasons for this are surely complex, but it may be that 
scholars perceive a critical consensus. Watson’s (2002) quick gloss of the book typifies its 
established interpretation in literary studies: “Susanna Kaysen’s Girl, Interrupted (1993) indicted 
the 1960s Establishment for institutionalizing her” (p. 180). Less flatteringly, Yagoda (2010) 
asserts, “Girl, Interrupted tells exactly the same kind of story of female adolescent mental illness 
as had the novelized The Bell Jar and I Never Promised You a Rose Garden some thirty years 
before” (p. 228). These impressions of the memoir as a (feminist) cultural critique, along with 
those that approach it as an educational patient narrative, represent the two leading categories of 
research on Girl, Interrupted. In what follows, I outline different threads of each position as I 
observe them in all studies known to me that mention Kaysen’s story. 
A Kaysen Study: Girl, Interrupted as Patient Narrative 
As is often the case with mental illness memoirs, numerous scholarly publications name 
Girl, Interrupted as a source of patient-centered insights into mental healthcare. Lee (2017), for 
example, juxtaposes an analysis of Girl, Interrupted and two autobiographical novels (Mary Jane 
Ward’s The Snake Pit and Joanne Greenberg’s I Never Promised You a Rose Garden) alongside 
a detailed history of the DSM, charting how this “ever-evolving diagnostic system necessarily 
affects depictions of mental healthcare” in literature (p. 193). Scholars that promote the reading 
of memoirs for counselors’ edification—arguing clinical practices improve when counselors 
learn about their profession from a patient’s perspective—often recommend Girl, Interrupted to 
colleagues (see Armstrong, 2012; Baker et al., 2008; Boyd, 1997; Clifford et al., 1999; Sommer 
et al., 1998; Smead, 1999; Whitley, 2012). Some such studies linger on Girl, Interrupted for a 
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paragraph or two, highlighting its specific value as “a warning about how closely caregivers are 
scrutinized by their charges” (Smead, 1999, p. 83) or a “remind[er]” for clinicians “to listen for 
voices that may appear to be small compared to those of psychiatry” (Boyd, 1997, p. 354). 
Nonetheless, health scholars framing Girl, Interrupted as a clinical tool tend to emphasize 
Kaysen’s diagnosis much more than humanists do. For example, Clifford et al. (1999) and 
Whitley (2012) share lists of valued memoirs organized by the disorders they depict; both point 
to Girl, Interrupted as a representative account of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). 
Despite Kaysen’s many objections to her diagnosis, a large portion of studies mentioning 
Girl, Interrupted actually center its portrayal of BPD. Sulzer et al. (2016) address this seeming 
contradiction as they cite Kaysen in research on BPD patient-clinician communication, noting 
that her critique of the DSM is “insightful, but not in disagreement about whether or not [she] 
met criteria” for BPD (p. 8). Cahn’s (2014) study of BPD literature also deems Kaysen the “most 
skeptical” of all the authors under review (p. 269), yet she affirms that Kaysen “knew [she] lived 
somewhere in between . . . reality and madness” as a teenager and thus “acknowledg[es] some 
degree of mental illness” in her memoir (p. 273). Accordingly, Baker et al. (2008) praise Girl, 
Interrupted for its ability to reduce clinicians’ bias against BPD clients—although BPD is “one 
of the most derogatory,” stigmatized disorders in the DSM due to its strong association with self-
harm (p. 22), these scholars argue literature “depathologises and rehumanises” persons with BPD 
“by going beyond symptoms and . . . trying to understand what it may be like to feel repeatedly 
compelled to cut yourself” (p. 26). Notably, Kaysen does not cut herself in Girl, Interrupted—
her chosen form of self-injury involves striking her wrist against a metal chair—yet her narrative 
is cited in several articles analyzing the prevalence of cutting behaviors in young women (see 
Berman and Wallace, 2007; Brickman, 2004; elliot, 2001). Brickman (2004) especially criticizes 
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Kaysen for failing to challenge rampant cultural stigmatization and feminization of self-harm, 
arguing that psychiatric discourse about self-harm “depends as much on myths of femininity . . . 
as the other aspects of [Kaysen’s] illness” and should be scrutinized accordingly (p. 103). In 
contrast, Berman and Wallace (2007) suggest Kaysen’s self-presentation as an “intelligent, 
sexually active, and self-injuring” young woman in Girl, Interrupted—as well as the celebrity 
she achieved afterward—runs the risk of glamorizing cutting (p. 55)—to impressionable readers, 
“the idea of self-injury might be appealing, perhaps inducing the contagion effect” (p. 56). 
Stranger than Non-Fiction: Girl, Interrupted as Cultural Critique 
 Psychologists surveyed by Clifford et al. (1999) ranked Girl, Interrupted in the top five 
of 40 “autobiographies” they evaluated for use as clinical tools (p. 58), but Segrist’s (2008) 
abnormal psychology students reported learning less about mental illness from this text than any 
other in their course, complaining “the author disclosed little emotion and seemed to withhold 
personal reactions” (p. 104). Indeed, Girl, Interrupted’s narration is often described as detached, 
minimalist, dry, and so on—for it is a literary memoir, not a textbook, and that fact is reflected in 
the bulk of studies that cite it. Among humanists, Girl, Interrupted is all but distinguished by its 
deconstruction of certain binaries: truth versus fiction (Adams, 2005), sanity versus insanity 
(Couser, 1999), normal versus abnormal (Eakin, 2001), adulthood versus youth (Marshall, 2006), 
public versus private (Igo, 2018), and more. Recounting his career as a memoir scholar who once 
appreciated “liars” in the genre, Adams (2009) cites Girl Interrupted as a text that changed his 
mind: “I found myself growing somewhat annoyed at these authors’ disingenuousness. . . . Not 
only did I come to think that all autobiography is anomalous, but also that the basic concept of 
genre was highly suspect” (p. 341). Generic distinctions are also “less pertinent” to Caminero-
Santangelo (1998, p. 20), who argues that memoirs’ characters are “creatively constructed 
 
 55 
personas, the products of deliberate artistic choices” just like those of novels, and fiction is no 
less “conditioned by the author’s own social and historical experiences” than memoirs are (p. 
20). In choosing to read Girl, Interrupted alongside fiction with no differentiation between the 
two, Caminero-Santangelo is not alone—many critics do the same, implicitly sharing Yagoda’s 
(2010) view (cited above) that Kaysen’s story speaks to those of women writers famously treated 
for mental illness in the 1940s to 1950s (see Bridgford, 2012; Hubert, 2002; Lee, 2017).7 
 Of all the binary constructs broken down in Girl, Interrupted, the line between sanity 
and insanity—and ensuing critiques of psychiatry—is surely the most frequently explored 
whenever scholars cite this book. Geller and Harris (1995) stress that Kaysen’s memoir 
“describes[s] the personal agony, the fear, and the tyranny” experienced in psychiatric 
institutions (p. 326); Stefan (2003) further notes that Kaysen “[does] not project the gratitude and 
alliance with mental health professionals” that some mentally ill authors do (p. 1370). Hubert 
(2002) advances an early feminist reading of Girl, Interrupted, arguing that the rise of feminism, 
the anti-psychiatry movement, and other subversive ideologies in the twentieth century sparked a 
shift in women’s “madness narratives” (p. 96); unlike her predecessors, Kaysen is said to “resist 
internalized oppression and question psychiatric diagnoses, particularly the classification of 
women” (p. 110). Interestingly, whereas Kaysen’s analysis of BPD through a gender lens strikes 
Couser (1999) as an “obvious feminist objection” needing little explication (p. 7), later readings 
of Girl, Interrupted foreground its feminist significance. In one of very few article-length studies 
 
7It is widely acknowledged that Virginia Cunningham’s stay at Juniper Hill Asylum in the The 
Snake Pit (1946) was based upon Mary Jane Ward’s treatment for schizophrenia at Rockland 
State Hospital in 1941; Deborah Blau’s treatment for schizophrenia by Dr. Fried in I Never 
Promised You a Rose Garden (1964) was inspired by Joanne Greenberg’s treatment by Dr. 
Frieda Fromm-Reichmann at Chestnut Lodge in 1948–1951; and Esther Greenwoood’s 
depressive episodes and eventual hospitalization in The Bell Jar (1963) parallel Sylvia Plath’s 
attempted suicide and subsequent treatment at McLean Hospital in 1953–1954. 
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of this text, Marshall (2006) argues that Kaysen’s writing exposes “cultural pedagogies and 
practices” that seek to normalize mental in young girls while also obscuring its causes in 
patriarchal oppression (p. 122; see also Marshall & Rogers, 2005, p. 17). Quite consistently with 
Marshall’s findings, White (2008) applies the concept of feminist “autobiographical manifesto” 
to Girl Interrupted and other women’s mental illness memoirs, tracing specific rhetorical 
strategies each author uses to resist patriarchal medicine, politicize her story, and call for radical 
social change (p. 12). Underlying White’s analysis—and all scholarly engagement with Girl, 
Interrupted, I think—is the idea that Kaysen’s central argument must be deciphered because it is, 
apparently, quite popular with (young and female) readers. Girl, Interrupted has been 
influencing cultural discourse about mental illness since 1993, yet we do not seem to know what 
we are learning: is this an informative patient narrative of BPD and self-harm, a sane woman’s 
takedown of a system that wrongfully imprisoned her, or something else? 
Case Study: Girl, Interrupted and the Tortured Artist Topos 
Girl, Interrupted clearly challenges some aspects of psychiatry, but Longhurst (2019) 
insists “the text is not, as it is often read, a simple ‘writing back’ narrative” (p. 41)—instead, 
Kaysen performs a “counterdiagnosis,” frustrating her audience’s “desire for neatness, for 
definition, and certainty” by “complicating and entangling” her portrayal of her sanity (p. 40). 
That this book is “fraught with ambivalence” about Kaysen’s hospitalization is a position shared 
by Clark (2007, p. 52), although she reads Girl, Interrupted as an essentially private, therapeutic 
project: “an attempt to integrate this episode into the larger story of [Kaysen’s] life” (p. 52). 
Clark suggests it is Kaysen, not her audience, who might be frustrated by the search for meaning 
in her so-called madness. That is, since Kaysen frames her hospitalization as both “the logical 
outcome” of her life trajectory and “a traumatic break” in same, it seems her time at McLean 
“can never be entirely recounted or accounted for” (2007, p. 52). What these scholars are 
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noticing is that, to the end of Girl, Interrupted, Kaysen presents as much evidence that she was 
mentally ill at one time—and identified as such—as evidence against this point. Moreover, as 
Adams (2005) provocatively observes, Girl, Interrupted is not quite a polemic against McLean: 
“Kaysen’s memoir, for all of its insistence on false diagnosis, improper treatment, and time 
wasted, also sends clear signals that her time in the hospital was valuable” (pp. 134-135). 
Proceeding from these scholars’ conclusions about Girl, Interrupted’s lack of conclusions, I turn 
now to examine Kaysen’s story against the backdrop of the Tortured Artist topos. I focus first on 
her construction of a core writerly identity that existed long before (and after) her mental illness; 
second, I analyze the relationship between Kaysen’s creative ambitions and her complicated 
decision to enter McLean, illuminating how the Tortured Artist directly or indirectly influences 
the text at various stages. In due course, I read Kaysen’s ambiguous recovery at the end of Girl, 
Interrupted as her reaction to the moment when her Tortured Artist persona—as all forms of 
symbolic madness do, according to Caminero-Santangelo (1998)—“inevitably surpassed its 
causes, overshadowed [her], and rendered helpless the [woman] in its grasp” (p. 51). 
Author, Write Thyself: Kaysen’s Creative Identity 
When scholars read Kaysen’s self-presentation in her memoir as a “seemingly ‘normal’ 
teenage girl struggling to find her way” (Brickman, 2004, p. 100), arguing “all of her actions 
could be as easily applied to numerous teenage girls” (Adams, 2005, p. 128), they seem to be 
highlighting Kaysen’s sanity as evidence that she was falsely imprisoned at McLean. If Kaysen’s 
teenage angst never surpassed that of the average young woman, then her institutionalization 
seems more like bad luck than the result of her deviation from some norm. Unfortunately, this 
view overlooks a number of important facts—not just the symptoms of mental illness Kaysen 
overtly acknowledges in her past self (a suicide attempt, habitual self-harm, depersonalization, 
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etc.), but also the book’s allusions to her exceptionality in other realms. In particular, although 
the people around her do not recognize her as she does herself, Girl, Interrupted consistently 
identifies Kaysen as an avid writer and bibliophile. Through Kaysen’s recollections of her early 
life and the circumstances of her BPD diagnosis, the text underscores her past uniqueness as an 
aspiring writer, inviting readers to connect her creativity to her extraordinary distress. 
The contrast between Kaysen’s sense of her self-efficacy and others’ failures to honor it 
is evident from Girl, Interrupted’s first lines of dialogue onward. Recounting her meeting with 
the doctor who sent her to McLean, Kaysen emphasizes her displays of agency throughout that 
day: waking up “early, so as to get to this appointment,” feeling “a sense of accomplishment” 
from “do[ing] all that could be done” for a pimple on her chin, traveling a long distance (“I’d 
changed trains twice”) to see the doctor, and so on (1994, p. 7). Nonetheless, Kaysen’s doctor 
instantly casts her inflamed pimple as proof of mental illness, asserting “You’ve been picking at 
it. . . . You’ve been picking at yourself” (p. 7). Kaysen’s inner response reflects her knowledge, 
presumably forged through past experience, that she need not bother arguing with someone 
determined to misjudge her: “He was going to keep talking about it until I agreed with him, so I 
nodded” (p. 7). Even in this early scene, Girl, Interrupted subtly challenges the idea that Kaysen 
lacked initiative, direction, or stable identity in her teenage years. Importantly, scholars citing 
this memoir usually accept Kaysens’ doctors’ opinion—as shared on a McLean admissions form 
and internal memo photocopied into the text—that she showed “increasing patternless [sic] of 
life,” a “chaotic unplanned life,” “no plan at present,” and “immersion in fantasy” prior to her 
hospitalization (pp. 11-13). Kaysen, on the other hand, suggests there is a vital difference 
between having no personal aspirations whatsoever and having aspirations other people cannot 
or will not understand. The fatigue she feels as she is pathologized for squeezing a pimple (“I did 
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need a rest. . . . I had the impulse, once, to get up and leave. . . But I was too tired”) seems to be 
caused by the doctor’s rigid condescension (pp. 7-8), not by any actual aversion to activity on her 
part, and this scene is just a microcosm of the many times Kaysen’s abilities and ambitions will 
be overlooked across the remainder of Girl, Interrupted’s non-linear plot. 
As Kaysen reveals increasingly more about her parents’ and teachers’ reactions to her 
teenage self in later portions of Girl, Interrupted, the text solidifies its portrait of her essential 
writerly identity. In an oft-cited passage from her annotations of the diagnostic criteria for BPD, 
Kaysen reflects at length on the notion that persons with BPD “often experience[e] . . . instability 
of self-image as chronic feelings of emptiness or boredom” (p. 154). According to Kaysen, her 
feelings of extreme emptiness and boredom arose from: 
the fact that I was living a life based on my incapacities, which were numerous. A 
partial list follows. I could not and did not want to: ski, play tennis, or go to gym 
class; attend to any subject in school other than English and biology; write papers 
on any assigned topics (I wrote poems instead of papers for English; I got F’s); 
plan to go or apply to college; give any reasonable explanation for these refusals. 
My self-image was not unstable. I saw myself, quite correctly, as unfit for the 
educational and social systems. (pp. 154-155). 
 
Notice that, although this passage ostensibly dwells on Kaysen’s weaknesses, it also reveals a 
number of strengths: firm convictions, cultivated talents, and deliberate actions. The qualifiers 
interspersed throughout directly undermine most of her self-criticisms’ suasory force as proof of 
her “incapacity.” Apparently, these were tasks she did not want to do, not simply tasks she was 
unable to do. If she could not care about any subjects other than English and biology, that must 
mean she did care about those two classes. If she had no desire to write papers on assigned 
topics, perhaps she was interested in writing something else about topics of her choosing—and 
indeed she was, since the text immediately confirms she wrote poems with some regularity for 
English class, despite the penalties she incurred for doing so. And importantly, in stating that she 
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had no reasonable explanation to give for her actions, Kaysen prompts readers to wonder what 
other kind of explanation she might have given, and who judged it as unreasonable. On the 
whole, Kaysen implies that the people around her younger self erred in two key ways: first by 
misconstruing her behaviors, and second by relying solely on those external conditions to make 
judgments about her entire identity (or lack thereof). In Kaysen’s view, her incompatibility with 
the systems her parents and teachers chose for her was not arbitrary; it was not rebellion for 
rebellion’s sake in lieu of genuine interests. She was quite stable in her desires to read and write 
creative texts, but sadly, the most significant aspects of her identity were not legible to the most 
significant people in her life. In their eyes, her active pursuit of her talents could only be seen as 
a passive failure to do the things they thought her life should be “based on.” 
In spotlighting Kaysen’s appreciation for English (literature), this passage echoes several 
other moments scattered throughout Girl, Interrupted. Early in the book, Kaysen defines her 
attraction to two men in relation to her admiration of their writing: she writes, “I had a boyfriend 
named Johnny who wrote me love poems—good ones” (p. 37), and a bit later, “I stopped seeing 
Johnny and took up with my English teacher, who wrote even better poems, though not to me” 
(p. 38). Although Kaysen repeatedly stresses her distaste for formal education, having refused to 
attend college despite her parents’ wishes, Girl, Interrupted’s various literary references leave 
little doubt that the author is well-read: she alludes to “tumbling down a shaft into Wonderland” 
(p. 41), poets Robert Lowell and Sylvia Plath (p. 48), the children’s poem “Wynken, Blynken, 
and Nod” (p. 76), the early 1900s comic Little Nemo in Slumberland (p. 76), Aesop’s fable of the 
tortoise and the hare (p. 77), philosopher Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise (p. 77), and 
some person “writing a play about a man driven by [the] thought” that “the world is ‘stale, flat 
and unprofitable’” —that is, Shakespeare writing Hamlet (p. 137). Unsurprisingly, of the few 
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leisure activities Kaysen mentions herself engaging in over throughout the text, most involve 
some type of creativity or enjoyment of the arts: in addition to writing and reading, she mentions 
redecorating her room (p. 29), making caramel candies (p. 30), seeing movies (pp. 37, 134), 
playing charades (p. 63), attending “poetry meetings” at her teacher’s house (p. 85), going to art 
museums (pp. 85, 167), listening to records (p. 105), and painting watercolors (p. 161).8  
Readers never learn exactly how people in Kaysen’s life received her opinions about 
literature—instead, it was at one of their aforementioned poetry meetings that her English 
teacher propositioned her—but we can guess that they were unsupportive. On two occasions, 
Kaysen recalls trying to explain her strong feelings about Johannes Vermeer’s painting Girl 
Interrupted at Her Music with people who should have cared, but she is callously ignored (by a 
McLean psychiatrist) and verbally attacked (by an ex-boyfriend) in response (pp. 85, 167). The 
exchange with her psychiatrist, in particular, closely resembles that which occurs in the first 
scene of Girl, Interrupted. Both doctors fixate on one of Kaysen’s supposed symptoms of mental 
illness (in the latter case, her promiscuity), dismissing what she has to say about it, and Kaysen 
once again intuits there is no point in disagreeing: “Suddenly I know what she wants. . . . why 
should I disappoint her?” (pp. 85-86). And if we return to Kaysen’s annotations of the diagnostic 
criteria for BPD, we find even more explanation of the sense of resignation that characterizes her 
contact with authority figures throughout Girl, Interrupted. She writes: 
my parents and teachers did not share my self-image. . . . They did not put much 
value on my capacities, which were admittedly few, but genuine. I read 
everything, I wrote constantly, and I had boyfriends by the barrelful. “Why don’t 
you do the assigned reading?” they’d ask. “Why don’t you write your papers 
instead of whatever you’re writing—what is that, a short story?” . . . By my senior 
year I didn’t even bother with excuses, let alone explanations. (p. 155) 
 
8To be clear, two of these activities (playing charades and listening to records) are noted on 
photocopied documents from McLean that Kaysen inserts into the text; she does not explicitly 




Still refuting the notion that she once had an unstable self-image, Kaysen highlights the same 
core components of her identity that I observed above—though she “admits” her strengths were 
limited, as if she ought to regret that fact, her hyperbolic language (“everything,” “constantly,” 
etc.) unmistakably conveys pride in her talents. These words convey the intensity of her passions 
for writing and reading, of course, but they also point to the longevity of her pursuits: she seems 
to have been this way for a long time. That Kaysen specifies the age by which she “didn’t even 
bother” to explain herself—why she was called to write and read the things she did—indicates 
that, at an earlier age, she did try to make her parents and teachers understand her. Indeed, the 
adverbial phrase “By my senior year…” marks the passage of a decent bit of time between the 
point when others started questioning her self-image and the point when she stopped answering. 
No longer hoping for others to “excuse” her behavior (at minimum), Kaysen gave up on her 
parents’ and teachers’ ability to recognize her value, just as she later gave up on her psychiatrists. 
Yet she never stopped cultivating her artistic gifts, troubling as they were, for they were 
“genuine”—perhaps the most genuine part of her self-image. Hence, although Kaysen’s writerly 
identity seems to cause her madness somehow (per the Tortured Artist topos), it may be her 
commitment to this same identity that also facilitates her recovery. 
 
The Tortured (Woman) Artist: Madwoman or Mad Woman? 
Some may find it unremarkable that Kaysen, a professional writer who published two 
novels before writing Girl, Interrupted, portrays herself as a writer in her memoir. Why should 
this be significant? What I wish to emphasize is that Kaysen consciously chose to present herself 
this way—recall her clear and frequent statements about the artifice of the memoir genre—and 
her portrayal of her writerly identity is both uniquely hers and a reflection of dominant cultural 
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discourse about artists at her time of writing. Tautologically, anyone who writes a memoir is a 
writer, but not all memoirs mention that fact in the body of the text. Before the memoir boom, 
autobiographies were generally composed by persons of preexisting eminence or overt historical 
significance; literary ability was not a prerequisite. Moreover, those writers who do discuss their 
creative lives in their works surely do not have identical views of what it means to be “a writer.” 
Kaysen’s understanding of artistic personality is inevitably influenced by artist narratives that 
came before hers, but it is not universal. Hence, it is absolutely relevant to readings of Girl, 
Interrupted that Kaysen distinguishes herself as a creative woman in this book, and because she 
does this, anything she says about art/artists can be taken as a comment on her own personality.  
What does Kaysen say about artists? She affirms, quite explicitly, that they go mad. 
Reflecting on the prominence of McLean in American culture, she writes: 
Our hospital was famous and had housed many great poets and singers. Did the 
hospital specialize in poets and singers, or was it that poets and singers 
specialized in madness? Ray Charles was the most famous ex-patient. . . . We had 
the Taylor family, though. James graduated to a different hospital before I arrived, 
but Kate and Livingston were there. . . . Robert Lowell also didn’t come while I 
was there. Sylvia Plath had come and gone. What is it about meter and cadence 
and rhythm that makes their makers mad? (p. 48) 
 
Like Styron did in Darkness Visible in 1990, or like TV Tropes users do on their pop culture 
wiki in 2020, Kaysen cites eminent artists who allegedly experienced mental illness as evidence 
of some connection between creativity and madness. Whereas Styron had identified artists as 
depressed because they died by suicide, Kaysen labels her examples as “mad” because they once 
stayed at McLean—the same hospital, I should note, that she criticizes elsewhere in her memoir 
for the problematic labels it assigned to her. The quantity and quality (i.e., eminence) of the 
artists she names are, no doubt, intended to enhance the persuasiveness of her claims about the 
Tortured Artist topos. Interestingly, the “most famous ex-patient” mentioned, Ray Charles, was 
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not hospitalized for mental illness (per se), but rather permitted to visit McLean for occasional 
drug evaluations instead of being jailed for possession of heroin (Charles & Ritz, 1978). On the 
other hand, neither the Taylor family nor Sylvia Plath had reached great heights of fame in the 
United States by the time of Kaysen’s hospitalization; had she written Girl, Interrupted in 1967, 
they might not have been compelling examples of the Tortured Artist topos. That Kaysen groups 
these artists’ complex life stories together under a single sweeping cultural cliché is, probably, 
greater proof of her own investment in Tortured Artist discourse than of the claim that artists are 
prone to madness. Indeed, her first question gestures at the idea that McLean favors artists only 
to dismiss it, ending on the common-sense suggestion that artists frequent McLean because 
artists are distinctly likely to need its treatments. And by the end of this passage, Kaysen has 
proceeded from asking whether creativity begets madness to assuming this is so, wondering only 
how that process works: “What is it . . . that makes [artists] mad?” In raising that question, 
Kaysen affirms not only the existence of a link between creativity and madness but also the 
direction of that link, stressing that artist identity leads to (and takes primacy over) mad identity. 
Judging solely from Kaysen’s endorsement of the Tortured Artist topos and her self-
presentation as a writer, one might infer that Girl, Interrupted attributes the author’s mental 
illness to her literary ambitions. Moreover, the text’s allusions to Madwoman discourses—as 
popularized by Gilbert and Gubar’s (1979) monograph, The Madwoman in the Attic—further 
clarify how a woman writer linking her creativity to her madness would be legible to Kaysen’s 
audience. In the late-twentieth century, the Madwoman figure in literature and other media came 
to symbolize a range of messages about women’s oppression: the sublimation of their creativity, 
their anxiety in assuming unfeminine roles, their subversive rage against patriarchy, and more 
(see Goodman et al., 1996). Today, those wishing to reify Madwoman discourses increasingly 
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cite autobiographical texts by real women with mental illness—especially Sylvia Plath’s The Bell 
Jar, which fictionalized the clash between Plath’s creative ambitions and distressing patriarchal 
norms, for the author died by suicide soon after its publication. In addition to naming Plath as an 
alumna of McLean, Girl, Interrupted shares several moments between Kaysen and her roommate 
Georgina, a former Vassar College student, that touch on the idea of madness as the purview of 
extraordinary women. Wondering how (and why) Lisa managed to swipe all of the lightbulbs 
from their ward without being noticed, Georgina quips, “Lisa has the true artistic temperament” 
(p. 61). Later, Kaysen ponders why McLean admitted Alice Calais—a young woman implied to 
have “‘spent her life in a closet’” or “‘locked up in a closet,’” confined at home as many literary 
madwomen are—and Georgina guesses she is “Probably really incredibly crazy and interesting, 
so they let her in for less” (p. 111). Finally, when Kaysen visits Georgina’s consciousness-raising 
group after both have left McLean, she observes firsthand how real-live madwomen are revered 
in such spaces: “I could see that Georgina had a certain cachet because of her craziness” (p. 161).  
Though brief, each of these moments can be read as a nod to Madwoman discourses, 
hinting that independent-minded women are liable to go mad (or be labeled as such) under 
patriarchy. Indeed, madness might even be desirable for such women, for it seems to make them 
more creative, interesting, and powerful—and it places them in the company of other gifted 
women who once became famous for writing about mental illness.9 In this sense, Madwoman 
symbolism shares many features with the concept I am calling Tortured Artist discourse: whether 
one imagines madness as an outcome of oppression, exceptional creativity, or some combination 
of the two, these sensibilities attach a sort of dignity to madness where it would otherwise evoke 
 
9Consider the fact that Kaysen, a fairly unknown writer before Girl, Interrupted, is now likened 
to Sylvia Plath, Mary Jane Ward, Joanne Greenberg, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and so on—now, 
since 1993, women writing about mental illness often compare themselves to Kaysen. 
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stigma. I need not claim intentionality on Kaysen’s part in order to observe how readily Girl, 
Interrupted lends itself to the notion that her teenage madness—a quality not quite the same as a 
diagnosable psychiatric illness—followed from her essential writerly identity. If Kaysen takes it 
as a given that Tortured Artists are real, then my question is not whether her book is influenced 
by this topos, but rather why it is. What might Kaysen stand to gain in linking her mental illness 
to her creative ambitions, and what are the implications of her doing so? Through its accounts of 
Kaysen’s reasons for entering the hospital, the seeming escalation of her mental illness inside 
McLean, and the enigmatic circumstances of her release, Girl, Interrupted highlights both the 
appeal and, ultimately, the limitations of the Tortured Artist topos. 
Now You Lose It, Now You Don’t: Kaysen’s Journey In and Out of Madness 
As I noted earlier in this chapter, prior research citing Girl, Interrupted has thoroughly 
explored the view of Kaysen’s memoir as an indictment of 1960s psychiatry—and misogynistic 
psychiatric practices in particular—and extending those arguments is not my objective here. That 
Kaysen’s experiences as a creative young woman (both in and out of McLean) were shaped 
profoundly by her position in a sexist 1960s American society is indisputable, yet that does not 
nullify the possibility that she benefited from her hospitalization in some way. On the contrary, 
although it is clear that Kaysen criticizes McLean, it is also clear that she chose to be there. We 
should not be persuaded by her claims that the psychiatrist “tricked” her into hospitalization and 
she did not know she could refuse (p. 39), lest we miss the considerably larger body of evidence 
that something about McLean appealed to Kaysen.10 For instance, whereas fellow patient Lisa 
flees the hospital at regular intervals, Kaysen noticeably declines two opportunities to do the 
 
10I should note that, in context, Kaysen only faults the doctor for the length and timing of her 
hospitalization, not for the fact that she was hospitalized at all: “He tricked me, though: a couple 
of weeks. It was closer to two years. I was eighteen” (1994, p. 39). 
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same: when a visiting friend offers to free her from the ward, she tells him, “I’m here now. . . . I 
think I’ve got to stay here” (p. 27). Later, she ignores another patient urging her to escape the car 
to her upcoming dentist appointment, noting “[Lisa] was more realistic. . . . she knew I wouldn’t 
split” (p. 108). In point of fact, one of Girl, Interrupted’s most climatic scenes—an episode of 
depersonalization in which Kaysen panics that she has no bones, injures herself, and is heavily 
sedated—occurs right after Torrey, a patient conspicuously similar to Kaysen, is removed from 
McLean against her wishes. Like Kaysen, Torrey comes from a privileged background, has 
parents who denigrate her life choices, and feels intensely alienated at home (equating it with 
“being dead” and acting out “to feel like you’re not quite dead”) (p. 97). Kaysen fears for Torrey, 
asking their head nurse (Valerie), “You wouldn’t let Torrey’s parents take her back to Mexico, 
would you?” (p. 97). When Valerie reassures Kaysen, yet soon arranges for Torrey’s release, 
Kaysen seems personally betrayed: “‘Valerie, you promised—’ I began” (p. 99); “Oh, Valerie,’ I 
said, ‘you promised—’” (p. 103). In Kaysen’s final words about her episode, then, she frames 
her apparently deteriorating mental state as a type of preventive measure to avoid Torrey’s fate: 
“now I was safe, now I was really crazy, and nobody could take me out of there” (p. 104). 
Why does Kaysen remain in the hospital, despite her complaints about the lack of privacy 
and dignity therein? Girl, Interrupted mentions many benefits of being sheltered at McLean. 
Sarcastically comparing McLean’s patients to the political activists they admired on television, 
Kaysen observes, “We were safe in our expensive, well-appointed hospital, locked up with our 
rages and rebellions. Easy for us to say ‘Right on!’” (pp. 92-93). In a mental hospital, patients 
might profess whatever radical views they wish and engage in all variety of bizarre, antisocial 
behaviors with little fear of being beaten, killed, or sent to prison for their actions—stripped of 
both freedom and credibility, they pose no real threat to the status quo. Yet in Kaysen’s view, 
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McLean’s purpose was not to protect the world from its patients, but rather the reverse: “Though 
we were cut off from the world . . . we were also cut off from the demands and expectations that 
had driven us crazy. What could be expected of us now that we were stowed away in a loony 
bin?” (p. 94). Here Kaysen implicitly contrasts her life at McLean to her life before—in which 
she was expected to attend college or work a job rather than read literature and write poems—
suggesting, ironically, that the hospital provided her and fellow patients with a “refuge” from 
others’ crazy demands (p. 94). Indeed, the penultimate item on Kaysen’s list of causes of mental 
illness (in the chapter “Etiology”) conveys the same message, positing that mental patients may 
be “sane in an insane world” (p. 15). Barred from pursuing her creative ambitions, young Kaysen 
preferred to exist in a world with no expectations—to live a life based on no capacities, so to 
speak, rather than her supposed incapacities. For this reason, she bought her psychological 
freedom, willingly, at the cost of virtually every other type of independence. 
Across all of Girl, Interrupted, the chapter “Elementary Topography” focuses most 
directly on Kaysen’s reasons for entering the hospital, and it concludes on two vital facts. The 
first is that Kaysen remembers believing in her own sanity when she entered McLean, writing, “I 
have to admit, though, that I knew I wasn’t mad. . . . I knew I wasn’t mad and that they wouldn’t 
keep me there” (p. 42). The second is her revelation that, to her young self, thrusting herself into 
McLean felt like a deeply meaningful (albeit symbolic) expression of her identity: 
My ambition was to negate. . . . My hunger, my thirst, my loneliness and boredom 
and fear were all weapons aimed at my enemy, the world. They didn’t matter a 
whit to the world, of course, and they tormented me, but I got a gruesome 
satisfaction from my sufferings. They proved my existence. All my integrity 
seemed to lie in saying No. So the opportunity to be incarcerated was just too 
good to resist. It was a very big No—the biggest No this side of suicide. (p. 42) 
 
As before, Kaysen’s language emphasizes her desire for agency and achievement (in a sense) in 
her younger years—she writes of ambition, weapons, satisfaction, integrity, and opportunity. 
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Wryly exaggerating the scale of her battle with “the world” and the extent of its apathy towards 
her (her defenses “didn’t matter a whit”), Kaysen honors the intensity of her adolescent emotions 
while also alluding to the wisdom she has gained since then. The adult Kaysen might see how the 
impulses that led her to McLean also caused her great distress, hinting things may not have been 
what they “seemed to” be back then, yet she insists her actions were more than mere rebellion or 
masochism. On the contrary, they were her only means of self-actualization; like Torrey, who 
used drugs in hopes of feeling “not quite dead” (p. 97), Kaysen avers that her sufferings “proved 
[her] existence.” Born to a life in which her special talents were ignored, she chose to assert them 
(thus preserving her integrity) by refusing that life wholesale. In Kaysen’s mind, her time at 
McLean was never intended as a remedy for her madness—for she claims she was not mad when 
she entered—nor did she expect to escape her misery there. She was attracted to the idea of being 
“incarcerated,” as if she had committed a crime, because this state of affairs would at least 
externalize the sense of exceptionality, isolation, and stasis that had already defined her life to 
date. What Kaysen failed to consider, perhaps, were the limitations of her symbolic madness: it 
may not have symbolized what she wanted it to. In fact, it may have ceased to be symbolic at all.  
Halfway through Girl, Interrupted, Kaysen implies that the creative freedom to be gained 
through her admission to McLean was neither as forthcoming nor as lasting as she might have 
expected. Although her parents and teachers criticized her literary pursuits, discouraging her 
from cultivating her gifts, McLean’s medical staff literally pathologized her actions as symptoms 
of mental illness. Listing various jargon terms McLean staff used to describe its patients, Kaysen 
pauses on the phrase “indulging in behavior,” noting how it “could be attached to any activity 
and make it sound suspicious: indulging in eating behavior, talking behavior, writing behavior. 
In the outside world people ate and talked and wrote, but nothing we did was simple” (p. 84). 
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Like all of her conduct in the hospital, Kaysen’s expressions of her writerly identity—what to her 
seemed natural and vital, even sacred—could only be construed as some sort of sick compulsion 
in her doctors’ eyes. Moreover, whereas eating and talking must have been abundant among all 
patients at McLean, writing behavior was unique to Kaysen, perhaps making it all the more 
“suspicious” and less “simple” in its validation of her madness. It seems, then, that there were no 
conditions under which her creative ambitions would have been acceptable. But even if actions 
unremarkable in the outside world are assumed to carry serious psychological import at McLean, 
this does not mean the staff listened to Kaysen any better than her parents and teachers did. If 
anything, she suggests they understood her even less—and on the whole, they cared less, too.  
As the plot of Girl, Interrupted progresses to the latest stages of Kaysen’s hospitalization, 
following her depersonalization and seeming shift towards being “really crazy” (p. 104), the text 
increasingly reveals the bleaker sides of mental illness. The chapter “Dental Health,” in which 
Kaysen has a tooth extracted while under general anesthesia, ends with her tearfully begging to 
know how long she was unconscious: “‘I want to know how much time that was,’ I said. ‘See, 
Valerie, I’ve lost some time, and I need to know how much. I need to know’” (p. 109). Although 
she asks about ten times, both Valerie and the dentist evade her question, evidently dismissing it 
as meaningless hysteria. Next, the chapter “Calais is Engraved on my Heart” relates the dramatic 
breakdown of Alice Calais, a “timid” but friendly girl who “didn’t look too crazy” (p. 110). 
Alice becomes violently psychotic soon after entering McLean, occasioning her transfer to 
maximum security. As Kaysen visits Alice there with some fellow patients, they are struck by its 
differences from their ward (barred windows, doorless and seatless toilets, staff areas shielded 
with chicken-wire glass, etc.)—and disturbed when they realize Alice has been rubbing feces on 
her body and room walls. Kaysen is bewildered at the thought of someday sharing Alice’s fate, 
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as if it seems far worse than Torrey’s return to Mexico (or even the suicide of Daisy, another 
patient): “‘Shit on the wall,’ I said. ‘Oh, God. Could that happen to us? . . . It couldn’t, could it?’ 
I asked” (p. 115). And finally, when Kaysen shares her passion for McLean’s tunnels with two 
staff members in “The Shadow of the Real”—contrasted with the wards (where “You can’t go 
anywhere, and it’s noisy, and you’re stuck”), the underground tunnels (where “Everything is 
connected” and “You could . . . go anywhere”) are a type of symbol for Kaysen’s latent ambition 
(p. 122)—the nurse says nothing in response, and her therapist automatically psychologizes her 
statements. Smugly labeling the tunnels as “A womb” (p. 121), he diagnoses Kaysen with 
regressive fantasizing, ignoring her rebuttals—and then he, too, says nothing (p. 122).  
Each of these experiences displays the powerlessness of psychiatric hospitalization, 
heightening Kaysen’s ambivalence towards her creativity and madness alike: though she saw no 
point in living a life without expressive freedom pre-McLean, what could be the point of such 
freedom if, post-McLean, she might never again be trusted to know (let alone express) anything 
of consequence? 11 Indeed, even after Kaysen’s health mysteriously improves and she makes 
plans to leave McLean in the chapter “New Frontiers in Dental Health,” she imagines a social 
worker blaming her creative ambitions on the chronicity of her mental illness. Recounting how 
her longstanding, firmly stated career plans (“‘A writer,’ I said. . . . ‘I’m going to be a writer’”) 
were casually rejected by her social worker (“‘That’s a nice hobby, but how are you going to 
earn a living?’”) (p. 133), Kaysen elaborates on their mutual disliking: 
I didn’t like her because she didn’t understand that this was me, and I was going 
to be a writer; I was not going to type term bills or sell au gratin bowls or do any 
other stupid things. She didn’t like me because I was arrogant and uncooperative 
and probably still crazy for insisting on being a writer. (p. 133) 
 
 
11For a more thorough study of Girl, Interrupted’s theme of lost time and lives disrupted, the 
centrality of which is conveyed most obviously through the memoir’s title, see Clark (2007). 
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The notion that Kaysen was “still crazy,” of course, assumes that she was crazy in the past—but 
her objection seems to lie not with that assumption, but rather with the reduction of her writerly 
identity to a mere remnant of her madness. Nothing could be further from the truth in her mind, 
thus Kaysen affirms the primacy of her creativity within her personal identity, actually equating 
one with the other (“this was me”). Knowing that she was reading and writing literature long 
before McLean, Kaysen asserts that it is those pursuits, not the madness of the hospital nor the 
“stupid things” her parents and teachers want, that will define her in the future.  
Scholars citing Girl, Interrupted often note Kaysen’s claim at the end of “Frontiers of 
Dental Health” that she was released from McLean because she got engaged: “Luckily, I got a 
marriage proposal and they let me out. In 1968, everybody could understand a marriage 
proposal” (p. 133; see Clark, 2007; Marshall, 2006; White, 2008; etc.). While a proposal might 
have persuaded Kaysen’s doctors to let her leave, it does not explain why she wanted to leave—
and the text contains many clues that Kaysen worked for her release, such as her analyst noting 
her “fairly well integrated personality” (p. 118), her promotion to “grounds privileges” in the 
hospital (p. 119), her decision to start applying for jobs (p. 123), and her final authorization to 
leave McLean for unsupervised outings with her future husband (p. 135). Moreover, although 
Kaysen is certain at this time that she will be a writer, her vision of life with her future husband 
is quite murky: asked to picture it, she says, “‘Nothing. . . It’s quiet. It’s like—I don’t know. It’s 
like falling off a cliff. . . . I guess my life will just stop when I get married’” (p. 136). Needless to 
say, Kaysen did become a writer, whereas Girl, Interrupted emphasizes that she is no longer 
married. To fixate on her engagement, then, is to miss the fact that the entire preceding chapter is 
focused on her career (past and future); the text implies it was Kaysen’s determination to be a 
writer that finally inspired her recovery from mental illness. Indeed, through her utter refusal to 
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back down on her ambitions for either the social worker or (later) Valerie, she maintains that 
they are the ones who “‘don’t understand’ . . . didn’t seem to understand” and whose demands 
are “impossible” (p. 133). She did not know then how her ambivalence towards her madness—its 
promise of psychological freedom and its damage to her credibility—would affect her in the 
future, but she knew the only way to be a writer was to leave McLean, and that is what she did. 
Conclusion: The Artist Formerly Known as Tortured 
The Tortured Artist topos, as depicted in artifacts like Darkness Visible, Girl, Interrupted, 
hundreds of other narratives by/about talented artists, and ever-multiplying posts on a modern 
pop culture wiki (to name a few), is seldom clear in its mechanics. Even if we do believe that 
creative persons are prone to mental illness, how exactly do we understand the cause of that 
relationship? TV Tropes suggests that artists go mad to secure creative freedom, because their 
talents are unappreciated by others, to bring attention to their art, because their art is garnering 
too much attention, or because artists are celestially destined to be “angsty” individuals. Any one 
of these propositions could apply to my reading of Girl, Interrupted. And like many Tortured 
Artists before her, Kaysen and her life story now seem to be artifacts of the Tortured Artist 
topos, too, proving its basis in truth through the excellence of her talents. To read the minimalist 
sentences and dry humor of this memoir—knowing now of the fame Kaysen would one day 
achieve—one might almost forget that the girl she writes about in Girl, Interrupted was ever so 
unhappy. Yet the photocopied documents all throughout the text tell a different story: they note 
how Kaysen “stated that she found it necessary at times to break ice cubes to get rid of her 
anger” (p. 63), that she is a “very depressed, desperate young lady” who is “Quite tense & cries 
easily altho tries to maintain composure” while “talking at grt. length of past & present history” 
(p. 69), that she was “very frightened at the thought that she never had a satisfactory childhood. . 
. . most extremely upset about her parents and their lack of understanding” and she “relates this 
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to other people, and that they can’t understand or can’t be trusted” (p. 105), and so on. 
Clearly, transforming mental illness into a symbol of creativity may be therapeutic for 
someone in Kaysen’s position, allowing her to cope with her past traumas and reclaim her sense 
of identity in the thirty years between her hospitalization and the writing of her memoir. Perhaps 
the specific kairotic moment in which this book was written—when the Madwoman figure had 
solidly entered the American social imaginary, yet the rise of modern medications and (thus) 
biological psychiatry was yet to come—was also crucial to its popularity. Writing in 1993 about 
events that happened in 1967, Kaysen asked, “What is it about meter and cadence and rhythm 
that makes their makers mad?” In 2020, I have no better answer to this question, but I do know 
some information about psychiatric medicine that was inaccessible to her and her doctors at 
McLean. Girl, Interrupted indicates that moving forward with her writerly ambitions required 
Kaysen to surrender her mad identity, implicitly rejecting the notion that she was ever mentally 
ill at all. Indeed, as she acknowledges in the chapter “Stigmatography,” it was only in ceasing to 
speak—or even think—about her hospitalization at all that she was finally able to cope with this 
experience (p. 125). Furthermore, she writes: “I began to feel revulsion too. Insane people: I had 
a good nose for them and I didn’t want to have anything to do with them. I still don’t” (p. 125).  
When the Tortured Artist topos is enacted in the real, non-literary world, it seems to 
encourage persons with psychiatric disabilities to fear, abhor, or wholly deny real pieces of their 
identities and histories in order to embrace their creative talent as Kaysen does. In its suggestion 
that artistic fulfillment, not psychiatric treatment, is the true solution to mental illness, this cliché 
leads to the impression that mental illness would not exist if society were more tolerant of 
exceptional creativity (and other gifts). As an artifact of the Tortured Artist topos, then, Girl, 
Interrupted all but frames mental health as a voluntary action, dangerously invalidating the 
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CHAPTER 2: AN UNBIASED MIND: BREAKING DOWN THE BRAINIAC 
“Actually, throughout my life, my two greatest assets have been mental stability and 
being, like, really smart,” tweeted former President Donald Trump on January 6, 2018 (Trump, 
2018b). “I went from VERY successful businessman, to top T.V. Star[,] ....to President of the 
United States (on my first try). I think that would qualify as not smart, but genius....and a very 
stable genius at that!” (Trump, 2018b, 2018c, ellipses in original). In an apparent response to 
recent media speculation about his mental health—and thus his fitness to hold the highest office 
in the U.S. government—Trump posted these words to Twitter early one morning roughly a year 
into his presidency. Dismissing widespread disbelief in his intellectual abilities, Trump cited 
three impressive life accomplishments as proof that he was actually a “genius.” Moreover, 
Trump reassured his followers that—contrary to statements made by “the Democrats and their 
lapdogs, the Fake News Mainstream Media,” who had recently been “screaming [about his] 
mental stability”—he was absolutely not in need of psychiatric help (Trump, 2018a). In the 
process, the former President coined a curiously memorable phrase that would follow him (in 
earnest and in jest) for the remainder of his one-term administration. 
Was Trump “a very stable genius”? According to a spate of op-eds, think pieces, and 
other popular media published between 2016 and 2020, the opposite was true. Trump’s critics 
had long argued that he lacked the necessary knowledge and experience for his position, but as 
his behavior grew increasingly erratic in the late 2010s, many public figures began to question 
whether Trump was even sane at all. In 2017 alone, three books were published with titles that 
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clearly disputed the President’s psychological health: Keith Olbermann’s Trump Is F*cking 
Crazy (This Is Not a Joke), Matt Taibbi’s Insane Clown President: Dispatches from the 2016 
Circus, and Bandy X. Lee’s The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump: 27 Psychiatrists and Mental 
Health Experts Assess a President. The last of these—a collection of essays by diverse scholars 
and clinicians—was so successful with popular readers that a second edition (featuring ten new 
essays) was released in 2019. Two other best-selling books and one acclaimed film have further 
examined Trump’s alleged mental illness/es: Omarosa Manigault Newman’s memoir Unhinged: 
An Insider’s Account of the Trump White House (2018), Dan Partland’s documentary #Unfit: The 
Psychology of Donald Trump (2020), and—of course—Philip Rucker and Carol Leonnig’s book 
A Very Stable Genius: Donald J. Trump’s Testing of America (2020). At varying levels of 
seriousness, these texts argue that Trump is not qualified to serve as President because he is not 
of sound mind: he is diagnosed with pathological lying, narcissism, sociopathy, paranoia, 
sadism, delusions, histrionics, dementia, anxiety, and numerous other psychiatric afflictions. 
No doubt, none of these experts’ assessments were intended as a compliment to Trump’s 
character: both their criticisms and Trump’s vehement denials reinforce, at least implicitly, the 
notion that a mentally ill President is undesirable. But perhaps if Trump had read their arguments 
more closely, he would not have been so insulted. Although his critics are unanimous in their 
belief that Trump is not “stable,” their evaluations of his “genius” (or lack thereof) are less 
straightforward. On the contrary, it has become a commonplace to suggest that Trump’s mental 
instability is not a hindrance to his professional success, but rather an essential ingredient of the 
same: it is precisely due to his alleged mental illnesses that he rose to one of the most powerful 
political positions in the modern world. Dodes (2017), who judges Trump as meeting diagnostic 
criteria for antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), speculates that Trump’s sociopathy endows 
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him with “a definite perceptive acumen, making him a genius at manipulation” (p. 89). Although 
persons with ASPD “are lacking an essential part of being human,” Dodes notes, those who are 
“successful sociopaths” may also possess extraordinary skills of self-aggrandizement that are 
inaccessible to their empathic counterparts (pp. 84-85). Dodes explains: 
We are a culture that admires external success in wealth and power, regardless of 
how it is achieved. People with sociopathic qualities who are able to achieve high 
status and power precisely because of their manipulations and cheating are, 
therefore, sometimes seen as not only psychologically healthy, but superior. . . . 
those who are good at manipulation, at appearing charming and caring, at 
concealing their immoral or illegal behavior, . . . bully their way to the top. (p. 84) 
 
In Dodes’s view, Trump’s performance in conventional metrics of success for American life 
(i.e., “wealth and power”) is inextricably tied to his underlying mental disorder—the former is 
something like a symptom of the latter. But although individuals with ASPD may appear to be 
superior to their fellow humans in some respects, Dodes stresses that sociopaths do not lead 
happy lives: “their success is on the outside. . . . They are still severely emotionally ill” (p. 85). 
 As Dodes’s study illustrates, ongoing debates about Trump’s psychological wellbeing—
and indeed, discussions of any (presumed) mentally ill person who rises to prominence in a 
specialized domain—very often touch upon a subset of Mad Genius rhetoric I call the “Brainiac” 
topos.1 This topos posits that mental illness confers special gifts and talents—persons with 
mental illness achieve eminence, or they have the potential to do so, precisely because they are 
mentally ill. The specific belief that personality disorders like ASPD lead to success in power-
holding institutions is reflected in an abundance of cultural artifacts from the late-twentieth 
century onwards. For example, Spieker (2017) analyzes four popular TV shows in which mental 
 
1The word “Brainiac,” an apparent portmanteau of “brain” and “maniac,” is best known as the 
name of a fictional DC Comics supervillain first introduced in 1958—but nowadays, the word 
has “slipped into common usage” as a term for any highly intelligent, if not socially integrated 
individual (Beard & Hoa Vo Thi-Beard, 2007). 
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illness “professionally enables” characters who experience it so much that “it is turned into a 
veritable superpower,” arguing that such shows “present mental illness as the basis of their 
protagonists’ success” (pp. 159-60). According to Spieker, Dr. Gregory House’s pathological 
narcissism on House is depicted as a source of “extraordinary tenacity and drive,” providing him 
with “exceptional analytical powers” and diagnostic skill (pp. 161-62). Similarly, severe ASPD 
distinguishes Dexter Morgan (a righteous serial killer) as “the ultimate vigilante” on Dexter: 
[Dexter] is unencumbered by emotions that could blur his judgement, untouched 
by the violence he commits yet in control of his bloodlust, isolated enough to 
freely give in to his violent urges, and a masterful manipulator and liar who (for 
the most part) manages to hide his double life (Spieker, 2017, p. 163). 
 
But importantly, it is not only villains and antiheroes whose mental illnesses manifest as 
superpowers—regarding Adrian Monk of Monk, Spieker argues that obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD) “constitute[s] the basis of his prowess as a detective” in the world of the show, 
since it endows him with “extraordinarily acute senses” and a “flawless [eidetic] memory” (p. 
160-61). When Monk briefly seeks treatment for his OCD, though, he “loses his crime-fighting 
superpowers,” concluding that “he cannot have the gift without the curse” (p. 161). Regardless of 
the Brainiac’s specific illness, gifts, and intentions, it seems that all those who embrace this topos 
must eventually confront the same dilemma: they must decide whether “it is better to possess 
unique talents and be unhappy [or] to be normal and content” (Spieker, 2017, p. 163). 
Blurring the line between objective fact and subjective experience, this chapter examines 
how the Brainiac topos is constructed in first- and third-hand narratives about mental illness that 
are written by, for, and/or about science enthusiasts. I begin with a survey of the most influential 
scientific research on a causal relationship between madness and genius (broadly defined)—all 
of which was published in the last 40 years—explaining how contemporary popular science 
writing still perpetuates the notion that the Brainiac topos is scientific fact. Next, I clarify how 
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the work of one specific public figure—psychologist and author Kay Redfield Jamison—has 
dramatically affected Western discourse about mental illness since the late 1980s, drawing 
connections between Jamison’s most influential scholarly works and the enduring popularity of 
the Brainiac topos. Finally, I formulate a case study on the functions of the Brainiac topos in 
autobiographical writing by persons with mental illness, focusing on what may be the most 
famous Brainiac-related text in American culture: Jamison’s 1995 memoir, An Unquiet Mind: A 
Memoir of Moods and Madness. As both a scholar and practitioner of psychology, Jamison is 
noticeably committed to the notion that (some) mental illnesses are biological and genetic in 
their origins; as someone who is personally diagnosed with manic-depressive illness, she also 
firmly believes that her condition is scientifically linked to special abilities. By using evidence 
from her own life story to advocate for these two points, I argue, Jamison enacts a fairly overt 
Brainiac persona over the course of her famous memoir. As a result, An Unquiet Mind defends—
perhaps a bit too easily, and too well—the extraordinary value of persons with psychiatric 
symptoms to a society that may otherwise wish to eliminate them altogether. 
Something Resembling a Consensus: The Brainiac Topos and Popular Science 
To contemporary rhetoricians, it might be difficult to recall a time when Mad Genius 
rhetoric did not pervade scientific and medical literature about mental illness. As of 2021, 
virtually hundreds of scholarly studies have examined the supposed link between psychiatric 
diagnoses and subjects’ apparent gifts or talents, and new research is published on a monthly (if 
not weekly) basis.2 Yet it should be noted that—despite the longstanding prominence of Mad 
 
2At my time of writing, one of the most recent scholarly publications to address Mad Genius was 
published just nine days ago. In his Creativity Studies article “Exploring Creativity Through 
Artists’ Reflections,” Daniel (2021) examines how 314 self-identified artists define “creativity” 
and describe its role in their lives. In doing so, Daniel seeks insights into (among other things) 
the notion that creativity is “a side effect of mental health conditions” (p. 1). 
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Genius rhetoric in cultural discourse—quantitative research on this topic is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Moreover, although the term “Brainiac topos” is my own invention and not used 
by any scientists I know of, it is clear to me that a majority of quantitative studies examining the 
relationship between madness and genius are interested in a Brainiac-type hypothesis: they want 
to know whether mental illness can be a source of special abilities. Because the Brainiac topos 
assumes that madness precedes genius, it cannot be studied in the absence of some standard 
system and credentials for identifying mental illness in human subjects. That is, whereas the 
Tortured Artist topos entails some clearly observable “genius” (e.g., public eminence) that gives 
way to a more ambiguous form of “madness,” the Brainiac topos involves a definite madness 
that confers comparatively indefinite genius. And psychiatric diagnosis and scientific research 
are, by definition, the exclusive domain of psychiatrists and scientists. It seems that scholarly 
and/or medical expertise is required in order to argue convincingly for the Brainiac topos, and 
only a small number of people—the majority of whom are not severely mentally ill—are ever 
granted authority in those institutions. In comparison to other offshoots of Mad Genius rhetoric, 
then, the Brainiac topos is probably the most commonly circulated in scientific research and the 
least commonly circulated in autobiographical narratives by persons with mental illness. 
Detailed genealogies of scientific research on the relationship between mental illness and 
mental gifts (especially creativity) are widely available, and I need not reconstruct one at length 
in this chapter (see for instance Becker, 2014; Kyaga, 2015; Schlesinger, 2012; Simonton, 2009; 
etc.). Criticisms of such research are also fairly common, although all such writing centers on 
three basic, immutable problems to which I alluded in the introduction to this project and which 
all of my case studies implicitly address. These are what Schlesinger (2014)—the most vocal 
detractor of Mad Genius research throughout the past decade—calls “Definition dilemma: C” 
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(creativity), “Definition dilemma: M” (madness), and “Problems linking C&M” (pp. 60-63; see 
also Schlesinger, 2009, 2012). Some examples of “C” (or “G,” in this project) dilemmas are: Is 
genius an innate personality trait or a learned, demonstrated, domain-specific ability? Should 
genius solely be evaluated by “experts,” or can it also be identified by general audiences/peers? 
Moreover, what credence should be given to personal testimonies of genius (i.e., self-assessment 
and report)? If a person has not achieved public eminence of any kind, can they still be labeled as 
a genius?—what degree of ability is truly exceptional, and what falls within the range of ordinary 
human experience? Of course, M dilemmas are much the same, questioning how, to/by whom, 
and under what circumstances the label of “madness” can be applied. The resulting difficulties of 
proving a link between these two concepts are thus quite apparent, but quantitative research on 
the Brainiac topos routinely assumes it is possible to diagnose and connect madness/genius with 
some degree of certainty—and even if the scholars producing this work are aware of their 
studies’ limitations, those who access scientific information via non-scholarly media may not be. 
To contextualize my discussion of the Brainiac topos in this chapter, I wish to emphasize 
the supreme importance of scientific research—and to an even greater extent, popular science  
publications—in its ongoing construction and widespread circulation. Table 1 shares 15 journal 
articles and monographs that are, as far as I can tell, the most widely-cited scholarly publications  
by psy- scientists who have investigated the supposed link between mental illness and special 
mental gifts. Compiled through cross-referenced searches for relevant madness/genius keywords 
on the Web of Science, perhaps the largest and most precise citation database used in academic 
science fields, this archive represents the dominant scholarly positions on the Brainiac topos  
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since the date of the first article’s publication. In Andreasen’s (1987) own words, empirical 
research on the relationship between “genius and insanity” was nearly nonexistent prior to her 
landmark study: “In spite of the considerable interest in this topic, quantitative studies have been 
sparse, and none of the published studies . . . has used modern diagnostic techniques” (p. 1288). 
But although Andreasen’s study was the first of its kind, it certainly was not the last—per table 
1, research on the Brainiac topos exploded in the late-twentieth century, and it has remained 
Table 1 
 
Influential Scientific Research on the Brainiac Topos, 1987-2020 
 
Year Author(s) Journal Title Citations 
1987 Andreasen American Journal of 
Psychiatry 
Creativity and mental illness: Prevalence rates in writers 
and their first-degree relatives 
415 
1989 Jamison Psychiatry Mood disorders and patterns of creativity in British writers 
and artists 
246 
1992 Ludwig American Journal of 
Psychotherapy 
Creative achievement and psychopathology: Comparison 
among professions 
128 
1993 Jamison — Touched with fire: Manic-depressive illness and the 
artistic temperament 
408 
1994 Post British Journal of 
Psychiatry 
Creativity and psychopathology: A study of 291 world-
famous men 
238 
1994 Ludwig American Journal of 
Psychiatry 
Mental illness and creative activity in female writers 95 
1995 Ludwig — The price of greatness: Resolving the creativity and 
madness controversy 
176 
2006 Nettle Journal of Research in 
Personality 
Schizotypy and mental health amongst poets, visual artists, 
and mathematicians 
149 
2006 Burch et al. British Journal of 
Psychology 
Schizotypy and creativity in visual artists 107 
2007 Santosa et al. Journal of Affective 
Disorders 
Enhanced creativity in bipolar disorder patients: A 
controlled study 
88 
2008 Akinola & 
Mendes 
Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 
The dark side of creativity: Biological vulnerability and 
negative emotions lead to greater artistic creativity 
102 
2011 Kyaga et al. British Journal of 
Psychiatry 
Creativity and mental disorder: Family study of 300,000 
people with severe mental disorder 
148 
2011 Carson Canadian Journal of 
Psychiatry 
Creativity and psychopathology: A shared vulnerability 
model 
103 
2013 Kyaga et al. Journal of Psychiatric 
Research 
Mental illness, suicide and creativity: 40-Year prospective 
total population study 
107 
2015 Power et al. Nature Neuroscience Polygenic risk scores for schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder predict creativity 
149 
 
Note. “Citations” refers to the number of times each publication has been cited in other scholarly publications (according 




constant ever since. And do any of these studies prove the existence of a link between mental 
illness and special mental abilities? That is a subject of much debate, but two things are certain: 
1) The authors generally believed they did, and each one framed their study as an expansion of 
previous research findings.3 2) Their work has successfully convinced millions of people that the 
Brainiac topos is scientific fact—including the popular science writers who continue to cite these 
decades-old studies as their primary sources of evidence for madness/genius claims. For these 
reasons, Becker (2014) summarizes the current state of Brainiac research as follows: 
“Notwithstanding dissenting views, the combined force of the most recent studies has led to 
something resembling a consensus, one that views the link between creativity and illness. . . as a 
genuine, pervasive, and timeless phenomenon with decided biological roots” (p. 3). 
Like all offshoots of Mad Genius rhetoric, the Brainiac topos can be found in myriad 
fiction and non-fiction cultural artifacts, but it is reasonable to think that science journalism is the 
most persuasive of all forums in which Brainiac arguments are commonly made. Popular science 
media are infused with the legitimacy of scientific knowledge—which is assumed to be objective 
and factual—while being far more accessible (financially, linguistically, physically, etc.) to the 
average science enthusiast than leading academic journals. For insights into the general public’s 
perceptions of Brainiac research, then, it is instructive to examine its portrayal in popular science 
publications. In particular, given that quantitative research on the Brainiac topos is most often 
conducted by psy- scientists and clinicians, I choose to survey how this topic has been depicted 
in/on the popular magazine and website Psychology Today. Founded in 1967, Psychology Today 
 
3With striking consistency, each of the studies listed in table 1 cites all those that precede it in 
this archive. The only exceptions to this are that Post (1994) did not cite Ludwig (1992), and 
Ludwig (1995) did not cite Post (1994). Additionally, as both Jamison and Ludwig published 
monographs that reiterated the findings of their earlier works, some subsequent scholars only 
cited those books and not the authors’ original journal articles (or vice-versa). 
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currently consists of a bimonthly print magazine and an extensive online archive of expert blog 
posts, encyclopedia entries, self-tests, and a database of therapy providers. According to the 
magazine’s own estimates, Psychology Today publishes more than 50 new articles on its website 
every day, generating roughly 21.4 million unique visitors and 52 million page views per month 
(“Digital Advertising,” 2020). By comparison, digital market intelligence company SimilarWeb 
estimates that Psychology Today’s website received 26.5 million visits (of 2.06 pages per visit) 
in December 2020, ranking Psychology Today as the number one most-visited site worldwide in 
the category of Mental Health (“PsychologyToday.com: December 2020 Overview,” n.d.). 
Although data collected early in Psychology Today’s history showed a significant decline 
in both its reliance on empirical research and its contributors’ average education levels over time 
(Smith & Schroeder, 1980), at present, the magazine’s website strongly emphasizes its authors’ 
credibility: “These renowned thinkers include top psychologists and psychiatrists, as well as 
intelligence operatives, lawyers, essayists, doctors, and animal researchers with a trained lens on 
what makes us tick” (“Meet Our Contributors,” n.d.). But irrespective of—or perhaps due to—
Psychology Today’s assertions that “articles on psychologytoday.com are written by [a] network 
of expert authors,” the magazine has been a subject of intermittent political and intellectual 
controversy in its 54 years of circulation. As recently as 2015, for example, Psychology Today 
was widely criticized for its refusal to remove advertisements for ex-gay “conversion” therapists 
from its database—this despite the American Psychological Association’s longstanding rejection 
of the belief that therapy can alter sexual/gender identity and (relatedly) the increasing illegality 
of practicing such therapies on minors in the United States (Shapiro, 2015).4 In 2011, a blog post 
 
4Psychology Today has since reversed this decision, announcing in an official statement on the 
organization’s website that it “does not endorse or publish ads for reparative therapy in print, 
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by evolutionary psychologist Satoshi Kanazowa titled “Why Are Black Women Less Physically 
Attractive Than Other Women?” also sparked enormous outrage for its claims that the author’s 
overtly racist and misogynist views were supported by scientific data (Sehgal, 2011). According 
to Nyabola (2011)’s analysis of Kanazowa’s piece, such writing illuminates “just how dangerous 
this kind of ‘science’ can be” through its exploitation of readers’ limited science literacy and 
consequent trust in academic authors (para. 1): “it’s a classic trick in which pseudoscientists 
blind you with multicoloured graphs and three decimal place figures to convince lay readers that 
their research was thorough and is conclusive. I mean, who can argue with three decimal 
places?” (para. 5). As these two events illustrate, the perceived offensiveness—and harmfulness 
—of prejudicial attitudes seems to grow exponentially when they are promoted by credentialed 
experts on a website that brands itself as a purveyor of scientific knowledge. 
Table 2 lists every blog post published on Psychology Today in the past decade that 
explicitly cites the research listed in Table 1 to support the blogger’s discussion of a connection 
between mental illness and mental talents. Following a common convention of internet writing—
and of blog posts in particular—14 of these 20 articles pose a question in either their titles or 
subtitles (or in one case, both). The rhetorical impact of doing this is obvious: these titles draw in 
audiences who wish to know the answers to those questions, and they also invite readers to 
provide their own responses via a comment on the authors’ blogs. To articulate the topic of one’s 
writing as an interrogative sentence, in general, implies both that the answer is not already 
common knowledge and that one possesses special insights into the issue at hand—and when the 
topic is framed as a simple Yes/No question, it seems all the more reasonable to expect an 
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The Brainiac Topos/Mad Genius on PsychologyToday.com, 2010-2020 
 
Year Author(s) Title & Subtitle Cites 
2010 Jaffe Depression’s upside, down: Are we fooling ourselves to say 
depression has an upside? 
Andreasen (1987); Jamison 
(1989); Ludwig (1995) 
2010 Kaufman Schizotypy, flow, and the artist’s experience: Is the creative 
experience schizo? 
Nettle (2006) 
2011 Latham Bipolar or Bi-Winning? Sometimes it’s hard to tell the difference Jamison 
2011 Robinson Does madness enhance or diminish genius?: Why we are 
fascinated by Vincent van Gogh 
Post (1994) 
2012 Burton Bipolar disorder and creativity: What explains the link between 
bipolar disorder and creativity? 
Andreasen (1987); Jamison 
(1989, 1995); Post (1994); 
Santosa et al. (2007) 
2013 Haupt Writing fiction is my anti-depressant: Can indulging your creative 
side boost your mood? 
Carson (2011/career); Jamison 
(1989/career); Akinola & 
Mendes (2008) 
2013 Kaufman Is angst behind all great creativity?: Angst may not be the best 
catalyst for your creativity 
Jamison (1989/career) 
2013 Kumar Creative occupations and psychological disorders: Is creativity 
linked to psychological disorders? 
Kyaga et al. (2011, 2013) 
2014 Vitelli In search of the mad genius: Are highly creative people more 
prone to mental illness? 
Carson (2011) 
2014 Vyse Halloween and the Mad Scientist problem: Horror movies and the 
fear of science 
Jamison (1993) 
2014 Badcock Can you be both mad and creative? The cliché of the mad genius 
has a real core of truth 
Jamison (1989); Ludwig (1995) 
2015 Gabora The silver lining around fearful living: How threatening stuff can 
bring out your creative side 
Akinola & Mendes (2008) 
2015 Davey Mood disorders and creativity: Does psychological disturbance 
increase creativity? 
Jamison (1989, 1995); Kyaga et 
al. (2013); Ludwig (1995) 
2015 Burton Mad genius: Schizophrenia and creativity: What, if anything, is 
the link between psychosis and creativity? 
Kyaga et al. (2011) 
2015 Rubin Creativity and psychiatric illnesses: Creativity, schizophrenia, 
and bipolar disorder may share genes 
Power (2015) 
2016 Maisel Judith Schlesinger on creative genius and the Insanity Hoax: On 
the future of mental health 
Jamison (1989/career) 
2016 Palumbo Breaking news: Writing is hard! Work the problem—Don’t make 
yourself the problem 
Jamison 
2017 Griffiths Psychology, art, and body fluids: A brief look at the extreme 
world of bodily fluid art 
Jamison (1993); Post (1994) 
2019 Ehrenfeld Are creative people crazier?: Yes, being ‘a little bit’ bipolar or 
schizophrenic is linked to creativity 
Kyaga et al. (2013) 
2020 Wright Is there a thin line between genius and insanity?: Part 1: Are tales 
of ‘mad geniuses’ accurate representations? 
Post (1994) 
 
Note. Not all of these posts include a formal reference list, and in some cases, a scholar’s entire career is cited in lieu of 
some specific study. Sources from Table 1 were counted as “Cited” in Table 2 if they were mentioned by three or more of 
the following details: the scholar’s name, the year of the study, the methods employed, and key findings. These posts were 
identified foremost through searches for scholars’ names, thus this archive is likely missing some posts published during 
this time that cited information from those sources but omitted other identifying details. 
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answer in the body of the text. Hence, it is noteworthy that ten of the blog post titles/subtitles in 
Table 2 do contain a Yes/No question: “Are we fooling ourselves to say depression has an 
upside?” (Jaffe, 2010); “Is the creative experience schizo?” (Kaufman, 2010); “Can indulging 
your creative side boost your mood?” (Haupt, 2013); “Is angst behind all great creativity?” 
(Kaufman, 2013); “Is creativity linked to psychological disorders?” (Kumar, 2013); “Are highly 
creative people more prone to mental illness?” (Vitelli, 2014); “Can you be both mad and 
creative?” (Badcock, 2014); “Does psychological disturbance increase creativity?” (Davey, 
2015); “Are creative people crazier?” (Ehrenfeld, 2019); “Is there a thin line between genius and 
insanity? . . . Are tales of ‘mad geniuses’ accurate representations?” (Wright, 2020). 
A majority of the blog post titles/subtitles cited above can be paraphrased as, “Is madness 
really linked to genius?”—and more often than not, the other half of the headline hints at the 
author’s answer to this question, and that answer is “yes.” Most notably, Badcock (2014) claims 
that “The cliché of the mad genius has a real core of truth” and Ehrenfeld (2019) asserts, “Yes, 
being ‘a little bit’ bipolar or schizophrenic is linked to creativity.” But even those titles that are 
not formulated as Yes/No questions (or as questions at all) strongly suggest the authors’ support 
of the Brainiac topos: Burton’s (2012) query of “What explains the link between bipolar disorder 
and creativity?” clearly assumes such a link exists, as does Gabora’s (2015) explanation of “How 
threatening stuff can bring out your creative side” or, more subtly, Latham’s (2011) remark that 
“Sometimes it’s hard to tell the difference” between mania and “winning,” Rubin’s (2015) claim 
that “Creativity, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder may share genes,” and Robinson’s (2011) 
account of “Why we are fascinated by Vincent van Gogh” (i.e., “the most celebrated example of 
 
 89 
a genius who was mentally ill”) (para. 2).5 Scrolling past these articles on the Psychology Today 
homepage or any news aggregator, some readers may be persuaded by their headlines’ bold 
language that the articles’ actual body texts are not required reading. As distillations of popular 
science essays—that are themselves distillations of highly complex, context-dependent scholarly 
research—these blog post titles instantly convey exciting scientific conclusions without delving 
into the (considerably less exciting) human-made processes that produced them. But readers who 
do click these links seeking scientific validation of the Brainiac topos will not be disappointed. 
Like the scholars they cite, some of the bloggers listed in Table 2 offer more nuanced discussions 
of their sources’ limitations than others: Vitelli (2014), for one, acknowledges that “the actual 
scientific evidence [for Mad Genius] is still scarce” (para. 1) and “the methodology has often 
been flawed” (para. 6); Robinson (2011) also affirms that “establish[ing] a definitive connection 
between mental illness and creativity is impossible, at present” because “Psychologists and 
psychiatrists assess it very differently” (para. 10). Nevertheless, none of these authors entirely 
rejects the notion that mental illness might be connected to special mental gifts. 
To persons who hold the Brainiac topos in high esteem, regarding this concept as an 
objective truth rather than a cultural cliché, it may seem redundant to observe that scientific 
research has often supported Brainiac-type hypotheses and those findings are reflected in popular 
science writing. Still, it is absolutely crucial to acknowledge that this research trend is a product 
of human thought and behavior, and a fairly recent one at that—there was a time before 
Andreasen’s 1987 study when psy- science academics did not generally promote the notion of a 
 
5It would be difficult to argue against Robinson’s claim here. In total, nine of the articles listed in 
Table 2 (i.e., almost half of the archive) mention Vincent van Gogh by name in their titles, body 
texts, and/or authors’ biographies: Davey (2015); Griffiths (2017); Latham (2011); Maisel 
(2016); Palumbo (2016); Robinson (2011); Vitelli (2014); Vyse (2014); Wright (2020). 
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biological basis to Mad Genius, just as there have been times when mental illness itself was not 
commonly assumed to be biological, when there were no standardized criteria for diagnosing 
mental disorders, when formal psy- science research did not exist at all, and so on. Needless to 
say, I do not suggest here that scientific research is invalid or entirely subjective; I only stress the 
fact that human agency affects which topics are studied in academic contexts and, subsequently, 
which research findings are circulated and absorbed among the general public. Clearly, humans 
are intrigued by the Brainiac topos, and personal values of some kind must underlie both popular 
and scholarly writers’ investment in publicizing Brainiac research—most obviously, it might be 
their commitments to truth and education. But even if it is true that persons with mental illness 
are, biologically, endowed with special abilities by virtue of being mentally ill, that does not 
explain why such knowledge is assumed to be important. From a rhetorical perspective, what is 
the advantage (and for whom) of persuading people that an age-old cultural stereotype about 
“madness” is actually a scientific fact about persons with psychiatric diagnoses? 
Although our beliefs are strongly shaped by scientific data, only a relatively tiny fraction 
of the world’s population (i.e., accredited scientists) ever exerts direct control over that form of 
knowledge production. And in the case of the Brainiac topos, specifically, Schlesinger (2012) 
has argued for years that widespread belief in madness conferring genius is “largely due to the 
work of just three people: psychiatrists Nancy Andreasen and Arnold Ludwig and especially 
psychologist Kay Jamison” (p. 94). Indeed, Schlesinger elaborates elsewhere: 
Andreasen conducted what is often referred to as “the landmark” study. . . .  
Jamison followed with the most influential in 1989, and then in 1993, produced 
the proverbial bible of the creativity and madness movement, Touched With Fire: 
Manic Depression and the Artistic Temperament. . . . Jamison has always been 
the most vocal and prolific advocate of the link between artistic endeavor and 
psychopathology—particularly bipolar disorder—and remains the media’s 




On the basis of Kay Redfield Jamison’s illustrious scholarly career and her recent celebrity as an 
advocate for mentally ill persons, Schlesinger implies that she is directly responsible for the 
proliferation of Mad Genius rhetoric since the 1990s. As noted above, Schlesinger has surely 
been the harshest critic of Mad Genius rhetoric—and of Jamison, in particular—over the past 
decade, but she is not alone in emphasizing Jamison’s influence over cultural discourse about 
mental illness. Emmons (2010) identifies Jamison as one of several “poster children” for mental 
illness in the U.S., arguing that such figures are “examples against and through which readers 
learn to judge themselves. . . . [they] portray the recognizable faces of the illness” (p. 137). 
Similarly, in her groundbreaking autoethnographic study Bipolar Expeditions, Martin (2007) 
observes that Jamison’s “effect on the public representation of mental illness [has been] 
dramatic. . . . It would be hard to exaggerate the impact of Jamison’s work” (p. 23). Finally, 
Berman (2019) seems to agree with Schlesinger—albeit not for the purpose of disparaging 
Jamison—in his estimation that “Jamison has contributed perhaps more than anyone to an 
understanding of the interaction of mood disorders and the artistic temperament” (p. 122). 
Maybe Touched With Fire is the “bible” of the Brainiac topos, as Schlesinger asserts—
note that it is the second most widely-cited publication in Table 1—but Jamison’s most famous 
and revered work is, without a doubt, her 1995 memoir An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods 
and Madness. To examine the functions of Mad Genius rhetoric in autobiographical writing, 
then, I am all but duty-bound to perform a close reading of that text. In the following section, I 
review key events in Jamison’s scholarly career that directly contributed to the writing and (later) 
the reception of her memoir. Having situated my case study in this chapter within existing 
analyses of An Unquiet Mind as an “inspirational” narrative, I then show how Jamison enacts a 
Brainiac persona in this text by portraying her illness as both genetic and advantageous. 
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An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness 
Few persons can be credited for transforming prevalent perceptions of mental illness—
both popular and scholarly—during their lifetimes to the extent that Kay Redfield Jamison has. 
Long before she published her first memoir at the age of 49, Jamison earned a Ph.D. in clinical 
psychology at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), eventually joining the UCLA 
faculty as an assistant professor of psychiatry in 1974. Over the two decades that followed, 
Jamison’s research delved into such diverse topics as narcotics addiction, psychosocial aspects of 
mastectomy, and chronic pain syndrome, but it was for her research on manic-depressive illness 
(MDI) that she was soon recognized as a leading expert in her field.6 By 1990, Jamison had co-
authored “the definitive textbook on manic-depression” (simply titled Manic-Depressive Illness), 
dedicating one of its lengthy chapters to research on creativity and MDI (Hogan & Hogan, 2001, 
p. 50). A subsection of that chapter titled “Importance of Studying Positive Aspects of Manic-
Depressive Illness” asserts that “we should be careful not to disregard [the] beneficial features” 
of mood disorders, since “Understanding the assets that accompany manic-depressive illness . . . 
is as important to a thorough understanding of the illness as knowledge of its natural history, 
physiology, and psychopathology” (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990, p. 363). To illuminate the 
authoritative tone of these statements (and others similar) in Jamison’s textbook, one might 
consider that, when the second edition of Manic-Depressive Illness was published nearly 20 
years later, the latter sentence was rewritten as: “Understanding the assets that may accompany 
manic-depressive illness . . . is important to a thorough understanding of the illness” (Goodwin & 
Jamison, 2007, p. 402). Reflecting current scholarly views of the Brainiac topos, MDI’s benefits 
 
6Although the term “bipolar disorder” is more common in contemporary parlance, I use the term 
“manic-depressive illness” (abbreviated as “MDI”) to refer to Jamison’s illness throughout this 
chapter because that is her preferred term. See Jamison, 1995, pp. 181-82. 
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are now framed as a possibility (that “may” exist) rather than a proven fact, and understanding 
this topic is simply “important” rather than being of equal importance to biological/medical 
knowledge. The original edition’s phrasing is, in comparison, remarkably assertive. 
Manic-Depressive Illness was lauded for its unprecedented discussion of the link between 
MDI and valued personality traits, leading a reviewer in the prestigious New England Journal of 
Medicine to write: “The chapter on creativity is a particular gem, thoughtfully highlighting the 
association of this disorder with artistic, political, and religious leadership. It includes marvelous 
quotes (from the famous and infamous) and vignettes” (Goldman, 1991, pp. 778-79). But despite 
its intended usage as a scientific textbook, Manic-Depressive Illness could also be classified as 
Jamison’s first creative and/or autobiographical publication—its factual material is interspersed 
with bits of self-reflective writing simply credited to “a patient with manic-depressive illness” 
who was later revealed to be Jamison herself (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990, p. 18, 41, 236, 725, 
746, 747, 769, etc.). Interestingly, no indication is given in the original Manic-Depressive Illness 
that most (if not all) of these creative snippets were composed by the same individual, but nearly 
all of them subsequently appeared—expanded, and with minimal edits—in An Unquiet Mind. 
Hence, although the second edition of Manic-Depressive Illness eliminated most of Jamison’s 
creative/autobiographical contributions, those that remain are marked with the following end 
note: “This description and others written by ‘a patient with manic-depressive illness’ were 
written by one of the authors, Kay R. Jamison” (Goodwin & Jamison, 2007, p. 868).7 
In 1993, Jamison published the aforementioned Touched With Fire, a 370-page popular 
science book in which the author summarizes her position on creativity and MDI as follows: 
 
7For a more detailed discussion of the overlaps between Manic-Depressive Illness and An 
Unquiet Mind, see Berman, 2019, pp. 27-34. 
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The basic argument of this book is not that all writers and artists are depressed, 
suicidal, or manic. It is, rather, that a greatly disproportionate number of them are; 
that the manic-depressive and artistic temperaments are. . . causally related to one 
another. The genetic basis of manic-depressive illness provides not only one part 
of this argument, but also the constitutional core of . . . temperament. (p. 237) 
 
Here Jamison clarifies that the subject of her book is not what I would call the Tortured Artist 
topos (i.e., the notion that genius leads to madness), but rather her belief that biological MDI is 
“causally related” to artistic ability. Still, Touched With Fire is probably best remembered for its 
concluding appendix of “Writers, Artists, and Composers with Probable Cyclothymia, Major 
Depression, or Manic-Depressive Illness” (Jamison, 1993, pp. 267-70). This resource lists 166 
eminent creative persons whose life stories suggested to Jamison—because they allegedly spent 
time in psychiatric institutions, died by (or attempted) suicide, had family histories of mental 
illness, or were otherwise represented as intensely moody in auto/biographical records—that they 
were mentally ill. Although Jamison frames her famous appendix as “an illustrative rather than 
comprehensive list,” referring readers to the body text for “systematic studies,” her judgments 
therein have been cited and reprinted in numerous publications in the years since Touched With 
Fire was first released (Jamison, 1993, p. 268). For instance, Lipton’s (2013) Psychology Today 
article on the psychology of “silence” provides the following endorsement of Jamison’s research: 
See Kay Redfield Jamison’s wonderful book, Touched with Fire (1993) for 
another huge list of those silenced by depression and bipolar disorder. If you want 
to be shocked, go directly to the end to see her list of authors and artists with 
major mental disorders, and those who were silenced by suicide. (para. 7) 
 
As Lipton’s comments suggest, Jamison’s list has often been embraced by fellow psychologists 
as not only scientifically valid, but groundbreaking (i.e., “huge” and “shocking”).  
Vehemently opposing her colleagues’ esteem for Touched With Fire, Schlesinger (2009) 
highlights possible shortcomings of its appendix, including the fact that “there is no bibliography 
to facilitate source-checking” (p. 5) and “There [is] considerable ambiguity about which 
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diagnostic criteria were used” to produce it (p. 6). As a consequence, Schlesinger suggests it is 
Jamison’s credentials and her readers’ basic desire to believe in Mad Genius—not the legitimacy 
of her research findings—that explains the popularity of this list. Schlesinger writes: 
At this point, the question becomes: How many of the list selections rest solely on 
Jamison’s say-so? But even if the answer were “all of them,” given her 
prominence and the common expectation that all great artists are wired for 
psychopathology, for most people her opinion alone will suffice. (2009, p. 6) 
 
Notwithstanding Schlesinger’s incendiary tone, her observations here are not entirely invalid. 
Although Jamison asserts in several places of Touched With Fire that her judgments are based on 
“autobiographical, biographical, and medical sources,” and references are provided for some of 
the historical figures she discusses—most notably, a list of sources is given for each of the 36 
entries in a table titled “Mood Disorders and Suicide in British and Irish Poets Born 1705-
1805”—there is very little attribution of specific claims to specific sources (1993, p. 283). For a 
large majority of the entries in the concluding appendix, no citations are given whatsoever. 
Moreover, per Jamison’s note to the appendix, all of these individuals were deceased at the time 
of her list’s creation; it is impossible to evaluate them with modern diagnostic criteria (1993, p. 
267). Still, through her widely-cited 1989 study, co-authoring of Manic-Depressive Illness, and 
especially through the publication of Touched With Fire, Jamison had established herself as the 
world’s top authority on the subject of creativity and mental illness—indeed, her opinions were 
highly regarded. And they still are: in 1995, Jamison’s many scholarly achievements were all 
arguably eclipsed by the runaway success of her first memoir, An Unquiet Mind. It is on this 
book that I focus the remainder of this chapter, intervening in existing scholarly analyses of both 
Jamison’s career and the specific arguments her memoir makes about her mental illness. 
Chronicling Jamison’s secret lifelong struggles with MDI, An Unquiet Mind spent five 
months on the New York Times bestseller list, has been translated into 25 languages, and partly 
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inspired—along with Jamison’s other works—a 2015 film titled Touched With Fire in which 
Jamison made a cameo appearance (Lapin, 2015, para. 2). Given Jamison’s identity as a scholar 
and practitioner of psychology, it is understandable that her book has generally been embraced 
by academic and medical institutions. Like many memoirs of psychiatric illness, An Unquiet 
Mind has often been recommended as an educational tool for clinicians and patients (see 
Armstrong 2012; Boyd, 1997; Whitley, 2012). But according to a study by Clifford et al. (1998), 
Jamison’s memoir also had the special distinction of being the most highly-rated/ranked mental 
illness memoir in a survey of 362 clinical psychologists (p. 58). Hence, Stefan (2003) compares 
Jamison’s book to William Styron’s Darkness Visible, noting that both authors “credit mental 
health professionals, medication, and hospitalization with saving their lives” and their narratives 
“are not indictments of the present mental health system in any sense” (p. 1370). Similarly, 
Schoeneman et al. (2012) find Jamison’s use of figurative language to be highly consistent with 
Styron’s, concluding that the two are “clearly drawing from a common source of metaphoric 
anchors” in their subjective descriptions of mental illness (p. 203). On the other hand, Beilke 
(2008) and Farber (2012) each contrasts An Unquiet Mind with Kate Millett’s 1990 memoir The 
Loony-Bin Trip, suggesting the latter is less widely read due to its rejection of psychiatric 
medicine and Millet’s MDI diagnosis. Apparently disparaging Jamison as a “fervent apostle of 
the biopsychiatric model” (p. 211), Farber writes: “Psychiatrists recommend that their educated 
patients read Jamison. They do not mention Millett, and why should they? Their goal is to make 
a living, not to affirm the sanctity of the soul” (p. 248).  
For Beilke (2008), the most meaningful difference between The Loony-Bin Trip and An 
Unquiet Mind lies in their understandings of identity and selfhood for persons with MDI: Millett 
“conceptualizes her mind and her self as identical,” feeling that psychiatrists are “dismissing her 
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core self, her basic identity” by labeling her as mentally ill, whereas Jamison “emphasizes a core 
identity, a self that exists apart from her mind and apart from her bipolar disorder” (p. 32). 
Furthermore, it may be due to Jamison’s “academic background in biology” and “professional 
affiliation as a psychologist” that she is able to accept her diagnosis and maintain a sense of 
personal wholeness despite her MDI (2008, p. 32). Hope et al. (2011) interpret An Unquiet Mind 
quite similarly to Beilke, observing in their analysis of “authentic” identities in mental illness 
memoirs that Jamison “does not write much about authenticity” in relation to her MDI because 
she perceives her condition “very much as a biological illness separate from her identity” (p. 28). 
But other scholars read Jamison’s portrayal of her personal identity—and her relationship with 
biological psychiatry—as considerably more complex. According to Hogan and Hogan (2001), 
Jamison’s belief in a biological model of MDI ensures that her illness is always both “an ‘it,’ an 
impersonal condition” and “part and parcel of the self,” thus the “irresolvable ambiguity in the 
heart of the manic-depressive identity” also “lies at the heart of her story” (p. 50). Additionally, 
Bullard (2002) suggests that although Jamison portrays psychiatric drugs as “the motor force of 
her journey toward wholeness” (p. 284), she experiences even further identity crises as a result of 
treating her MDI: medication provides “access to the ‘normal’ world that had always eluded 
her,” but it does so by “[making] Jamison’s own psychic landscape into a foreign land” (p. 285).  
Despite Jamison’s ostensible support for biological psychiatry, An Unquiet Mind is also 
occasionally cited as a (feminist) critique of medicine, especially for its discussion of a doctor 
who once commanded Jamison not to have children because of her MDI (see Morrow, 2006; 
Pryal, 2010; Sayce & Perkins, 2002; Selden, 2005; White, 2008). For example, in contrast to 
Beilke and Farber’s research cited above, White (2008) basically likens An Unquiet Mind to The 
Loony-Bin Trip (along with Susanna Kaysen’s Girl, Interrupted), explaining how all three 
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memoirs challenge mental health stigma and argue for social change. According to White’s 
reading, Jamison’s memoir “focus[es] on the way this marginalization plays out within academic 
and medical communities” (p. 9). Nonetheless, White infers that Jamison is ultimately optimistic 
about psy- science, stressing how An Unquiet Mind “imagines a future where scientific 
breakthroughs will lead to important advancements” in mental healthcare (p. 11). 
Pryal (2010) also examines the rhetorical aspects of An Unquiet Mind alongside other 
memoirs about mental illness, emphasizing how they argue for the authors’ credibility before 
stigmatizing audiences. One strategy Pryal describes is “criticizing doctors,” and she too explains 
how Jamison uses her “authority as a clinical scientist” to “pinpoint the weaknesses of medical 
treatment” (e.g., some doctors’ lack of “knowledge and professionalism”) (p. 494). Furthermore, 
Pryal describes Jamison’s discussions of the Brainiac topos (which she calls “the creative genius 
trope”) as a form of “laying claim”—that is, a way of defending one’s credibility as a mentally ill 
person by “locating oneself within a tradition of creative geniuses” who were also mentally ill (p. 
496). Jamison and other authors perpetuate the notion that madness confers genius, Pryal argues, 
for the purpose of “removing the taboo from mental illness” and “helping other sufferers to be 
more open” about their diagnoses (p. 498). However, Pryal foregrounds the fact that Brainiac 
research is “built on weak historical and scientific evidence,” and “the causation—that is, the 
notion that mood disorders cause creativity—is not at all clear” (p. 498). My own investigation 
of An Unquiet Mind proceeds from Pryal’s study in this respect, delving more deeply into 
Jamison’s construction of a Brainiac persona as a means of coping with mental health stigma. 
Case Study: An Unquiet Mind and the Brainiac Topos 
Pryal (2010) suggests the appeal of the Brainiac topos is its power to persuade audiences 
“that one can achieve great things even with, or because of, a mood disorder” (p. 498). For 
readers of An Unquiet Mind, in particular, it seems especially tempting to attribute Jamison’s 
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distinguished career to her symptoms of MDI. In point of fact, Chrisman (2011) places Jamison’s 
memoir on a shortlist of texts that have been “not just inspirational but lifesaving for [her],” 
calling for a reclamation of “inspiration” in disability studies—especially with regards to 
narratives of psychiatric disability (p. 181). Presumably unintentionally, Chrisman echoes Pryal 
in her praise for An Unquiet Mind: “Jamison’s memoir illuminates the possibility of completing 
degrees, maintaining a professional life, having stable intimate relationships, and living a 
genuinely fulfilled existence despite (even because of) a severe, though treatable mental illness” 
(p. 182). That Jamison’s story might be inspiring to persons with mental illness may be the most 
common of all reactions to her memoir—not only is she admired for her exceptional career, 
which reassures other persons with MDI that they might similarly “overcome” their illnesses, but 
readers also frequently applaud her “bravery,” “courage,” and so on for deciding to come 
forward with her illness (see for instance Berman, 2019, p. 134; Boyd, 1997, p. 351; Myers, 
2004, p. 270; Schoeneman et al., 2012, p. 186; Squier, 2004, p. 41; etc.).  
Naturally, individuals who write about taboo experiences in the memoir genre are fairly 
frequently described as brave. Yet it is clear that readers’ conceptions of Jamison’s bravery, 
specifically, is closely tied to her success as a scholar and practitioner of psychology. According 
to Berman (2019), writing a mental illness memoir is “immeasurably more daunting for 
psychotherapists” than it is for authors from other professions (p. 119). Berman elaborates: 
They could lose not only their present patients, as well as future referrals, but also 
their license to practice psychotherapy. There’s no stigma for oncologists or 
cardiologists to write a memoir about their struggles with cancer or heart disease; 
there is stigma for a therapist to write about personal experience with depression 
or manic depression. . . . These fears and others confronted Kay Redfield Jamison 
before she made the momentous decision to write An Unquiet Mind (p. 119) 
 
Clearly, Jamison’s eminent career is a central focus of the story she tells in An Unquiet Mind—it 
is both the domain in which she demonstrates her exceptional abilities and, for that reason, it is 
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the site of her greatest fears in relation to her illness. Whereas Chrisman and Pryal more subtly 
hint that Jamison’s success is “because of” her MDI (or portrayed as such), I contend that the 
Brainiac topos is an essential feature of her narration in An Unquiet Mind. Specifically, the 
following analysis briefly traces two basic, interrelated arguments that Jamison makes about 
MDI all throughout the text. The first is that MDI is an entirely genetic, biological illness; the 
second is that MDI absolutely does confer special advantages upon its sufferers. By enacting a 
Brainiac persona in the writing of her life story—in other words, by self-presenting as both a 
brainy maniac and a manic brain—Jamison stands to gain a sense of unity between these two 
seemingly disparate fragments of her identity. Above all, she implicitly resists stigmatizing 
cultural discourses that construe mentally ill people as irrational and therefore unproductive. 
Coming By It Honestly: Genetic Origins of Jamison’s MDI 
 Fundamental to the Brainiac topos is the idea that madness precedes genius: it is 
precisely due to one’s mental illness that one is, in a sense, granted access to extraordinary 
psychic realms. Under the contemporary psychiatric paradigm, this might mean that we assume a 
person with mental illness is afflicted with a biological disease, and their special mental gifts (if 
they have them) are understood as a symptom of that underlying condition. Interestingly, as the 
most severe symptoms of many mental illnesses do not tend to manifest until a person’s late 
teens or early twenties, it is certain that some persons receive a psychiatric diagnosis well after 
they have already been labeled as creative, intelligent, other otherwise gifted. If taken to an 
extreme, then, the Brainiac topos may assume that the Brainiac was born with their apparent 
predisposition towards madness, thus ensuring that any and all signs of genius they exhibit later 
in life are attributable to that core aspect of their identity. And for Jamison in An Unquiet Mind, 
there can be no doubt that her MDI is rooted in some as-yet unknown—but nonetheless utterly 
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genuine—hereditary basis. Through Jamison’s portrayal of the onset of her mental illness, her 
reflections on her extended family’s experiences of psychological distress, and her optimistic 
expectations for future scientific research on MDI, An Unquiet Mind quite actively promotes the 
author’s opinion that her illness is not only biological, but also fundamentally genetic. 
From the very beginning of An Unquiet Mind, the text subtly introduces the notion that 
Jamison’s MDI is a genetic disease. On the second page of the Prologue, Jamison affirms that 
her symptoms have affected her “For as long as [she] can remember,” characterizing herself as 
“Intensely emotional as a child, mercurial as a young girl, [and] first severely depressed as an 
adolescent” (1995, p. 4). The implication that her illness was brought on by internal, rather than 
environmental, factors is made all the more explicit in the following chapter’s detailed 
descriptions of her childhood. As a military family, Jamison’s family moved frequently 
throughout her early years, but the text emphasizes that her parents “kept life as secure, warm, 
and constant as possible” for their children (p. 13). Indeed, in contrast to her sister’s apparent 
unhappiness with the family’s “conservative military lifestyle,” Jamison recalls that she herself 
“basically loved school” and was “vigorously involved in sports and friends and class activities” 
(p. 14). Reflecting on her gratitude for her parents’ love and support, she writes: 
The long and important years of childhood and early adolescence were, for the 
most part, very happy ones for me, and they afforded me a solid base of warmth, 
friendship, and confidence. They were to be an extremely powerful amulet, a 
potent and positive countervailing force against future unhappiness. (p. 15) 
 
In Jamison’s view, the circumstances of her early upbringing were not at all responsible for her 
later struggles with MDI—as a protective “amulet” against her internal turmoil, the stability of 
her childhood may actually have mitigated the most negative outcomes of her illness. That she 
did eventually develop severe MDI despite the effectiveness of this “countervailing force” is, her 
narration indicates, further evidence of her extreme predisposition towards this disease. 
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Although Jamison dismisses the possibility that her family could have contributed to her 
MDI through environmental factors, multiple moments of An Unquiet Mind imply that Jamison’s 
family affected—or rather, caused—her MDI through genetic factors. For example, Jamison’s 
depictions of both her sister’s and her father’s volatile emotions during her adolescence strongly 
suggest a connection between the “very black and passing moods” (p. 14) and “the blackness [of] 
depression” (p. 35) she ascribes to them (respectively) and her own “violent struggles with black 
moods” in later years (p. 14). It is noteworthy, too, that as the plot of An Unquiet Mind 
progresses towards Jamison’s earliest memories of MDI-related mood swings, she defines her 
symptoms in relation to behavior she had previously witnessed in her father: “I soon found out 
that it was not just my father who was given to black and chaotic moods. By the time I was 
sixteen or seventeen, it became clear” (p. 35). Recalling her close friendships at that time with 
two classmates who were also “a bit inclined to the darker side” (p. 36), Jamison accounts for the 
trio’s shared pursuits by pointing to the similarities of their family histories: 
we wove our outside lives together . . . engaging in passionate discussions about 
where our lives were going, the hows and whys of death, listening to Beethoven, 
Mozart, and Schumann, and vigorously debating the melancholic and existential 
readings . . . we had set for ourselves. We all came by our black chaos honestly: 
two of us, we were to discover later, had manic-depressive illness in our 
immediate families; the other’s mother had shot herself through the heart. (p. 36) 
 
For the morbidity of the friends’ interests—which might otherwise seem odd for three high-
achieving teenagers in the early 1960s (“in various school leadership positions and very active in 
sports and other extracurricular activities”) (p. 36)—Jamison provides a simple explanation: it is 
hereditary. To use the phrase “come by it honestly” in relation to some personal trait is, of 
course, to assert that it was inherited from a close relative. Usually, that relative is a parent. 
As An Unquiet Mind proceeds through Jamison’s adulthood, her understanding of MDI 
as a genetic disorder continually emerges as a key factor both in the events of her life and in her 
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reactions to them. For example, when recalling how she wrote bizarre responses to a mock 
Rorschach test in one of her college psychology courses, she notes: “My mind was flying high 
that day, courtesy of whatever witches’ brew of neurotransmitters God had programmed into my 
genes” (p. 46). Furthermore, while recounting the summer of her first major manic episode, she 
explains the rapid escalation of her MDI as follows: “Summer, a lack of sleep, a deluge of work, 
and exquisitely vulnerable genes eventually took me to the back of beyond (p. 70). Both of these 
events are portrayed as early milestones in Jamison’s illness, and both are ultimately ascribed to 
her genetic makeup. Through Jamison’s use of romantic, even supernatural language—“witches’ 
brew,” “God had programmed,” or “exquisitely vulnerable”—the text further underscores the 
disconnect between her inborn MDI and the influence of her external environment. Although she 
does not know exactly how her illness functions at a biochemical level, she is certain its origins 
are beyond human control. And needless to say, the idea that Jamison mysteriously, involuntarily 
inherited her MDI from one of her parents strongly affects the decisions she makes about her 
own reproductive health over the course of her memoir. The scene in which her doctor pressures 
her not to give birth—largely because “he thought it was best to avoid bringing another manic-
depressive into the world” (p. 191)—may be the most memorable moment of An Unquiet Mind, 
but Jamison also describes the anxiety she felt while disclosing her MDI to her intended future 
husband. She writes: “I had no doubt he loved me, but he knew as well as I did how uncertain the 
course of the illness could be. . . . he desperately wanted children, and manic-depressive illness 
was hereditary” (p. 144). It seems the genetic basis of her MDI is so significant that Jamison not 
only expected her partner to reject her for it; she found it understandable that he might do so. 
Readers of An Unquiet Mind should note that Jamison never explicitly states that her 
father (or sister) has MDI, yet the passages cited above are fairly unambiguous in their assertions 
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that her illness is genetic. Hence, Jamison’s certainty that many of her relatives have/had MDI is 
also on prominent display in her memory—shared towards the end of the book—of drawing an 
impromptu family pedigree chart with a colleague years ago at a professional conference (p. 
188). Having used darkened symbols to represent afflicted individuals, she writes: 
I was amazed at how many of my squares and circles were darkened, or darkened 
with a question mark placed underneath (I knew, for instance, that my great-uncle 
had spent virtually all of his adult life in an asylum, but I didn’t know what his 
diagnosis had been). Manic-depressive illness occurred repeatedly, throughout the 
three generations I had knowledge of, on my father’s side of the family; asterisks, 
representing suicide attempts, showed up like a starfield. (p. 189) 
 
Curiously, Jamison’s narration in this passage does not clarify exactly which family members 
were represented on her chart, how she accessed information about their medical histories, or 
what criteria she used to label them as having had MDI. As illustrated by her inclusion of a 
great-uncle whose diagnosis was unknown to her, it seems clear that not all of the relatives listed 
had been examined by psychiatrists—and (per Jamison’s own textbook on MDI), the diagnosis 
of “manic-depressive illness” itself did not officially exist until the release of the DSM-II in 1968 
(Jamison & Goodwin, 2007, p. 91). But from the perspective of Jamison’s readers, the import of 
this pedigree is obvious: if the alleged recurrence of MDI across her lineage is not hard evidence 
of the disease’s heritability, Jamison suggests, then it would be a pretty incredible (“amazing”) 
coincidence. When Jamison subsequently reflects on the “personal issues” that discourage her 
from speaking publicly about her illness, then, it is no wonder that her concerns “revolve, to a 
large extent, around issues of family privacy—especially because the illness under consideration 
is a genetic one” (Jamison, 1995, p. 201). From Jamison’s perspective, disclosing her MDI 
diagnosis is tantamount to exposing sensitive information about her entire family. 
Thus far in my reading of Jamison’s Brainiac persona in An Unquiet Mind, I have 
focused on parts of the memoir in which she seems to present evidence for the idea that her MDI, 
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specifically, is genetic due to its connections to her family history and various life events. But to 
gain the fullest understanding of Jamison’s portrayal of MDI in this text, it is imperative also to 
notice the moments in which she does not argue that the illness is genetic, but rather simply 
asserts this point as scientific fact. As has been noted by several other scholars, the narration of 
An Unquiet Mind often delves deeply into Jamison’s enthusiasm for academic science and 
medicine, and her hopes for the future of scientific research on her illness may be her most 
frequently discussed topic (see Beilke, 2008; Berman, 2019; Boyd, 1997; Bullard, 2002). No 
chapter better illustrates this facet of the text than “The Troubled Helix,” which shares Jamison’s 
reflections on the state of scientific research on MDI in the 1990s alongside her memories of 
attending recent academic conferences and meeting other leading MDI scholars. Naturally, it is 
not the research findings themselves that are remarkable—Jamison is hardly the only scientist 
who believes that MDI may be genetic—so much as Jamison’s great confidence in their accuracy 
and value. For example, while describing her fellow attendees at a conference that was “focused 
specifically on the genetic basis of manic-depressive illness,” Jamison writes: 
all of [us] are in one way or another actively engaged in the search for the genes 
responsible. . . . It seemed very likely, when I looked around the room, that 
among these scientists, and somewhere within these pedigrees, the location of the 
gene or genes responsible for manic-depressive illness was going to be found. It 
was a very exciting thought, because once the genes are located, early and far 
more accurate diagnosis is likely to follow; so, too, is more specific, safer, less 
problematic, and more effective treatment. (pp. 187-88) 
 
Jamison’s language in this passage is firm in its endorsement of genetic research on MDI, taking 
it as a given that the “gene or genes responsible” for MDI absolutely do exist, they will “very 
likely” be discovered by one of her colleagues, and there will be enormous benefits for persons 
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with MDI “once” (not if) these genes are found.8 As in Jamison’s discussion of her family 
history of MDI, little detail is provided as to how exactly she drew these conclusions; even less 
clear are the concrete scientific processes through which she hopes her predictions will come 
true. Nonetheless, given both the decisiveness of Jamison’s words and her well-known academic 
credentials, readers are left with the impression that genetic research on MDI is a settled matter. 
More Things, More Deeply: MDI as a Source of Special Abilities 
If Jamison’s belief that she was born with MDI is essential to her memoir’s portrayal of 
madness, then her belief that MDI confers extraordinary abilities is equally essential to her 
understanding of genius in this text. The latter idea is woven into her narration as early and often 
as is the former: within the first few pages of the Prologue, Jamison observes that many MDI 
sufferers are “among the most imaginative and gifted that we as a society have” (p. 5), that the 
illness is “a distillation both of what is finest in our natures, and of what is most dangerous” (p. 
5), and MDI is “unique in conferring advantage and pleasure, yet . . . brings in its wake almost 
unendurable suffering” (p. 6). By my count, there are at least three sentences in An Unquiet Mind 
that specifically, explicitly state that MDI confers advantages upon persons with the illness. In 
addition to that which I just cited, there are Jamison’s assertions that “this was an illness that 
could confer advantage as well as disadvantage” (p. 29) and that “manic-depressive illness can 
confer advantages on both the individual and society” (p. 194). It is unsurprising that Jamison 
would, in her first openly creative and autobiographical publication, circulate the same ideas 
 
8A few pages later in the narrative, Jamison reiterates several of the points made in this passage: 
“Clearly, if better and earlier diagnosis and more specific, less troublesome treatments result 
from the ongoing genetic research, then the benefits to individuals who have manic-depressive 
illness, to their families, and to society will be extraordinary. It is, in fact, only a matter of time 
until these benefits will be available” (p. 194). Although these comments initially seem more 
tentative in their predictions regarding future genetic research on MDI (“if, . . . then”), the 
concluding sentence leaves little doubt as to Jamison’s position on the issue. 
 
 107 
about MDI that she had been studying for the past decade of her academic/medical career. But 
what makes Jamison’s memoir distinct is that, unlike prior scholarly studies that argued for the 
Brainiac topos as scientific fact, the evidence cited therein is drawn from the author’s own life—
and the strength of her beliefs is matched by the vastness of her authority as a longtime scholar, 
therapist, and sufferer of MDI. Jamison’s seeming attribution of her career success to her MDI 
symptoms and, eventually, her determination to reform academic curricula in psy- science both 
exemplify her opinion that MDI is a source of special gifts. Indeed, by the end of An Unquiet 
Mind, the text arguably challenges the notion that Jamison’s illness even is an illness at all. 
Despite Jamison’s noticeable optimism about genetic research on MDI in “The Troubled 
Helix,” the text also highlights her concerns about the “very difficult ethical issues” (“immensely 
troubling problems”) that are likely to arise as a result of future scientific progress (pp. 194-95). 
Above all, Jamison worries that prenatal diagnostic testing will lead to more abortions of fetuses 
that might have MDI, wondering, “Do we risk making the world a blander, more homogenized 
place if we get rid of the genes for manic-depressive illness?” (p. 194). According to Jamison, 
the genes responsible for MDI should be protected because they clearly benefit society: 
What are the risks to the risk takers, those restless individuals [with MDI] who 
join with others in society to propel the arts, business, politics, and science? . . . 
The disease, in both its severe and less severe forms, appears to convey its 
advantages not only through its relationship to the artistic temperament and 
imagination, but through its influence on many eminent scientists, as well as 
business, religious, military, and political leaders. (p. 194) 
 
Across Jamison’s past research on MDI, individuals with the illness had most often been 
assigned the qualities of “imagination” and “the artistic temperament” (i.e., creativity). But in 
this passage, Jamison emphasizes that the value of MDI genes extends far beyond individual 
self-expression, crediting MDI for bringing large-scale benefits to some of the most powerful 
institutions in Western society: business, politics, science/medicine, religion, and the military. 
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MDI seems to be an asset in all fields, and Jamison’s comments here gain further credence when 
they are echoed by her department chair in a later scene of An Unquiet Mind. Recalling how she 
waited fearfully for his response to the revelation that she had MDI, she writes: “He paused, and 
then laughed. ‘If we got rid of all of the manic-depressives on the medical school faculty, not 
only would we have a much smaller faculty, it would also be a far more boring one’” (p. 209). 
Implicitly, Jamison’s colleague reassures her that MDI is common among the faculty at their 
elite university, constructing the illness as a sort of qualification for psychiatry professorship 
rather than a hindrance to such a career. And in Jamison’s portrayal of her own professional 
achievements throughout her memoir, An Unquiet Mind suggests that she agrees—in her 
estimation, her MDI has helped her to succeed in the competitive field of academic medicine. 
There can be no illusion for readers of An Unquiet Mind that Jamison enjoys depressive 
episodes: the text indicates that it was only due to her extreme depressions (and eventual suicide 
attempt) that Jamison finally agreed to treat her MDI with long-term medication. Towards the 
end of the book, she writes: “Depression is awful beyond words or sounds or images. . . . There 
is nothing good to be said for it” (p. 217). However, as An Unquiet Mind explores Jamison’s 
experiences of mania—which she describes at the outset of the text as “great personal pleasure, 
an incomparable flow of thoughts, and a ceaseless energy” (p. 6)—it is increasingly apparent that 
Jamison understands this aspect of MDI as not only enjoyable, but beneficial to her. In addition 
to “giving a certain romantic tumultuousness to [her] personal life,” Jamison suggests, her MDI 
has been especially valuable to her career: “These fiery moods . . . over the years, added a great 
deal that was positive to my professional life. Certainly, they had ignited and propelled much of 
my writing, research, and advocacy work” (p. 122). In Jamison’s view, her manic episodes 
provide her with a special clarity of mind, abundance of energy, and various other abilities that 
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are “very conducive to productivity” in her scholarly projects (p. 99). As a “strange and driving 
force, a destroyer, a fire in the blood,” Jamison’s mania may be frightening and unpredictable for 
her, yet An Unquiet Mind repeatedly hints that MDI’s advantages outweigh its disadvantages. 
Notably, to conclude the chapter of her memoir that recounts the most harmful consequences of 
her MDI—her severe depressions, violent psychotic episodes, suicide attempt, and so on—
Jamison ultimately points to the illness’s redeeming qualities. She writes: “Fortunately, having 
fire in one’s blood is not without its benefits in the world of academic medicine, especially in the 
pursuit of tenure” (p. 123). As one might expect, the chapter that immediately follows (titled 
“Tenure”) crafts a defense of her belief that MDI helped her to succeed in academia. 
Although the early chapters of An Unquiet Mind contend that Jamison showed signs of 
MDI from childhood onwards, it is noteworthy that her illness did not fully manifest—through 
“very severe manic episodes that . . . escalated wildly and psychotically out of control” (p. 37)—
until after she had already joined the faculty at UCLA. In a sense, Jamison implies that she was 
only able to finish her Ph.D. because her illness was in “remission” during those years: “I was 
experiencing . . . a deceptive respite from the savagely recurrent course that the untreated illness 
ultimately takes” (p. 56). But with Jamison’s more frequent and extreme experiences of MDI 
symptoms as a professor, the text implies, came even more extraordinary intellect, productivity, 
and achievement. Far from being discouraged by her MDI, Jamison states that she grew “more 
and more determined to pull out some good from all of the pain, to try and put [her] illness to 
some use,” and it seems that she succeeded in capitalizing on her symptoms (p. 125). She writes:  
When manic, or mildly so, I would write a paper in a day, ideas would flow, I 
would design new studies, catch up on my patient charts and correspondence, and 
chip away at the mindless mounds of bureaucratic paperwork. . . . It was a loopy 
but intense life: marvelous, ghastly, dreadful, indescribably difficult, gloriously 




From Jamison’s perspective, her manic states were an asset to her career because they allowed 
her to complete important tasks with remarkable skill and ease (e.g., writing an academic paper 
in one day); moreover, they seemed to make her more mundane responsibilities feel enjoyable. 
Echoing her earlier descriptions of the mild manic states she experienced in college—during 
which “classwork . . .  seemed very straightforward, and [she] found examinations, laboratory 
work, and papers almost absurdly easy” (p. 44)—Jamison affirms that her professional life 
during manic episodes was “marvelous”, “gloriously and unexpectedly easy,” and “great fun.” 
As a result, An Unquiet Mind establishes that Jamison’s excellent productivity as a scholar is 
closely tied to her MDI: without tapping into the latter, she would not have realized the former. 
A reading of Manic-Depressive Illness and Touched With Fire demystifies, to some 
extent, how Jamison has personally contributed to scholars’ widespread uptake of the Brainiac 
topos as scientific fact. But as the plot of An Unquiet Mind moves forward into later stages of her 
career—the stages at which she published these two books—readers encounter numerous more 
examples of her efforts to promote the Brainiac topos at an institutional level. More than simply 
inspiring her to study mood disorders in her scholarly career, Jamison’s firsthand experience of 
MDI made her “absolutely and single-mindedly determined to make a difference in how the 
illness was seen and treated” (p. 126). Hence, when Jamison and two colleagues founded an 
outpatient clinic for the treatment of mood disorders at UCLA (the UCLA Affective Disorders 
Clinic), she also made it a priority to start a teaching program “that would qualify as a clinical 
rotation, or training experience” for students of psy- science/medicine at the university (p. 126). 
In addition to teaching “the basics” of psychiatric medicine, Jamison explains, she and her 
colleagues expanded their curricula to include previously underrepresented topics, including: 
the positive aspects of the illness . . . heightened energy and perceptual awareness, 
increased fluidity and originality of thinking, intense exhilaration of moods and 
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experience, increased sexual desire, expansiveness of vision, and a lengthened 
grasp of aspiration. I tried to encourage our clinic doctors to see that this was an 
illness that could confer advantage as well as disadvantage. (p. 128) 
 
Listing a range of “advantages” that MDI supposedly confers upon its sufferers, Jamison affirms 
that psychiatrists-in-training must be aware of the illness’s positive features in order to provide 
competent treatment for their patients. That MDI is linked to special abilities is a fact she wanted 
her colleagues to “see”—rather than a theory for them to consider—and in Jamison’s description 
of herself as “trying to encourage [others]” to understand her ideas, the text subtly hints at both 
the difficulty and the virtue of this task. In other words, Jamison conveys that although the 
benefits of MDI are intimately familiar to her, they are not easily recognized by those who lack 
firsthand experience, thus it was (and is) her duty to share her special knowledge. 
Few aspects of Jamison’s memoir better illustrate her investment in the Brainiac topos—
and her own enactment of a Brainiac persona—than her impassioned efforts to educate fellow 
scientists and doctors about the advantages of MDI. By the end of An Unquiet Mind, the 
narration’s central focus seems to shift from arguing that Jamison’s MDI is genetic and 
advantageous towards contemplating what, after all, can be done about those facts: How can 
persons with MDI cope with their extraordinary gifts? What further research can be done about 
this topic? How can she ensure that doctors learn what they need to know? Nonetheless, in the 
closing words of her memoir, Jamison revisits her own utterly personal, emotional insights into 
the meaning of her mental illness. Having raised the question of whether (if given a choice) she 
would choose to have MDI, Jamison stresses that she would never want her illness if she did not 
have access to effective medication. However, since “lithium does work for [her]” and she is 
able to take it, Jamison muses that she would indeed choose MDI over ordinary mental health (p. 
218). In doing so, she offers An Unquiet Mind’s final endorsement of the Brainiac topos: 
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I honestly believe that as a result of [my MDI] I have felt more things, more 
deeply; had more experiences, more intensely; loved more, and been more loved; 
laughed more often for having cried more often; appreciated more the springs, for 
all the winters; worn death ‘as close as dungarees,’ appreciated it—and life—
more; seen the finest and the most terrible in people, and slowly learned the 
values of caring, loyalty, and seeing things through. . . . normal or manic, I have 
run faster, thought faster, and loved faster than most I know. (p. 218) 
 
In this passage, perhaps the lengthiest and most effusive celebration of Mad Genius rhetoric to be 
written by any author of any mental illness memoir, Jamison wholeheartedly assures her readers 
that having MDI is a valuable experience. Although it causes her great pain, Jamison concludes, 
it is also thanks to her lifelong mental illness that she has felt, experienced, loved, laughed, cried, 
appreciated, worn, seen, learned, run, and thought—in a word—“more.” 
Conclusion: Absolute Knowledge Corrupts Absolutely? 
Of the four memoirs I analyze in this dissertation, An Unquiet Mind is undoubtedly the 
most overt in its promotion of Mad Genius rhetoric. Whereas readers’ absorption of Susanna 
Kaysen’s story in Girl, Interrupted—an intentionally minimalist, literary text—somewhat hinges 
on their preexisting familiarity with the Tortured Artist topos, Jamison’s narration in An Unquiet 
Mind is comparatively direct in telling readers what to think about mental illness and when to 
think it. Moreover, Jamison’s arguments are not so beholden to the specific historical context 
in/about which she writes: we are meant to accept the information her memoir shares precisely 
because it is, in her judgment, built on objective (i.e., timeless) facts. And as I have striven to 
clarify throughout this chapter, my reading of Jamison’s Brainiac persona in An Unquiet Mind is 
not meant as an attack on Jamison, Jamison’s career, nor the entire scientific enterprise. That the 
personae of two such disparate individuals as Kay Redfield Jamison and Donald Trump can both 
be analyzed through a Brainiac lens is, no doubt, a testament to the versatility and power of this 
topos. To my knowledge, most MDI experts do believe it is a genetic disorder—at least insofar 
as they believe that genetics probably play some role, in some MDI cases, at some times—and 
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many must also believe MDI is scientifically linked to special abilities. The same is true of 
various other mental illnesses: in his book Against Depression, for example, Kramer (2006) 
analyzes evidence that major depressive disorder confers advantages in a manner somewhat 
similar to Jamison’s investigation of MDI in Touched With Fire. But most important to my 
interests in this dissertation, I think, is the fact that countless people with mental illness also 
believe their conditions are a source of special gifts—gifts they may be unwilling to sacrifice in 
order to treat their illnesses, even if that choice costs them their health, happiness, and/or lives. 
The extremity of Jamison’s MDI symptoms, combined with her awareness (when well) 
that her behaviors during episodes of illness are wholly involuntary, all but guarantees that she 
would recognize her condition as a biological disease. Ironically, for someone experiencing 
frequent negative outcomes due to genetic factors beyond their control, it only seems rational to 
hope for some positive outcome to arise from those same factors. One can hardly begrudge these 
hopes, true or false, of any individual person living with a serious mental illness. Nonetheless, 
Schoeneman et al. (2012) wonder whether the “countervailing story” of An Unquiet Mind—in 
which Jamison, despite her urgent insistences that MDI sufferers must seek treatment for their 
symptoms, portrays her own experience of taking medication as “a loss of the sublime and a 
return to the mundane”—may be inconvenient for clinicians who want to assign this book to 
patients with MDI (p. 204). Briefly reflecting on this point, they write: 
There are, however, aspects of Jamison’s account of Bipolar Disorder that could 
be problematic. In the first place, unlike depression, mania has a number of 
positive features such as power, acuity, seductiveness, and extravagance that are 
eradicated with recovery. . . . [To] readers of this memoir, it is not clear whether 
Jamison’s descriptions of the positive features of manic episodes and their 
subsequent loss undercuts her larger narrative of recovery from a destructive loss 




Apparently distressed by her memories of being “unpredictably and uncontrollably irrational and 
destructive,” Jamison uses logos to persuade her readers that MDI has actually made her an 
extraordinarily rational and creative scientist (1995, p. 121). But in its deceptively simple 
presentation of Brainiac-type hypotheses as scientific fact, the narration of An Unquiet Mind also 
seems to absolve Jamison of any fault for perpetuating the Brainiac topos as a cultural cliché. Put 
differently, An Unquiet Mind implies that Jamison cannot possibly do harm by persuading her 
readers that mental illness confers special gifts—and that these gifts are “eradicated” and “lost” 
when a person seeks treatment. On the contrary, Jamison is certain that by educating others of 
this scientific fact, she will improve existing treatments (i.e., psychotherapies) for persons with 
mental illness while also helping to destigmatize its symptoms. The only problem with her 
project is: the Brainiac topos is not scientific fact, and it undeniably does do harm. 
As Jamison is well aware, the assumption that any human trait is both genetic and 
inherently undesirable quickly loses its appeal when used to justify eugenics and other forms of 
violence against affected persons. Less salient in her memoir is the fact that assigning positive 
value to so-called genes is equally perplexing when, for example, doing so may convince some 
people to choose their genetic gifts over medicating a life-threatening illness. Given Jamison’s 
distinguished career, it is difficult for readers to assess whether she herself has made that choice. 
In the events recounted in An Unquiet Mind, at least—and in her rise to fame after the release of 
this beloved book—she seems to have her “cake” and treat it, too (so to speak). Read from one 
perspective, Jamison’s memoir is an inspiring story of a woman with a severe psychiatric 
disability who ascended to prominence in sexist, ableist academic institutions during the 1970s to 
revolutionize popular and scholarly discourse about MDI. Having nearly died from her disease, 
Jamison dedicated her career to advocating for other persons with mental illness, and there is no 
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telling how many lives she has saved. But read from a different angle, An Unquiet Mind is a 
“self-congratulatory” book written by a remarkably privileged woman whose “money and 
connections” (powerful friends, world-class doctors, loving partners, etc.) thoroughly “insulated 
her from the horrific repercussions typically associated” with her illness—and who was already 
“safely tenured” at a prestigious university when it was published (Maisel, 2016, para. 8). 
Asserting that she would rather have MDI than not, Jamison “romanticiz[es] a condition that 
causes . . . profound suffering and broken lives for those who do not have her advantages” 
(Maisel, 2016, para. 10). The relationship between these two readings is like that between a good 
story and a good argument or that between an effective coping mechanism and a positive health 
outcome. So, does Jamison’s enactment of a Brainiac persona undercut her memoir’s pro-










CHAPTER 3: WEEPS OF FAITH: TRAUMA AND THE  
ETHOS OF THE SURVIVOR 
 
Halfway through Nana-Ama Danquah’s groundbreaking 1998 memoir, Willow Weep for 
Me: A Black Woman’s Journey Through Depression, the author recalls a period of her childhood 
in which she heard a certain disco song played “over and over” each night before bed (1999, p. 
106).1 The song was Gloria Gaynor’s 1979 hit “I Will Survive,” and Danquah’s mother listened 
to it frequently in the months after her husband, Danquah’s father, left their family. Here and 
elsewhere in Willow Weep for Me, a woman’s ability to “survive” the circumstances of her life is 
framed as a desirable, even mandatory skill—especially for women who are (like Danquah and 
her mother) Black, single mothers, and/or first-generation immigrants. From Danquah’s adult 
perspective, the precipitating event for her mother’s nightly ritual is fairly obvious: to survive the 
painful dissolution of her marriage, she immersed herself in lyrics her daughter glosses as “one 
woman’s pledge to overcome the devastation of a break-up” (1999, p. 106). The end point of this 
ritual is clearly demarcated, too. Several pages later, Danquah notes how her mother’s grieving 
ended when she entered a new romantic relationship: “Mum cut off her hair and lost a ton of 
weight. . . . Mum was visibly happier. She smiled a lot, wore nicer clothes, and stopped playing 
that song” (p. 110). If survival was the motivation behind listening to “I Will Survive,” and 
divorce was the thing to be survived (in the transitive sense of the verb), then Danquah’s mother 
 
1Per the cover of Willow Weep for Me, Danquah’s professional name at the time of its 
publication was Meri Nana-Ama Danquah. I refer to her as Nana-Ama Danquah because, as of 
2019, this is her stated preference: “As an African writer, it feels strangely like a rite of passage, 





seemed to have met her goal. Her newfound vivacity was visible not only in her turn away from 
Gaynor’s words of affirmation, but in her efforts to maintain an outward look of feminine 
normality—smiling, dressing well, tending to her hair, and staying thin. 
Unfortunately for Danquah, break-ups are just one of many distressing ordeals she herself 
endures over the course of Willow Weep for Me, and the exact beginning or end of her healing 
processes is not so clear. As a self-described “single black mother about a half a paycheck away 
from the government cheese line,” Danquah survives instances of racism, misogyny, 
xenophobia, domestic violence, abandonment, sexual abuse, poverty, educational setbacks, 
professional flops, alcoholism, and various other hardships dating back to an early separation 
from her mother at the age of three (Danquah, 1999, p. 235). It might be apt to characterize her 
as someone who survives per se (in the intransitive sense of the verb); in colloquial terms, she 
would be called a “survivor.” And indeed, that is exactly what happens in a scene near the end of 
Willow Weep for Me. When Danquah and a friend, Ursula, discover they both are working on 
writing projects about depression and named after the willow tree, Danquah jokes, “‘That old 
weeping willow tree . . . It’s sure seen a lot of victims and a lot of tears’” (p. 262). Objecting to 
the subtext of Danquah’s joke—that the two women are among the willow’s victims—Ursula 
interjects, “‘We’re not victims, we’re survivors. The willow is a healing herb. . . . Isn’t that 
inspirational?’” (p. 262). Here Danquah digresses from her dialogue with Ursula, reflecting on 
the poignant cultural history of the willow: although the willow was once a “symbol of joy” (p. 
262), Danquah writes, it was after the Babylonian exile era of Jewish history that the tree came 
to symbolize “the act of weeping, the mourning over loss, and the litany for survival” (p. 263). 
Nonetheless, having noted how willow bark was also used to make salicylic acid (a precursor to 





The rhetorical implications of “survival”—and the figure of “the survivor” in particular—
has been an object of popular and scholarly inquiry in the United States at least since the end of 
World War II (Orgad, 2009). That these words hold power when applied to a specific person or 
thing is apparent in the scene described above. In just a few words, both women convey a great 
deal of information about so-called survival: it is different from victimhood, it is applicable to 
persons living with depression, it has the potential to inspire, and it is connected to healing. 
Above all, Ursula’s statement indicates that identifying oneself (and others) as a survivor is a 
positive action, even an honor, and she and Danquah have rightly won that honor through the 
many hardships they have endured. And evidently, Ursula was not alone in her assessment of 
Danquah’s life story—one cannot help noticing how survivor discourse features prominently in 
the marketing materials for Willow Weep for Me. According to the book jacket of its first 1998 
printing, this book “is not simply a memoir about depression, it is a powerful meditation on 
courage and a litany for survival.”2 Likewise, the back cover of the 1999 reprint presents it as 
“an inspirational story of healing and emergence,” concluding that “Willow Weep to Me calls out 
to all women who suffer in silence . . . Meri Danquah rises from these pages, a true survivor who 
reclaims her life.” Readers are urged to pick up Willow Weep for Me, then, not “simply” out of 
special interest in mental illness (or the memoir genre), but rather out of universal interest in the 
pursuit of survival, courage, autonomy, and other human values. Indeed, it seems that “all 
women” can learn something precious from this text, for it reveals deep truths about the very 
nature of survival from the perspective of an expert—a “true survivor.” 
 
2This endorsement is also likely meant to call to mind one of Audre Lorde’s most famous works, 





Judging by its title, one might expect Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman’s Journey 
Through Depression to be a firsthand account of clinical depression with some reflection on the 
author’s race and gender (among other topics)—and this is a pretty accurate description. Yet 
these cover blurbs distance Danquah’s narrative from its basis in a stigmatized mental illness, 
locating the value of her writing instead in the exceptional strength of her spirit and the rarity of 
her wisdom. In doing so, they allude to an increasingly popular cultural cliché that I call the 
“Survivor” topos, a subtype of Mad Genius rhetoric that rationalizes the supposed link between 
madness and genius on the basis that such qualities share a common origin in personal trauma. 
That experiences of trauma often carry negative short- and long-term psychological effects in the 
human mind is an established fact in all mental health professions—beyond the obvious risk of 
developing posttraumatic stress disorder, persons coping with trauma are often diagnosed with 
depression, anxiety, and substance abuse disorders (to name a few). But although the Survivor 
once suffered unspeakable pain, hardly emerging with their psychological well-being intact, 
Survivor discourse hints that something special can be gained from trauma, too: extraordinary 
strength, wisdom, courage, and more. Identifying Danquah as a Survivor in Willow Weep for Me, 
then, serves at least two rhetorical functions. First, it conveys the seriousness of her hardships, 
perhaps suggesting she is uniquely prone to trauma. Secondly, and importantly, it establishes her 
authority to inform her audience about a multitude of human experiences and emotions. From a 
publisher’s perspective, Survivor discourse is appealing simply because it makes Danquah’s 
memoir sound more interesting than some other titles their audiences might purchase. But for 
Danquah herself, a woman exposing her stigmatized illness by writing in the controversial 





This chapter unites recent research in autobiography studies and mental health rhetoric to 
explore the significance of Survivor discourse in first-person narratives of psychiatric illness. In 
particular, I show how Willow Weep for Me constructs the author’s persona as a paradigmatic 
Survivor—in essence, an expert at survival—through its focus on the extremity of Danquah’s life 
events, the role of such traumas in her development of depression, and the exceptional character 
she seems to have built along the way. Whereas most scholars citing Danquah’s memoir read her 
discussions of race, class, and gender foremost as a challenge to the sociopolitical forces barring 
her access to mental healthcare (see Mollow, 2006, p. 74), I contend that Danquah’s portrayal of 
her extensive traumas also functions as a means of grappling with societal stigma against mental 
illness. I argue, then, for a view of Survivor discourse as one type of “recuperative ethos” for a 
person identified as mentally ill (Molloy, 2015, p. 138). In other words, Danquah’s engagement 
with the Survivor topos is a rhetorical strategy through which she affirms the value of her writing 
before readers she expects to associate her illness with personal weakness—highlighting her 
continuous survival against the odds, Danquah instead frames her past traumas as proof of her 
extraordinary character, thus building her ethos as a rhetor with depression. 
Inspired by Danquah’s reference to the song “I Will Survive,” I situate her testimony 
amid a growing tradition of Survivor narratives in contemporary pop music by/for women in 
distress, proceeding then to a brief history of the word “survivor” and the growing field of 
scholarly research on the Survivor topos. Next, I connect Survivor discourse and “the ethos of 
the survivor” (Serra, 2007, p. 34)—as described by literary scholars, namely specialists in 
autobiographical writing—to leading studies in mental health rhetoric, in which the challenge of 
building ethos is recognized as paramount to firsthand accounts of mental illness. Expanding on 





studies, I analyze the text for its engagement with the Survivor topos during several climactic 
moments of Danquah’s story: her disclosures of past traumas, her earliest confrontation with 
(and admission of) the notion that she may be depressed, her first encounter with psychotherapy, 
her pivotal decision to try psychiatric drugs, and her conversation with the editor who urged her 
to write this memoir. Ultimately, although laying claim to Survivor ethos strikes me as an utterly 
reasonable reaction to repeated experiences of trauma, I question the viability of this rhetorical 
strategy for either persons with mental illness or members of other stigmatized groups writ large. 
Victim to Victory: Popular and Scholarly Visions of the Survivor  
It is no surprise Danquah’s mother turned to a song like “I Will Survive,” which is 
written from the viewpoint of a newly-empowered person refusing reconciliation with a hurtful 
ex-lover, after her husband abandoned their family. Since its release in 1978, “I Will Survive” 
has, in Gloria Gaynor’s own words, “reached number one in every country that [she’s] ever 
heard of,” making it “the whole disco era’s biggest ever dance hit” (1997, p. 137). And according 
to her 1997 memoir, I Will Survive: The Book, Gaynor knew her signature song would be a hit 
“as soon as [she] read the lyrics,” because they struck her as “timeless words that everybody 
could relate to” (p. 136). Indeed, Gaynor credits her impassioned vocals on “I Will Survive” to 
the fact that she was still mourning her mother’s recent death and recovering from a major spinal 
surgery when she recorded it—although she herself did not write the song, nor was she suffering 
from a break-up at the time, she identified with its message of pain and perseverance (p. 139). 
For Gaynor, it is precisely because the song’s portrayal of “survival” is so broadly interpretable 
(and thus relatable) that “I Will Survive” has been so popular over the years: “All kinds of 
people have told me different ways in which this song has been an encouragement to them. It’s 





Importantly, although “I Will Survive” was made famous by Gaynor, its lyrics make no 
reference to the narrator’s (or their ex-lover’s) gender, race, class, or other salient identities. The 
song centers on a failed romance, but it is sparse on details about the relationship—for example, 
the narrator’s grievances are glossed over in the lyrics, “but then I spent so many nights thinking 
how you did me wrong” (Gaynor, 1978). In fact, the song’s thrice-repeated chorus does not 
mention romance at all, emphasizing only the narrator’s resistance to their antagonist (“just turn 
around now / ‘cause you’re not welcome anymore. . . . weren’t you the one who tried to break 
me with goodbye?”) and faith in their own ability to “stay alive” (Gaynor, 1978). Hence, even 35 
years after the release of “I Will Survive,” Sullivan (2013) echoes Gaynor’s claims about its 
universal appeal in his entry for the song in the Encyclopedia of Great Popular Song Recordings, 
arguing that it still “speaks to anyone who’s faced misfortune or tragedy and is determined to rise 
above it” (p. 713). Through lyrics that honor both the anguish of the narrator’s ordeal (“At first I 
was afraid, I was petrified / Kept thinking I could never live without you by my side”) as well as 
their transformation into a stronger, prouder individual in the aftermath (“I grew strong / And I 
learned how to get along. . . . now I hold my head up high, and you see me / Somebody new”) 
(Gaynor, 1978), “I Will Survive” all but perfectly exemplifies the Survivor topos as I understand 
it. The notion that personal suffering somehow strengthens a person’s character in the long-term 
is, perhaps, as much a hallmark of the human condition as is suffering itself. 
If Danquah’s mother had divorced after 2000 instead of the late 1970s, she would have 
had an even greater treasury of music from which to choose the soundtrack to her survival. 
Indeed, Bradford (2003) observes that popular music at the turn of the twenty-first century saw a 
distinct rise in “antiromance” lyrics across all Top 40 records by/for young women (p. 35). 





socioeconomic dependence on male partners were reflected in the cultural artifacts of this era. In 
particular, Bradford describes the “stronger than yesterday” stance—named after Britney 
Spears’s 2000 song, “Stronger”—as that of a woman who is “resistant to the power of romantic 
love over identity-formation, a woman who is not to be defined by a male partner” (2003, p. 37). 
Closely mirroring “I Will Survive,” “Stronger” begins with the narrator ending a damaging 
relationship (“I’ve had enough / I’m not your property as from today”) and imagines the 
narrator’s ex-lover underestimating their ability to move on (“You might think that I won’t make 
it on my own”); the chorus then revels in the enormous strength the narrator has gained through 
their past misery (“But now I’m stronger than yesterday / Now it’s nothing but my way”) 
(Spears, 2000). Likewise, although the song’s music video depicts Spears’s singing to an 
apparently unfaithful boyfriend (Bradford, 2003, p. 38), its gender-neutral lyrics actually share 
very little information about the addressee, the nature of their relationship with the narrator, or 
the reasons for their separation. Hence, when Rolling Stone readers voted “Stronger” as one of 
the ten best songs of Spears’s career, a staff writer characterized it as an overall “anthem of self-
empowerment,” suggesting it is beloved because it is “both obviously autobiographical and 
highly relatable to anyone eager to define themselves” (Perpetua, 2011, para. 2). 
Like Gaynor, Spears did not write any of her song’s empowering lyrics, and its narrative 
of personal growth was not inspired by events in her own life. Nonetheless, her performance of 
“Stronger” was clearly meant to be perceived as autobiographical: the penultimate line of its 
chorus, “my loneliness ain’t killing me no more” (Spears, 2000), was an obvious callback to her 
career-making 1998 single, “…Baby One More Time,” in which she repeatedly sang, “my 
loneliness is killing me” (Spears, 1998). Although the writer and producer of “…Baby One More 





other artists before she recorded it—Martin co-wrote “Stronger” for the express purpose of 
including it on Spears’s second album (see Goldstein, 2018, para. 14). As both songs seem to 
address a specific person (the “you” of the lyrics), the continuity between them may even suggest 
the love interest who hurt her in “Stronger” was the same one she had pined for in “…Baby One 
More Time,” further heightening her audience’s emotional investment in both songs’ narratives. 
Hence, as the Rolling Stone article cited above attests, pop music fans embraced “Stronger” both 
for its self-affirming message and the seemingly authentic context in which it was delivered. If 
Martin had intended for his song to be marketable (as it was) to young people “pushing back 
against controlling influences” (Perpetua, 2011, para. 2), then his effort was all the more 
persuasive for constructing Spears as a positive role model in that struggle. Persuading fans that 
Spears really had been mistreated by a recent boyfriend, “Stronger” also presumably inspired 
audiences through its impressive validation of the Survivor topos. After all, Spears was an 
incredibly famous pop star in the 2000s—she was only 19 years old when the album “Stronger” 
appeared on broke the Nielsen SoundScan record for highest first-week sales by a female artist, a 
record Spears held for 15 years (Feeney, 2014, para. 3). Indeed, she had grown much stronger. 
“Stronger” may have initiated the influx of “antiromance,” pro-survival women’s music 
in 2000s American pop culture—a series of (supposedly) autobiographical narratives for which 
“I Will Survive” had surely been a prototypical model—but whatever prominence Spears once 
had in contemporary Survivor discourse is now eclipsed by the abundance of women artists who 
have followed her example. Table 3 lists a range of chart-topping songs from 2000 onwards in 
which break-ups and other hardships are framed as a blessing in disguise for the women who live 
through them. Far from grieving the narrators’ shattered health and happiness, these songs 







Survivor Discourse in Popular Music, 2000-2020 
 
Year Vocalist Title Peak Example Lyrics 
2000 Britney 
Spears 
Stronger 11 But now I’m stronger than yesterday / Now it’s nothing but my way / My 
loneliness ain’t killing me no more / I, I’m stronger 
2001 Destiny’s 
Child 
Survivor 2 Now that you’re out of my life / I’m so much better / You thought that I’d be 
weak without you / but I’m stronger / You thought that I’d be broke 
without ya, but I’m richer. . . . I’m a survivor / I’m gonna make it  
2002 Christina 
Aguilera 
Fighter 20  ‘Cause it makes me that much stronger / makes me work a little bit harder / 
It makes me that much wiser / so thanks for making me a fighter / Made 
me learn a little bit faster / made my skin a little bit thicker / Makes me 
that much smarter / so thanks for making me a fighter 
2008 Pink So What 1 So, so what? / I’m still a rock star / I got my rock moves / and I don’t need 
you / And guess what? / I’m having more fun / and now that we’re done / 
I’m gonna show you tonight / I’m alright / I’m just fine 
2009 La Roux Bulletproof 8 Been there, done that, messed around / I’m having fun, don’t put me down / 
I’ll never let you sweep me off my feet / This time, baby, I’ll be / 
Bulletproof / This time, baby, I’ll be / Bulletproof 
2011 Demi 
Lovato 
Skyscraper 10 You can take everything I have / you can break everything I am / Like I’m 
made of glass / like I’m made of paper / Go on and try to tear me down / I 
will be rising from the ground / Like a skyscraper / like a skyscraper  
2011 Sia Titanium 7 I’m bulletproof, nothing to lose / Fire away, fire away / Ricochet, you take 
your aim / Fire away, fire away / You shoot me down, but I won’t fall / I 





1 What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger / stand a little taller / Doesn’t mean 
I’m lonely when I’m alone / What doesn’t kill you makes a fighter / 
footsteps even lighter / Doesn’t mean I’m over ‘cause you’re gone 
2013 Demi 
Lovato 
Warrior — Now I’m a warrior / Now I’ve got thicker skin / I’m a warrior / I’m stronger 
than I’ve ever been / And my armor is made of steel, you can’t get in / 
I’m a warrior / and you can never hurt me again 
2013 Katy  
Perry 
Roar 1 You held me down, but I got up / Get ready ‘cause I’ve had enough / I see it 
all, I see it now / I got the eye of the tiger, a fighter / dancing through the 
fire / ‘Cause I am a champion / and you’re gonna hear me roar 
2015 Rachel 
Platten 
Fight Song 6 This is my fight song / take back my life song / prove I’m alright song / My 
power’s turned on / starting right now, I’ll be strong / I’ll play my fight 
song. . . . ‘Cause I’ve still got a lot of fight left in me 
2017 Kesha Praying 22 But after everything you’ve done / I can thank you for how strong I have 
become. . . . And you said that I was done / Well, you were wrong, and 
now the best is yet to come / ‘Cause I can make it on my own 
2018 Ariana 
Grande 
Thank U, Next 1 One taught me love / one taught me patience / and one taught me pain / Now 
I’m so amazing / Say I’ve loved and I’ve lost / but that’s not what I see / 
So, look what I got / look what you taught me / And for that, I say / 
“Thank you, next”. . . . I’m so fuckin’ grateful for my ex 
2019 Avril 
Lavigne 
Warrior — ‘Cause I’m a warrior, I fight for my life / like a soldier, all through the night / 
And I won’t give up, I will survive / I’m a warrior / And I’m stronger, 
that’s why I’m alive / I will conquer, time after time / I’ll never falter, I 
will survive / I’m a warrior 
 
Note. Each song’s peak spot on the Billboard Hot 100 Chart (as of July 2020) was drawn from Billboard’s online 
archives (see “The Hot 100 Chart,” n.d.). Lyrics were retrieved directly from the original recordings and confirmed via 
Genius (see “Songs,” n.d.). See my reference list for complete citation information for each recording; with the exception 





wisdom, and personal prosperity. And whereas the self-referential airs of both Gaynor’s and 
Spears’s famous songs were largely fictitious, the success of more recent Survivor narratives in 
is inextricably intertwined with fans’ awareness of the true events that inspired them. Uniting a 
(now) familiar, beloved cliché about trauma with celebrity gossip that seems to prove its truth, 
Survivor discourse in contemporary music might appeal to any person whose life story vaguely 
resembles those of the singers they admire. That these songs are well received by popular 
audiences is evident, of course, in their frequent appearances on the Billboard Hot 100 Chart. 
 The lyrics of the songs in Table 3 still lack specificity, ensuring the audience’s ability to 
identify with their generic tales of triumph over woe, and their content is not as novel in 2020 as 
it might have been in 1978. But specificity and novelty are not the point: what sets these songs 
apart now is the artists’ credibility. Nearly every vocalist listed above was also credited as a co-
writer of her empowering song, and when the song was released, it was widely known that the 
lyrics alluded to her own professional setbacks (Destiny’s Child’s “Survivor,” Sia’s “Titanium,” 
Rachel Platten’s “Fight Song”), abusive childhood home (Christina Aguilera’s “Fighter,” Demi 
Lovato’s “Warrior”), high-profile divorce or separation (Pink’s “So What,” Katy Perry’s “Roar,” 
Ariana Grande’s “Thank U, Next”), debilitating health issues (Demi Lovato’s “Skyscraper,” 
Avril Lavigne’s “Warrior”), recovery from sexual assault (Kesha’s “Praying”), or some other 
trauma. To be sure, the demand for song lyrics that give a glimpse into the artist’s personal life is 
so powerful that Kelly Clarkson, promoting her 2011 album Stronger, had to clarify to fans that 
“What Doesn’t Kill You” (which she did not write) was not directed at anyone in particular. 
According to her interviewer, “the clues are there that someone has done Kelly wrong,” but 
Clarkson admitted, “there’s no common [source], like, it wasn’t like one [thing], I didn’t have a 





Demi Lovato was interviewed about Unbroken—her 2011 “comeback” album after her highly-
publicized stay at a treatment facility for bipolar disorder, bulimia, and self-harm in 2010—she 
stressed the deeply personal nature of “Skyscraper,” although this song was neither written by 
nor originally intended for her (Gayles, 2011, para. 1). Addressing the interviewer’s implied 
criticism on this point, Lovato asserted, “I’ve co-written a lot of the songs [on Unbroken]. . . . 
Even though I didn’t write on ‘Skyscraper,’ I still had a huge emotional attachment to it and I 
wanted to record it, because I was just so passionate about it” (Gayles, 2011, para. 33). In each of 
these exchanges, both the interviewer’s and artist’s comments reflect the elevation of bona fide 
Survivor narratives in their shared cultural context. Clearly, wisdom sans underlying trauma or 
trauma not directly translated into wisdom are less desirable than both simultaneously. 
Although the songs in table 1 were inspired by a wide range of events, each could also be 
interpreted as a type break-up song—and since break-ups are common, intensely emotional 
events for much of humankind, it is to be expected that the music industry engages with this 
topic on a near-constant basis. What I wish to highlight in compiling this archive, though, is not 
only the enduring popularity of Survivor narratives and the centrality of artists’ life stories in the 
marketing thereof, but also the striking consistency of themes across such songs’ lyrics. Notice, 
for example, how often the narrators use violent imagery to describe their struggles (bullets, 
being held/shot/torn down, being broken); their defenses are also usually expressed in corporeal 
terms (being bulletproof, fighting, getting/standing/rising up, wearing armor, dancing). Almost 
always, they emphasize the extraordinary changes they have seen in their character and lifestyle 
as a result of their ordeal (they are stronger, smarter, richer, wiser, thicker-skinned, more fun). 
Envisioning what they will do (make it, show “you,” rise, conquer) or will not do (be hurt, get 





person who once wounded them. And so the formulaic quality of Survivor narratives in the 
2010s music industry was, in a 2014 interview, neatly deconstructed by one of the artists most 
responsible for such songs’ popularity. Reflecting on her 2011 hit “Titanium” and a work-in-
progress titled “Invincible,” Sia explained her “‘victim to victory’ theory” as follows: 
[on] the radio, a large percentage of the hits are . . . about victim to victory, like 
“I’m having a terrible time.” And then the pre-chorus is “I don’t know what’s 
gonna happen next.” And the chorus is, “Now I’m brilliant, and everything is 
great, because something happened to make it great.” (Sanders, 2014, para. 26)3  
 
Clustering myriad hit songs under the umbrella of “victim to victory,” Sia’s comment points to 
an absolutely essential feature of Survivor discourse. Above all, Survivor narratives affirm that 
survival is not simply something a person does or an emotion they feel: it is who they are. 
Whether one actually uses the word “survivor” or some metaphoric variation (fighter, rock star, 
skyscraper, titanium, warrior, champion, soldier, etc.), enactments of the Survivor topos leave 
little doubt that the Survivor’s identity has been utterly transformed by their distress. Less clear, 
perhaps, is what exactly it means to take up this new identity—beyond the simple fact of keeping 
oneself alive, what constitutes survival? Theorization on this topic may be limited in a three- to 
four-minute pop song, but in the remainder of this section, I review current scholarly analyses of 
the Survivor as a historical figure, cultural construct, and narrative persona in Western culture. 
Colloquial use of the word “survivor” has increased steadily in the Western world since 
the mid-twentieth century, but it is only in recent decades that scholars have begun to theorize 
about the cultural construction of this term. By definition, a survivor is some being that continues 
 
3The work-in-progress Sia discusses in this article was ultimately released under the title 
“Unstoppable” on her 2016 album This Is Acting. Its lyrics would fit well in table 1: “put my 
armor on, show you how strong I am. . . . I’m unstoppable, I’m a Porsche with no brakes / I’m 
invincible, I win every single game / I’m so powerful, I don’t need batteries to play / I’m so 





to live; their features may be defined in contrast to those of another party who did not “survive.” 
The origins of this word in English are traced to legal communication, in which a survivor is 
someone who outlives a specific person (e.g., a parent or spouse) and may thus be entitled to 
certain rights.4 Survivor is also commonly used to refer to someone significantly affected, but not 
killed, by a specific natural disaster or mass tragedy. In such contexts, the phrasing “survivor of 
_____” may be more common than “_____ survivor.” But in the 1960s, the idea of a Survivor as 
a distinct identity came to be strongly associated—all but synonymous—with someone who had 
lived through the Holocaust or, to a much lesser extent, the United States’ 1945 bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since the 1980s, feminists have debated the advantages of the term 
Survivor in reference to persons who have experienced gender-based violence, often preferring 
this to more stigmatizing alternatives (e.g., “battered woman”). In the same era, though, Survivor 
also gained traction as a title for someone who has been treated for cancer (see Mullan, 1985), 
and gay men who lived through the early stages of the HIV/AIDS epidemic began to identify 
themselves as Survivors, too. Thus in contemporary parlance, Survivor discourse is expanding to 
capture an ever broader range of traumatic events and experiences—in the absence of obvious 
contextual clues, a person referring to Survivors can no longer assume a common understanding 
of this term among members of their audience. For this reason, Survivor is usually accompanied 
by a modifying noun. That is, we speak specifically of Holocaust survivors, bombing survivors, 
rape/incest survivors, domestic violence survivors, cancer survivors, AIDS (or other epidemic) 
survivors, mass shooting survivors, hurricane survivors, psychiatric survivors, and so on. 
These various forms of Survivor discourse diverge in their conceptions of how exactly a 
person becomes a Survivor, what it means to survive, and alternatives to survival. For example, 
 





Kelly et al. (1996) found that discussions of sexual violence tend to frame Survivor identity as a 
stage of emotional healing following that of the “victim” on the so-called journey to recovery: 
being a Survivor is associated with being active, resourceful, strong, courageous, and proud of 
oneself after a traumatic experience (pp. 90-91). By contrast, the same study showed that victims 
are imagined to be passive, helpless, weak, vulnerable, and ashamed (p. 91). In its most literal 
construction, though, survival is defined in opposition to dying and death—as Spry (1995) notes, 
“there can be no survivors without victims” (p. 28). The opposite of a Survivor is, regrettably, 
someone who has died. Accordingly, all variants of Survivor discourse imply that the Survivor 
once faced a mortal threat to their physical or emotional well-being, and the fact of their survival 
is invariably regarded as a triumph. Indeed, per Orgad’s (2009) genealogy of the Survivor in 
contemporary culture, as dominant discourse increasingly compares trauma to a “battle” over a 
person’s life, it seems that “the only legitimate and desirable choice is to fight and win the 
battle—to become a survivor” (p. 148). Regardless of whatever trauma a person has endured, 
they are encouraged to make peace with the past, seize control over their healing, speak out 
about their experiences, and thus achieve the special status of a Survivor (Orgad, 2009, p. 150).  
Of crucial importance to my study in this chapter is Orgad’s observation that, at present, 
Survivor identity is all but predicated on autobiographical acts. If an individual’s ability to speak 
and write about their past is deemed “central to empowerment” (p. 154), then “telling is the key 
to becoming a survivor” (2009, p. 150). It is through the act of storytelling that Survivors come 
into being, and for this reason, it is often by studying autobiographical narratives—for example, 
song lyrics—that we garner insights into Survivor discourse. While I cannot account for the vast 
archive of life writing by specific Survivors, some generalizations can be made about Survivor 





Reading Autobiography, a landmark text in autobiography studies, lists “survivor narrative” in its 
appendix of prominent life writing genres—they define this category as “narratives by survivors 
of traumatic, abusive, or genocidal experience” (p. 282). These scholars coincide with Orgad in 
their observation that, when it comes to narrating trauma, “victims must be remade as survivors 
through acts of speaking out” (p. 282). Citing an influential feminist study of Survivor discourse, 
Smith and Watson also stress the “political utility” of the Survivor’s testimony—especially when 
it “critiques larger cultural forces” in addition to exploring the author’s private emotions (p. 282; 
see also Alcoff and Gray, 1993). Likewise, Yagoda’s (2010) Memoir: A History praises the rise 
of memoirs by Black Americans and Holocaust survivors in 1960s publishing, describing these 
texts as “testaments to the wrongs suffered by a people coming from the pen of a survivor” (p. 
226). It was only due to the popularity of such politically-charged books, Yagoda suggests, that 
“victims of individual, as opposed to social, travail” were motivated to publish more highly 
personal stories of trauma in the early stages of the memoir boom (p. 226).5 
To be sure, autobiographical writing—and more importantly, publishing—has been vital 
to the circulation of Survivor discourse in American culture, drawing more and more scholarly 
attention to these texts’ rhetorical features. Gilmore (2010), for one, criticizes the recent trend 
towards tales of individual suffering and salvation (what she calls “American neoconfessionals”) 
in the memoir market, arguing the author of such a book is “made believable less by her [sic] 
suffering than by her anomalous redemption. . . . what appeals is struggle and overcoming” (pp. 
659-60, italics mine). Gilmore criticizes the American neoconfessional for displacing Survivor 
narratives of the past, in which authors wrote about trauma for the purpose of contextualizing it 
 
5Yagoda seems to use “victim” and “survivor” interchangeably throughout his book, but in 





within broader “histories of harm” and calling for justice (p. 659). Whereas those authors might 
be recognized as Survivors due to the clear, specific traumas recounted in their books, Gilmore 
suggests some modern authors deliberately affect a pseudo-Survivor persona for personal gain—
obscuring the details of their suffering, they make themselves more relatable and thus widely 
marketable to mass audiences. On the other hand, Couser (2011) notes how the stark contrast 
between authors and their audiences can also be a selling point for memoirs: the demand for tales 
of exceptional struggle and redemption even spurs some towards “autobiographical hoax,” in 
which authors falsely claim a racial, ethnic, or other cultural identity “once stigmatized but now 
privileged in some quarters precisely because of its history of oppression” (p. 53). Couser does 
not explain his curious assertion that some persons are privileged on the basis of oppression, but 
against a backdrop of Survivor discourse, no elaboration is needed. Whether readers hope to be 
flattered by our similarities to the Survivor or awed by our differences, the Survivor topos takes 
it as a given that the Survivor’s history of trauma makes them uniquely worthy of our regard. To 
elucidate the context in which Survivors are either granted or denied good character, then, I turn 
now to a discussion of mental health rhetoric and the notion of Survivor ethos. 
Survivor, Ethos, Survivor Ethos: Autobiography Studies and Mental Health Rhetoric 
Alongside the established Survivor discourses described above, in which survival is tied 
to specific types of violence, disease, or historical events, I observe another notion of survival 
emerging in the study of autobiographical texts. It is an idea Serra (2007) sketches as “the ethos 
of the survivor” in her study of Italian immigrant autobiographies, The Value of Worthless Lives 
(p. 34); to clarify the rhetorical dimensions of this concept as applied in this chapter, I use the 
phrase “Survivor ethos.” In Serra’s understanding, the ethos of the survivor involves “the 
sensation . . . of having escaped from destruction, having survived through the stampede of 





immigrant, the unlucky struggler, the fighter against an adverse destiny” (p. 43). Their narratives 
show how an immigrant’s survival in a new country is not only physical (staying alive), but also 
financial, professional, procreative, cultural, and more—hence, the immigrant is a Survivor per 
se—but far from soliciting pity, they suggest “their lives of sorrow make them heroes” (p. 34). 
Highlighting the great obstacles one must conquer to “make oneself” in America and the “moral 
lesson[s]” (e.g., “optimism against all odds”) one learns along the way (p.13), these otherwise 
unknown writers argue for their own worthiness to document their life stories. In doing so, as 
Serra’s book title indicates, they affirm the value of all immigrants’ lives, infusing them with 
Survivor ethos regardless of whether their stories are ever shared with a public audience. 
Just as Survivor identity can arise from a variety of traumatic experiences, it seems that 
Survivor ethos can evoke a multitude of special characteristics: strength, knowledge, resilience, 
wisdom, integrity, compassion, and countless others. In the passages cited above, Serra suggests 
immigrant writers depict themselves as moral “heroes” (benevolent and brave) through their tales 
of survival; they address an American audience, reassuring them of their abilities to contribute to 
this country. By contrast, Larsen (2012) parses Rupert Bazambanza’s preface to Smile Through 
the Tears, his 2009 graphic novel about the Rwandan genocide, thusly: “Bazambanza establishes 
an ethos as a survivor who has not only experienced the genocide, but also reached conclusions 
about it. . . . a survivor who has found direction and purpose in life by taking up a social cause” 
(p. 121). For Larsen, Bazambanza’s Survivor identity seems to endow him with unique critical 
faculties and a heightened sense of justice, permanently shifting his life course towards political 
activism, autobiographical writing, and other forms of public advocacy—and so he highlights his 
Survivor status in hopes of persuading his readers to follow where he leads. On the other hand, 





trauma as a source of valuable information, hinting that Survivors’ unique intelligence is what 
builds their credibility: “Survivors seem marked with special forms of knowledge to which the 
rest of us do not have access” (p. 167; see also Lifton, 1967). In sum, although the traits ascribed 
to the Survivor may vary in accordance with the type of trauma they survived, the virtue of those 
traits is rarely disputed. When I use the phrase “Survivor ethos,” then, I mean the overall 
excellence of character a Survivor is granted when the Survivor topos is upheld. 
Needless to say, I cite Serra’s work not to suggest that her archive can speak for all life 
writing by immigrants or any other marginalized group, but rather because I find that Survivor 
ethos—if understood, as it is here, to be constitutive of Mad Genius rhetoric—surfaces in an 
enormous number of trauma narratives, and delving more deeply into this concept sheds light on 
Survivor discourse as a whole. To be sure, Serra’s study uses the term “ethos” in its sense as “the 
characteristic spirit of a people, community, culture, or era as manifested in its attitudes and 
aspirations” (OED, n.d.), not explicitly interpreting “the ethos of the survivor” as a type of 
character an author displays through narrative techniques for the specific purpose of persuading 
their audience. Still, the Survivor aspect of her argument can easily be reframed in rhetorical 
terms. These immigrant authors emphasized their great capacities for survival in order to build 
ethos before American readers; they felt extra compelled to justify their autobiographical writing 
because immigrants’ perspectives have historically been devalued in the United States. In this 
sense, Serra’s findings are certainly generalizable to life writing by other types of authors whose 
personal characters are, for whatever reason, likely to be questioned by their audiences.   
That some speakers are disproportionately discredited in public forums due to their 
personal identities is, unfortunately, a well-known fact among scholars and activists alike. 





survivors of gender-based violence, all but requiring them to defend their own credibility when 
speaking out about assaults (see Alcoff & Gray, 1993; Kelly et al., 1996; Palmer-Mehta, 2018; 
Shearer-Cremean, 2004; Stenberg, 2018; etc.). Importantly, it is due (in part) to the association 
of trauma, oppression, and other forms of violence with intense emotionality and adverse 
psychological effects that firsthand accounts of such events are so frequently disregarded. 
Irrespective of whether a Survivor actually identifies as “traumatized” and/or a mental health 
consumer, extreme societal stigma against mental illness fosters the belief that persons in crisis 
are unreliable sources of information about their own experiences. Inevitably, some such persons 
will respond with assertions of their rationality—whereas the authors in Serra’s research seem to 
argue that hardship positively affected their morals, other Survivors may find themselves arguing 
that hardship did not negatively affect their sanity. As Price (2011) notes, the impulse to clarify 
that one’s negative emotions after a challenging ordeal are normal and not pathological (i.e., that 
one is “emotional but not crazy”) is so strong that it frequently precedes, rather than follows, 
disclosures of distress (p. 47). But in imagining a clear boundary between normal and abnormal 
emotions, one raises a question that has driven a great deal of research in mental health rhetoric: 
if a person truly is mentally ill, is it then justifiable to discount the things they say? 
Across the body of scholarship now increasingly called “mental health rhetoric research” 
(MHRR), a basic conflict is noted between mental illness and a person’s ability to be recognized 
as a rhetorical being. Reverberating in many MHRR studies is Prendergast’s (2003) comment 
that “to be disabled mentally is to be disabled rhetorically” (p. 202)—or alternatively, “If people 
think you’re crazy, they don’t listen to you” (p. 203; quoted in Donaldson, 2018; Johnson, 2010; 
Longhurst, 2019; Price, 2011; Pryal, 2010; Reynolds, 2018; Uthappa, 2018; etc.). If mental 





identified as mentally disabled will not be granted rhetoricity at all, let alone be heeded with 
respect. Of course, differing definitions of “disability” lead to multiple interpretations of this 
claim: what does it mean to be mentally (or rhetorically) disabled, and how do we distinguish 
this from illness, impairment, or other phenomena? Prendergast’s essay focuses on the “disease” 
of schizophrenia, stressing that it is “as much a brain disorder as Alzheimer’s disease or multiple 
sclerosis” (p. 2003, p. 190). On the other hand, Lewiecki-Wilson (2003) extends her analysis to 
all “psychiatric and cognitive disabilities that interfere with communication,” calling for a view 
of “collaborative and mediated rhetorics” as valid expressions of rhetorical agency for persons 
with any number of mental impairments (p. 157). But Johnson (2010) explains that social stigma 
is itself a disabling force—a “failure of the rhetorical environment” (p. 461)—for persons known 
to be mentally ill, permanently marking them as defective rhetors even if/when their disorders 
have no obvious effect on their communication skills. Instead of damaging a person’s credibility, 
Johnson argues, stigma “substitute[s] kakoethos in its place,” signifying not “a lack of ethos, but 
a present anti-ethos” (2010, p. 463). Simply put, speakers with mental illness are rhetorically 
disabled not just because they are doubted or dismissed, but because they are actively assumed to 
be “worthless, evil, dirty, ugly, weak, cowardly, envious, dangerous” and so on (p. 465). 
As rhetorical exclusion features prominently in early MHRR, several scholars have asked 
how persons with mental disability might respond to widespread denial of their rhetoricity. And 
whereas MHRR once centered “caregivers and their colleagues” (Reynolds, 2018, p. 3), often 
analyzing how mental health is constructed in institutional documents, recent studies turn more 
and more to patients’ own narratives. One common finding in such work is that individuals with 
mental illness draw extensively from formal psychiatric discourse (especially the Diagnostic and 





Holladay, 2017; Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013; Lee, 2017; Martin, 2007; Reynolds, 2018; 
Uthappa, 2017; etc.). The reason for this, Holladay (2017) contends, is that patients wish to 
display “scientific literacy” as a means of building ethos (p. 9)—realizing that “knowledge of 
scientific concepts and processes carries significant cache [sic] in conversations” about mental 
health (p. 14), they support their personal views by citing the most authoritative text in Western 
psychiatry. And in fact, MHRR quite consistently points to ethos (or lack thereof) as a vital 
component of patient narratives. Pryal (2010), for example, argues that memoirs about mood 
disorders build ethos through four basic narrative conventions: authors explain their reasons for 
writing, recount how they gained consciousness of their illness, criticize doctors who failed 
them, and align themselves with other (credible) ill persons (p. 485). In contrast, Molloy’s (2015) 
field research at a clubhouse for persons with mental illness analyzes their day-to-day discursive 
practices, seeking “ontologies that are thinly represented or absent in written documents and 
published work” such as famous memoirs (p. 141). Explicating what she calls “recuperative 
ethos,” Molloy finds that patients recoup their credibility through “displays of astuteness,” 
“arguments for strong human connections,” and “uses of religious topoi” (2015, p. 146).   
The introduction to Uthappa’s (2017) essay on the rhetoric of the Speakers Bureau, an 
organized group of advocates with mental disabilities, aptly summarizes the state of MHRR 
concerning firsthand accounts of mental illness: “The primary issue that arises in such rhetorical 
situations is the construction of ethos” (p. 164). But contrary to some scholars’ expectations, 
Uthappa argues that sharing potentially shocking or embarrassing details about one’s history of 
mental illness can actually help, not harm, a person’s ethos (p. 164). While it is true that so-
called “deep disclosures” increase one’s vulnerability, according to Uthappa, this practice can 





live the realities [of mental illness] may grant Speakers Bureau members extra credibility” 
before certain types of audiences (p. 168). In other words, as one Speakers Bureau member 
explains, “We’re in a unique position. Only we can teach it from our angle” (p. 168). Indeed, the 
notion that mentally ill rhetors might generate ethos on the basis of their experiential knowledge 
and practical wisdom is mentioned, if only briefly, by several of the MHRR scholars cited above 
(see Johnson, 2010; Molloy, 2015; Pryal, 2010). There may be limits to this ethos: in Johnson’s 
(2010) view, to “restrict a stigmatized rhetor to the position of spokesperson”—granting them 
rhetorical authority only on the topic of their stigmatized identity—effectively denies them 
“ethical flexibility,” or “the capacity to speak with authority on a number of different topics” (p. 
475, italics mine). What happens, though, if the rhetor lays claim to a number of different 
stigmatized identities? Does their credibility thus expand and flex accordingly? 
There is a key connection to be drawn between leading MHRR on personal narratives of 
mental illness and the Survivor topos I am articulating throughout this chapter. Perhaps some 
constructions of “survival” are not overtly linked to trauma, not all trauma begets mental illness 
(or vice versa), and not all mentally ill persons seek to generate ethos. But at the intersection of 
these popular discourses, the Survivor topos makes one point very clear: the events in humans’ 
lives that cause them the greatest pain are also those that strengthen their personal character the 
most. Moreover, it is through communicative processes—the acts of speaking and writing about 
such events—that humans actually argue for the severity of their traumas, the excellence of their 
characters, and the relationship between the two. Of course, what Survivor identity means to a 
pop artist writing a song about her recent break-up in 2020 cannot be the same as what it meant 
to an immigrant writing an unpublished autobiography about “making it” in America in 1920, 





selling memoir at the height of the memoir boom in the late 1990s. To illuminate how Survivor 
ethos functions in general, it is instructive to examine its influence on one specific, sustained, 
and arguably exceptional life narrative. For this reason, the remainder of this chapter will delve 
deeply into Nana-Ama Danquah’s Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman’s Journey Through 
Depression, reading its portrayal of her many traumas as a response to mental illness stigma. 
Case Study: Willow Weep for Me and the Survivor Topos 
Published in February 1998, Willow Weep for Me tells the story of Danquah’s life from 
her early childhood up until her time of writing in the late 1990s, chronicling the lead-up to her 
struggles with major depressive disorder between the years of 1989 and 1994. Danquah’s book 
has not enjoyed quite the same mainstream popularity as some other offerings of the memoir 
boom, but Willow Weep for Me’s impact on scholarly discussions of mental health—particularly 
in the fields of African diaspora studies and, to an even greater degree, (feminist) disability 
studies—certainly rivals that of the three other case studies examined in this dissertation. For 
example, Balogun (2009) reads Willow Weep for Me alongside Buchi Emecheta’s Head Above 
Water, another memoir written by a West African immigrant woman, drawing conclusions rather 
reminiscent of Serra’s (2007) discussion of “survival” in Italian immigrant autobiographies. Like 
Serra, Balogun stresses the themes of negotiating, struggling, fighting, coping, and other types of 
strategies these authors describe themselves deploying in order to survive in a new country, and 
one of these is autobiographical writing. The clash between traditional African society and the 
values of contemporary American culture, for Balogun, creates “an overwhelmingly powerful 
motivation” for immigrant women to publish their life stories—in doing so, they both “illuminate 
for others the great odds against which they have struggled” and valuably “highlight the reasons 
why they have prevailed” (2009, p. 445). Likewise, Uwakweh’s (2014) comparative analysis of 





“other noteworthy transnational narratives,” noting that despite the differences in these authors’ 
profiles, their stories “share remarkable unity of focus on female characters as they negotiate 
Diaspora spaces for survival” (p. 18). Approaching Willow Weep for Me foremost as a narrative 
by an African immigrant, these scholars stress how autobiographical writing functions as a tool 
for marginalized persons to assert their subjectivity and (thus) relieve psychological distress. 
Given that Willow Weep for Me is primarily a book about depression, Danquah has most 
often been cited by scholars specializing in mental health. It is noteworthy, though, that much of 
her influence in such research is indirect: her ideas are often shared via citations of one particular 
scholarly article about her memoir rather than of the memoir itself. Eight years after the release 
of Willow Weep for Me, Mollow’s (2006) article, “‘When Black Women Start Going on Prozac’: 
Race, Gender, and Mental Illness in Meri Nana-Ama Danquah’s Willow Weep for Me,” was 
published in MELUS. Examining the role of Danquah’s race and gender in her experience of 
mental illness, Mollow argues that this memoir “forces a reconsideration of several . . . central 
tenets of disability studies” (pp. 67-68)—among these are the field’s “reluctance to understand 
disability in terms of sickness or suffering, its tendency to define disability in visual terms, and 
its resistance to stories of overcoming” (p. 71).6 Provocative in its criticisms of disability studies 
trends, Mollow’s study was anthologized in the second edition of a foundational text in this field, 
The Disability Studies Reader (see Davis, 2006); it also appeared in the third and fourth editions. 
Due in part to its circulation in this volume, perhaps, the scholarly prominence of Mollow’s 
essay has now arguably eclipsed that of Willow Weep for Me itself—numerous feminist and/or 
 
6Mollow’s article takes its title from a passage of Willow Weep for Me in which Danquah 
describes a party she attended while writing her memoir. Upon hearing the subject of Danquah’s 
book, another guest (an “older, heavily perfumed” white woman) comments, “‘Black women and 
depression? . . . Isn’t that kinda redundant? . . . It’s just that when black women start going on 





disability studies scholars have quoted Mollow’s arguments regarding the intersectionality of 
mental health issues, but they do not generally cite Danquah in the process (see for instance 
Cahn, 2014; Johnson, 2013; Kelsey, 2013; Mollow, 2014; Orem, 2015; Pickens, 2017; Williams, 
2018). Research that does cite Willow Weep for Me either does so alongside Mollow’s essay 
(Mollow, 2017; Pickens, 2019), to support claims similar to Mollow’s regarding the role of race 
in mental health (Beauboeuf-Lafontant, 2005; Dean, 2007; Emmons, 2010; Hoffman & Hansen, 
2017; Shannonhouse, 1995; Walters, 2017), or as a passing example of a depression memoir 
(Miyatsu, 2018; Morrow, 2007; Radden, 2008). To my knowledge, Mollow’s essay remains the 
only article-length scholarly work that focuses exclusively on Willow Weep for Me.  
It cannot be denied that Danquah’s identities as an African immigrant and a Black 
woman shape the story she tells in Willow Weep for Me to a profound degree. Reflecting on her 
need for “a certain level of cultural sensitivity” in any therapist she meets, she writes: “I am 
black; I am female; I am an immigrant. Every one of these labels plays an equally significant part 
in my perception of myself and the world around me” (1999, p. 225). But my contention in this 
chapter is that these labels—along with numerous other marginalized identities and traumatic 
experiences Danquah discloses in her memoir—are also constitutive of an even broader, more 
holistic Survivor identity she enacts all throughout Willow Weep for Me. Furthermore, I find that 
her engagement with Survivor discourse can be a read as a rhetorical response to mental illness 
stigma, establishing her good character (as an expert in so-called survival) before an audience 
that might otherwise deny her rhetoricity on the basis of her mental illness. In what follows, I 
chronologize key facts of Willow Weep for Me’s non-linear narrative, affirming the multiplicity 
of Danquah’s traumas and her narrative emphasis on those events as triggering her clinical 





argue that her final self-presentation as a Survivor in Willow Weep for Me—an identity that 
coalesces around acts of speaking out—is central to her construction of ethos in this memoir. By 
framing Danquah’s long-deferred decision to seek psychiatric help as a testament to, rather than 
a negation of, the excellent character she has forged through a lifetime of psychological distress, 
Willow Weep for Me points to the alluring capaciousness of Survivor discourse. What is less 
clear by the conclusion of this memoir, though, is the extent to which mentally ill and/or 
traumatized persons as a class ultimately benefit from the proliferation of this topos. 
You’ve Been Through A Lot of Shit: Trauma and Depression 
The Survivor topos, as I understand it, holds that the events or circumstances of humans’ 
lives that cause us extraordinary distress are also a source of special excellence in character. As a 
consequence, Survivor identity can only be claimed by persons who successfully argue (at least 
implicitly) that they have endured great suffering of some kind; this label is only applicable to 
someone whose suffering is recognized as such by the labeler. The most overt way in which 
Willow Weep for Me engages with Survivor discourse, then, is by detailing the many variegated 
traumas the author experienced during the first three decades of her life. Ostensibly an account of 
clinical depression, this 269-page memoir could just as well be characterized as a story of trauma 
and, by extension, posttraumatic stress—interwoven with the details of Danquah’s psychiatric 
symptoms and treatments are deep descriptions of loss, violence, and other harms. The inclusion 
of this content is not arbitrary, and these events are not disconnected from one another. On the 
contrary, they are vital to the text’s depiction of Danquah’s mental illness as proceeding from a 





Nana-Ama Danquah was born Mildred Mary Nana-Ama Boakyewaa Brobby in Accra, 
Ghana on September 13, 1967.7 Having suffered the “traumatic loss” of her primary caregiver at 
the age of three—when her mother left their home country (“left Ghana, and me”) to attend 
college in Washington, D.C., never to return (p. 36)—Danquah emigrated to the United States at 
age six, accompanied by her beloved grandmother Auntie C. (Danquah, 1999). Her father joined 
the family in D.C. soon after, and although her parents had a second child when Danquah was 
ten (her sister Paula), Willow Weep for Me describes this period of the author’s life as one of 
great turbulence and destruction: “Daddy worked later and later. There were loud discussions, 
arguments, and fights. . . . I could hear screaming, crashing, banging and breaking. Always 
breaking” (p. 105). The anguish she felt when her father eventually vanished from their home 
was, as Danquah recalls, almost unbearable: “This is the first clear memory I have of feeling 
overwhelmingly sad for a lengthy period of time, of hating myself so much that I wanted to die” 
(p. 106). Here the text positions Danquah’s father’s withdrawal from the family as a catalyst for 
three classic symptoms of depression—chronic sadness, self-hatred, and suicidality—strongly 
suggesting that the author’s later mental illness could be traced to this childhood event. Yet while 
summarizing her life from ages eight to twelve in another passage, Danquah also implies that her 
parents’ divorce only exacerbated, rather than caused, a sense of emotional deprivation she had 
felt since being separated from her mother as a toddler: “In [this] time, . . . I began to accept loss 
as an inevitable part of the life I would lead. Regardless of how much someone or something 
meant to me, I knew that I would lose it” (p. 102). A later passage of Willow Weep for Me 
 
7After moving to the United States, Danquah—known to friends and family in Ghana as Nana-
Ama—was primarily called by the name “Mildred Brobby” outside of her family home (e.g., at 
school). She assumed her mother’s maiden name as her surname after her parents divorced; she 





expresses a strikingly similar sentiment: “I wanted . . . someone to hold me, to love me, and to 
stay forever. But I knew that would never happen. In my life, love was synonymous with loss. 
Love was fleeting. It was a feeble promise in an unsteady world” (p. 135). Importantly, 
Danquah’s narration highlights not only the emotional weight of her past beliefs about her life, 
but also their seeming uniqueness to her (“the life I would leave,” “In my life,” etc.).  
From a very early age, Willow Weep for Me suggests, Danquah developed an unusual 
ability to normalize (“accept”) basically abnormal life events, thereby surviving each parent’s 
prolonged abandonment of her. Contrasting her devotion to a “sad song [radio] station” with her 
mother’s ritualistic playing of “I Will Survive” during the same period of their lives, Danquah 
stresses how her childhood experiences prematurely aged her: “How could a heart so young beat 
to the syncopated sorrows of such rhythms? . . . there was a child crying like a grown woman in 
one room, a mother whimpering like a child in the other” (p. 107). Apparently transformed by 
the extremity of her early traumas, Danquah explicitly ascribes her younger self a degree of 
emotional intensity—and emotional maturity—wholly uncommon for a girl of 12. Unfortunately, 
Danquah’s parents’ divorce is neither the first nor the last of the severe emotional losses she 
recounts in Willow Weep for Me. As she tells a therapist later in the text, the dissolution of her 
family caused her mother to be both physically and emotionally inaccessible to her for years to 
come: “‘I don’t feel like I really know her. She worked a lot. She had to. My father wasn’t 
around and we needed the money’” (p. 192). Given the 10-year age difference between Danquah 
and her sister, neither she nor Paula felt significantly supported by the other in their childhoods 
(“we had each grown up feeling like an only child”) (p. 76). And although two other family 
members provided brief companionship for Danquah—Auntie C., who lived with Danquah when 





[her] father”), with whom she had regular outings whenever he visited D.C. (pp. 113-114)—both 
relatives painfully receded from her life by the time she started high school. In Danquah’s 
recollections, Auntie C.’s return to Ghana was “as devastating as losing [her] father, maybe even 
more” (p. 117); indeed, the losses of these two relatives quickly come to mind when she meets 
with her first therapist later in her story: “I told her about most of my early childhood, especially 
about Auntie C. and Uncle Paul and how much I missed them” (pp. 191-192). 
As more and more overtly violent traumas touch Danquah’s life in her early adolescence, 
Willow Weep for Me points to her lack of reliable caretakers as a contributing factor in—if not 
the underlying cause of—her resulting distress. Narratively, Auntie C.’s departure is followed by 
an account of the activities Danquah used to fill the space her grandmother left behind: joining 
school clubs and becoming infatuated with Wayne, an older neighbor. Wayne’s introduction in 
the book is couched in Danquah’s present-day belief that, had Auntie C. been around, she would 
have discouraged this crush: “He was what Auntie C. would call a true hooligan, an ambitionless 
high school graduate with few worries and many girlfriends” (p. 118). Readers soon learn that, 
when Danquah was 13, she was raped by Wayne (who “knew [she] liked him”) after being lured 
to his apartment (p. 118). Recounting this event in excruciating detail, Willow Weep for Me 
leaves little doubt as to the intense physical and psychological injuries the author suffered as a 
result of the assault. Along with her parents’ neglect, Danquah suggests her classmates’ racist, 
xenophobic bullying at school made her especially vulnerable to Wayne’s flattery and sexual 
advances: “I was stunned, elated. Ugly had been the most common adjective my peers used to 
describe me” (p. 119).8 And evidently, it was because she so “desperately wanted him to like 
 
8Danquah delves more deeply into this bullying elsewhere in Willow Weep for Me. For example, 
she writes: “I, and my name, became the target for incessant teasing and ridicule. . . . [they] 





[her]” that his violence impacted her so significantly (p. 120). That is, Danquah was traumatized 
not only by the assault itself, but also by her belief that she had deserved it: “The fact that I 
hadn’t wanted to go all the way with Wayne seemed insignificant. He didn’t make me go to his 
place. . . . I felt violated but I told myself I had no right to” (p. 121). Looking back on her rape in 
Willow Weep for Me, however, Danquah draws clear connections between the humiliation she 
felt both during and after the event, her inability to tell anyone what had happened, and her 
ensuing feelings of detachment from the world around her. In the weeks after her assault, she 
writes, “The world was present, yet distant somehow, gradually pulling itself out of [her] focus” 
(p. 121). And as she elaborates earlier in the text, “This is how the world feels to me when I am 
depressed. Everything is blurry, out of focus, fading like a photograph” (p. 44). In contrast to the 
intense emotionality that characterized the traumatic losses of her childhood, Danquah’s 
detached, depressed response to her assault is what allowed her to survive her adolescence. 
Few would dispute that emotional detachment is a reasonable (albeit damaging) response 
to sexual assault, but unfortunately for Danquah, the text suggests her self-isolating silence on 
this topic had disastrous consequences. Indeed, Danquah implies that this early instance of rape 
led almost directly to the years of continuous sexual abuse she later endured from Jonathan, her 
mother’s long-term boyfriend. Originally resentful of Jonathan’s constant presence in her life, 
Danquah notes that she grew “rather fond” of him in time, viewing him as “somewhere between 
being a relative, an authority figure, and a friend” (p. 122). But in a scene of Willow Weep for Me 
soon after Wayne’s assault, young Danquah worries that Jonathan “could tell [she] was no longer 
a virgin” after he offhandedly describes her as “precocious” (“it means grown, advanced. . . . 
 
my accent that refused to roll rs or clip vowels. They pinched their noses and slid away from me 
as I opened my lunch box. They told me I looked like a monkey, often referring to me as ‘the 





womanish”) (p. 122). Responding with what she hopes will sound like an innocuous question 
about virginity, Danquah soon finds herself manipulated into telling Jonathan the entire story of 
her rape: “I gave him every feeling, every detail, until there was nothing left to tell” (p. 123). She 
is soothed at first by his affectionate, paternal response, wondering “whether [her] father would 
have understood [her] the way Jonathan did” (p. 123), but this scene ends with Jonathan taking 
on “the wily smirk of an animal who had come upon his prey” and suddenly kissing her (p. 124). 
The paragraphs that follow clearly convey the aftermath of this incident: Danquah asks, “What 
kind of a man uses his erect penis, like the pointed, glistening tip of a blade, to butcher the trust 
of a child?” (p. 124), proceeding to reflect at length on the damaging effects of sexual abuse. 
Specifically, she recalls how she blamed herself for Jonathan’s actions just as she had with 
Wayne’s, describing her childhood ruminations as follows: “What kind of a child allows this to 
happen? It was never his fault, always mine. Couldn’t I have run? Couldn’t I have screamed? . . . 
These questions tortured me in my teens” (p. 124). Once again, Danquah’s portrayal of her 
traumas underscores the link between bodily harm and depressive, self-loathing thought patterns. 
Whereas Willow Weep for Me ties Danquah’s earliest symptoms of depression to her 
father’s abandonment, Danquah’s first suicide attempt at age 14 is attributed in large part to 
Jonathan’s sexual violence: “Because of the abuse, I was already in the process of dying. . . . I 
wanted someone else to notice this” (p. 125). Yet those two traumas are also connected to each 
other—the text suggests it was Danquah’s numerous emotional losses (of mother, father, 
grandmother, and uncle) that pushed her towards both Wayne and Jonathan in the first place, for 
she yearned for “an adult with whom I could talk easily without risk of judgment or punishment” 
(p. 122). Having attempted suicide in hopes that her loved ones would “would rush to [her] aid 





anyone about the sexual abuse: “The way I saw it, all of the adults in my life were either 
physically or emotionally unavailable. All except Jonathan” (p. 125). And as the text progresses 
through her high school graduation at age 17 and move to Los Angeles at age 20 (to pursue a 
writing career), the reverberations of Danquah’s early traumas are evident at every stage. For 
example, readers learn early in Willow Weep for Me that Danquah once endured domestic 
violence—following several months of verbal and (later) physical abuse, her ex-partner Justin 
beat her viciously during a visit with their infant daughter Korama (p. 41). Justin’s attack, a 
seemingly random misfortune, is given further context when her narration later alludes to a 
relationship between Danquah’s “past sexual abuse and [her] inclination toward violent men” (p. 
225). That Justin’s frequent violence also played a role in Danquah’s development of pre-
eclampsia, a high-risk pregnancy illness “usually brought on by stress or hypertension” that sent 
her to the Maternity ICU (“my blood pressure soared to a deadly high”) (p. 37), is also strongly 
implied. And whereas Danquah had planned to raise Korama with a co-parent, Justin’s sudden 
eviction of them and withdrawal of financial support effectively thrusts her into years of poverty 
and single motherhood—two constant (if less acute) sources of stress throughout her life. 
According to Danquah, it was in Los Angeles that she experienced her earliest episodes 
of clinical depression, although she would not fully recognize them as such until several years 
later. As a consequence, L.A. also provides the setting of one of Willow Weep for Me’s most 
climactic scenes: a conversation in which Danquah’s friend Eugene confronts her about her 
symptoms of mental illness for the first time, opining, “‘Meri, it sounds like you are severely 
depressed’” (p. 59). Wholly taken aback by this claim—particularly by the fact that “he qualified 
it as severe” (p. 59)—Danquah demands an explanation from Eugene. While she does not deny 





have no appetite, you stay cooped up inside all day and, quite frankly, your attitude sucks’”) (p. 
59), Danquah voices her distaste for the conclusions he has drawn as follows: 
“Meri, it makes sense, doesn’t it? You’ve been through a lot of shit. You didn’t 
think you’d just come out on the other side and that everything would be okay, 
did you?” I was beyond bothered by Eugene’s insinuation that I hadn’t “come out 
on the other side” of the difficult situations I had just faced. Considering the 
circumstances—a high-risk pregnancy, poverty, domestic violence, single 
motherhood—I thought I was doing pretty well. After all, I wasn’t on welfare, I 
wasn’t smoking crack or abusing my child. “Yeah, Gene, I did think so.” (p. 59) 
 
As one of Danquah’s closest friends and someone she calls on a daily basis, Eugene is keenly 
aware of the ordeals she has experienced over the past few years. His comments convey his firm 
belief, not only that Danquah’s life has been an especially stressful one (“you’ve been through a 
lot of shit”), but also that the things she has lived through are logical precursors for depression. 
From Eugene’s perspective, it is almost unthinkable that a person with Danquah’s history could 
bypass the adverse psychological effects of so much “shit” and come out perfectly “okay.” 
Notably, there is no indication here or elsewhere in Willow Weep for Me that Danquah has 
discussed her history of sexual violence with Eugene (or any other friend); that he so decisively 
posits a connection between her depression and trauma, despite knowing nothing about those 
particular events, only attests to the multiplicity of her hardships all throughout the text. 
Affirming that it “makes sense” for Danquah to be depressed—that any seemingly 
irrational actions or beliefs on her part may, in fact, be rational for someone in her position—
Eugene poses two rhetorical Yes/No questions (“doesn’t it? . . . did you?”) with which he thinks 
she cannot disagree. But she does disagree, for although she has experienced some remarkable 
situations (“a high-risk pregnancy, poverty, domestic violence, single motherhood,” to name a 
few), she resents her friend’s “insinuation” that she has not emerged victoriously from those 





she takes pride in her continued existence (“I thought I was doing pretty well”), naming several 
worse alternatives. And at this point of her life story, mental illness evidently constitutes 
personal failure in Danquah’s view just as much as any other of the stigmatized situations she 
lists above.9 Even if she did recognize the emotional impact of the harms she had endured, to 
admit the possibility that she might be clinically depressed would have been, for Danquah, 
tantamount to admitting she was personally defective. Writing a memoir from the perspective of 
a self-identified depressive would thus be unthinkable. How, then, did she come to embrace her 
mental illness and break her decades of silence around her childhood traumas? As Willow Weep 
for Me slowly shifts its focus from the chain of events leading to Danquah’s depression towards 
her reflections on recovery and the writing of this memoir, the advantages of Survivor discourse 
fully come to light. Through displays of the special character she has built in the wake of her 
traumatic past, Danquah argues for the special value—and exigence—of her narrative. 
Spilling the Beans: Survivor Ethos and Public Illness 
That mental illness stigma strongly influences Danquah’s story in Willow Weep for Me 
hardly needs justification—both the events of her life (e.g., choices she makes throughout the 
story) and the ways in which she recounts them are repeatedly framed as a result of her desire to 
conceal her depression. Hence, it may be in Willow Weep for Me’s reckonings with stigma that 
Danquah’s writing most overtly works to build her narrative ethos. For example, regarding her 
longtime refusal to seek professional help for her depression, she writes: “Now when I think 
about it, my past aversion to therapy seems irrational. It just boiled down to the simple fact that I 
didn’t want people thinking I was crazy” (p. 147). In retrospect, it seems to Danquah that the 
 
9In terms of the moral or medical significance of these behaviors, it seems unlikely that Danquah 
is equating the receipt of public assistance with drug addiction or child abuse. I read this simply 





“irrational” aspect of her mental illness was not her symptoms, but rather her unwillingness to 
treat them. What once seemed like a principled stance against therapy when she was in the throes 
of mental illness is, now that she is recovered (able to “think about it” more clearly), easily 
“boiled down” to the “simple fact” of her own prejudices against so-called crazy people. To 
embrace her psychiatric diagnosis and attempt to educate herself about it would thus be rational 
by this line of reasoning—and indeed, like many mentally ill rhetors before her, Danquah draws 
extensively from scientific discourse to validate her memoir’s various claims about depression. 
She cites recent scholarship on post-partum depression and the prevalence of alcoholism in 
Black women (pp. 38, 205), informs readers that “Medical science has no cure for depression” 
and “doctors still know very little” about the illness (pp. 256-57), and reproduces in full the 
diagnostic criteria for depression as they appeared in the DSM-IV (pp. 268-69). Highlighting how 
her account is informed by established psychiatric literature as well as personal reflection, 
Danquah fairly deliberately argues for her rhetorical authority on the subject of depression. 
Danquah’s performances of scientific literacy vis-à-vis the diagnosis and treatment of 
depression are crucial elements of her memoir, but they do not fully explain how she resolved 
her past aversion to being “crazy,” nor do they necessarily qualify her to speak on any other 
topics. Instead, it is Willow Weep for Me’s discussions of trauma that illuminate both the cause of 
Danquah’s depression (as shown above) and, importantly, her reasons for finally sharing her 
story. These might be the same reasons why, in Danquah’s view, her audience should value what 
she has to say. Early in the book, she affirms that there is a factual, even scientific basis for at 
least part of the Survivor topos. Contemplating several possible sources of “the unspoken anger 
that has fueled [her] depressions” (especially her parents), she writes: 
there is no denying that the events of my childhood played a major role in 





susceptibility to depressive disorders is usually formed early in childhood, 
especially with people who have experienced traumatic loss. (p. 35) 
  
Now confidently asserting a point that once offended her when voiced by Eugene—that she did 
not escape unscathed from the losses, violence, and other harms of her early life—Danquah quite 
clearly connects her mental illness to her past traumas. She cites no source for the theory that 
depression is rooted in early childhood events, but it is reasonable to assume she is referring to 
scientists and doctors.10 If this theory is true, the blame for her illness and (more importantly, 
perhaps) its many negative impacts on her life would fall firmly on the shoulders of her various 
abusers rather than on Danquah herself. In other words, this statement strengthens Danquah’s 
credibility in her readers’ eyes by suggesting that her depression, which we might otherwise 
equate with bad character, was actually triggered by environmental conditions that could not be 
helped. In this sense, Willow Weep for Me demands recognition for Danquah’s expertise far 
beyond the subject of mental illness, establishing her as a Survivor whose writings can shed light 
on a range of exceptional events. What is more, in her musings on the incremental steps through 
which she recovered from her depression, the text begins to craft a logic by which she is all but 
obligated to share her expertise before a public audience (e.g., write a memoir). 
Following the chain of traumatic events that lead to Danquah’s development of 
depression and face-off with Eugene partway through Willow Weep for Me, a second chain of 
healing events in her recovery serve to illuminate her good character and, consequently, her 
construction of Survivor ethos in this memoir. The first of these is a conversation between 
Danquah and Jade, a friend she meets soon after moving back to D.C. at age 24, in which she 
 
10Notice that the use of passive voice in her second sentence is distinctly persuasive: because the 
belief she describes is not attributed to any specific person—suggesting it is ubiquitous and 





openly acknowledges her mental illness for the first time (“admitted to Jade—and myself—that I 
suffered from depression”) (p. 84). Returning from an outing that had dissolved into angry 
bickering, Danquah is taken aback when Jade abruptly asks her, “Are you depressed? . . . Do you 
suffer from depression?” (p. 81). They soon discover they both struggle with depression, and 
although Danquah is frightened to learn that her friend is on Prozac, she feels her fears fading as 
they speak more and more candidly about their personal histories. She writes: “Telling Jade that I 
was depressed did not leave me defenseless. Rather, it gave me a sudden surge of strength and 
determination. I wanted to know more” (p. 85). Whereas Danquah previously worried that 
speaking out about her distress would debase her in others’ eyes, here she emphasizes the special 
feelings of empowerment, fortitude, and curiosity that actually resulted from this decision. 
Moreover, the text stresses that these positive qualities, which she gained through lived 
experience, entirely contradicted her prior expectations, which had been shaped by mainstream 
culture (i.e., mental illness stigma). Simply put, Danquah subtly yet perceptibly introduces her 
readers to the upside of the Survivor topos: the belief that extreme trauma, though it induces 
mental illness, can also pave one’s way to exceptionally good character. 
Danquah and Jade’s conversation in the scene cited above is ostensibly about depression, 
yet her reconstruction of Jade’s life story as she heard it that night more precisely revolves—like 
Willow Weep for Me itself—around trauma. We learn that Jade, too, had a troubled childhood: 
she experienced the loss of “the best friend [she] ever had,” parental neglect (implied), extreme 
academic pressures, and continuous racist bullying from her predominantly white classmates (p. 
89). When Danquah marvels at Jade’s memory, observing that “The past is one big blur to [her]” 
in contrast (p. 89), Jade stresses the value of self-disclosure in psychotherapy: “‘The more I talk 





think you just file it away for safe-keeping’” (p. 90). Needless to say, the idea of “safe-keeping” 
memories assumes several basic points: memories are self-contained items, almost like material 
possessions, that the rememberer owns; they are precious and must be preserved and protected; 
there will come a time when the rememberer wants to withdraw them from the “file” for some 
practical use. And all throughout this scene, the narration highlights the contrast between Jade’s 
eagerness to process her painful past memories and Danquah’s reluctance to do the same. 
Replying to Jade’s endorsement of therapy, Danquah skeptically shrugs, “‘Hmm. . . . I’m not 
sure I’d want to remember any of my past’” (p. 90). But by the evening’s end, Jade’s candor has 
led Danquah to the realization, not only that she has been deliberately suppressing her past (the 
“old life haunting [her]”), but also that doing so is harming her (p. 95). She writes: “How could I 
have been so naive to believe that I could return to D.C. and create a future without contending 
with the past?” (p. 95). Once again, the narration stresses Danquah’s special ability—as a result 
of her disclosure to Jade and, indirectly, of her traumatic past itself—to uncover fundamental 
truths about humanity that might be wholly inaccessible to a non-traumatized person. Whereas 
she once considered her silence around her traumas as a sign of strength (as a “naive” person 
would), she now reframes “contending with the past” as the wiser, worthier decision. It is no 
wonder, then, that Willow Weep for Me implicitly credits Jade for pushing Danquah towards her 
personal process of remembering, verbalizing, and finally healing from her childhood traumas. 
The morning after Danquah’s memorable outing with Jade, she visits her childhood 
neighborhood for the first time since she left home at age 18, and it is in these pages of Willow 
Weep for Me—which we might describe as an extended flashback sequence—that the details of 
her childhood suffering and survival gradually unfold. Recalling her nervousness at the onset of 





life well. Well enough to want to forget or rewrite the parts that were painful” (p. 103). Beyond 
the traumas already mentioned in this chapter, Danquah’s flashback touches on the following 
events: her beloved ninth-grade English teacher, the most supportive adult in her life at the time, 
mysteriously disappeared from her school the following year (p. 130); she witnessed, at close 
range, the gruesome death of a classmate who was hit by a bus (p. 134); soon after that incident, 
she became accidentally pregnant and had an abortion (p. 135); she briefly reconciled with her 
father, but ultimately cut ties with him again due to her mother’s emotional manipulation (p. 
137); she began to engage in high-risk sexual behavior and alcohol abuse with friends (p. 137); 
another close, lifelong friend of hers died in a “freak motorcycle accident” shortly after they 
graduated high school (p. 138). And of course, in foregrounding her Survivor status at this point 
of the story, Danquah adds significant credence to the numerous narrative digressions—
apparently authoritative messages about the interrelatedness of memory, truth-telling, and 
healing—also scattered throughout these pages. Having argued that Danquah is someone who 
has experienced extraordinary trauma, the narration starts gesturing, too, at the extraordinary 
character (wisdom, strength, integrity, etc.) that she has gleaned from her survival. 
All across Willow Weep for Me’s extended flashback sequence, the text highlights (as in 
earlier scenes) the stark contrast between Danquah’s past assumptions about psychic pain—
which seem to be a proxy for her audience’s current beliefs about the same—and the greater 
insights she has developed through the process of actually living out, through, and with a lifetime 
of trauma. For instance, she writes: “I have learned, with difficulty, that the need for separation 
cannot automatically be interpreted as rejection. . . . With twenty-five years of the world’s grit 
under my nails, it finally got through to me” (p. 109); “The illusion of time is that it heals all 





the luxury of entertaining the myths of our myriad possibilities, what we could have or should 
have done but did not” (p. 124); “Self-reflection is necessary for personal growth. . . . Healing is 
about much more than remembering. Healing is about reinterpreting events, aligning the fiction 
with the fact” (pp. 124-25). One cannot help noticing the many commonalities between these 
declarative, (mostly) affirmative sentences, all of which serve to emphasize Danquah’s expertise 
on the subjects at hand. Grammatically, her repeated use of either definite nouns (e.g., “The 
illusion”) or uncountable abstract nouns (e.g., “Healing”) followed by stative verbs (especially 
“be” and “is”) has the effect of presenting her statements, which are inherently subjective beliefs, 
as factual information. Although these sentences appear in a personal memoir, most are neither 
explicitly about Danquah nor directly attributed to her, although one does employ a universal 
“we” as its indirect object. As a consequence, the text understates Danquah’s emotional 
investment in her subject matter, rather positioning her as an authority who is entitled to speak 
on “our” behalf. Whereas emotionally charged language might seem symptomatic of her illness, 
here Danquah’s measured, self-assured tone conveys that her ideas are the result of deliberative 
thought. And what are her topics? As a Survivor, Danquah’s expertise is not limited to some 
specific event in her own life, or even one specific type of trauma, or even the umbrella topic of 
trauma itself. On the contrary, her theorizing of such lofty, universal topics as “the need for 
separation,” “time,” “self-reflection,” “healing,” and so on seems to validate the claim I precited 
earlier from the cover blurb of Willow Weep for Me: this is not simply a memoir about 
depression, and its author is much more than a mere spokesperson for depressive individuals. 
As stepping stones to Danquah’s recovery from mental illness in her real life, the 
authoritative messages she shares throughout her extended flashback sequence also play a key 





statements suggest that the quantity and quality of her insights into the human condition have 
grown exponentially in proportion to the extent of her traumas—to return to a question I raised 
above, it seems her credibility does expand and flex according to the number of stigmatized (or 
more precisely, traumatized) identities she can claim. That she can claim a plethora of “issues” is 
obvious both to Danquah and those around her: “My past, my memories, my pain. . . . I needed 
someone to help me sort them all out. I had so many issues to deal with. More issues, as one of 
my friends says, than People magazine” (p. 168). Thus Danquah’s pivotal decision to enter 
therapy is framed, not exactly as an effort to relieve her psychic pain, but rather as a fulfillment 
of her duty to “sort out” her various traumas. Yet as Willow Weep for Me progresses from 
Danquah’s earliest travails into therapy and medication to her eventual decision to write her 
memoir, the special distinction of her persona as a Survivor reaches its pinnacle within this text. 
Indeed, her narration thoroughly solidifies the relationship between excellent character and acts 
of “speaking out” as it pertains to the Survivor topos, providing a framework through which the 
latter can be understood as both a cause and a consequence of the former.  
For Danquah, the very act of speaking openly about trauma seems to be a sign of the 
Survivor’s good character, even as that act is also understood as a means of building character 
(i.e., through the therapeutic process). Towards the end of Willow Weep for Me, she writes: 
Despite the reservations I had about Dr. Fitzgerald, I did not stop seeing him. . . . 
Finally, I was releasing things that had been bottled up for years. I decided that 
what was most critical at this stage was for me to keep speaking. . . . It did not 
make that much of a difference to me if Dr. Fitzgerald was listening or not, if he 
cared or not, if he understood or not. I was listening, I was hearing, I was 
understanding. I cared. (pp. 225-26) 
 
Faintly echoing Jade’s notion of safe-keeping memories for later withdrawal in therapy, 
Danquah’s comparison of therapy to a release of “bottled up” events initially reads as an 





person with mental illness by displaying her deference to scientific authority. But the person 
Danquah ultimately credits for endowing her with greater “understanding” is, it should be noted, 
her own self. In Danquah’s view, the core advantage of therapy lies not in what she can learn 
from a psychiatrist, but rather in what she can learn from herself; the raw material for special 
strength, wisdom, and other virtues is already contained in her survival of extraordinary events, 
and she is the only one who can speak those virtues into being. As a result, Danquah affirms that 
her ability to “keep speaking” is of paramount importance, implying that this single practice can 
give rise to a range of altruistic skills in listening, hearing, and understanding. For these skills are 
as essential to the Survivor topos as good character itself: although it is Danquah’s own mental 
health that she serves in private therapy, the concluding passages of Willow Weep for Me suggest 
that using her Survivor ethos to empower other people is her final destiny. 
According to Danquah, she never set out with the intention of writing about her 
depression. In one scene towards the end of her memoir, she recalls being vehemently opposed 
to such an idea when it was first suggested by her editor at The Washington Post. At this point of 
the story, she has already published two acclaimed pieces in the Post, but her editor rejects her 
latest (mostly improvised) pitch because she has no “angle”—that is, no special viewpoint she 
plans to feature or statement she wants to make (p. 235). When the conversation drifts towards 
her ongoing recovery from depression, though, he immediately insists she write that story for the 
Post instead. Citing the success of William Styron’s Darkness Visible and other popular media 
about depression, he dismisses her concerns about the subject being too taboo and, contrarily, 
cautions her against “repeating what’s already been said, which will be pretty hard to do” (p. 
235). Apparently nonplussed by this advice, Danquah replies, “Yeah, right. . . . Like Styron and I 





The way I did depression was a-whole-nother bag of beans” (p. 235). So far removed is her 
worldview from that of Styron, a wealthy middle-aged white man who won numerous literary 
accolades before writing his memoir, that the thought of their life stories overlapping is all but 
laughable to her. But instead of taking umbrage at Danquah’s sarcasm, her editor heartily agrees: 
“‘There you have it,’ he said, as if he’d struck gold. ‘Make it about two thousand words’” (p. 
235). Evidently in the 1990s American cultural context they both inhabit, it is the uniqueness of 
Danquah’s “angle” on depression, not the uniqueness of the illness itself, that appeals. 
In Danquah’s editor’s view, her various marginalized identities (e.g., gender, race, and 
class) qualify her to tell a story of depression that no one else can. He sees inherent value in her 
story of survival because, like a precious metal—the “gold” to which she wryly refers—it is 
extremely rare. But for Danquah, it is no wonder that there are so few depression narratives 
written from a Black woman’s point of view, and that is not because the illness is uncommon 
within this group. As she observes in the opening of her memoir, media representations of 
mental illness vary widely in accordance with the subjects’ presumed race and gender. Dominant 
narratives of depression, then, are far more likely to glorify the “genius” of a white man like 
Styron than to explore the anguish of a Black woman like herself. She writes: 
I have noticed that the mental illness that affects white men is often characterized, 
if not glamorized, as a sign of genius, a burden of cerebral superiority, artistic 
eccentricity. . . . White women who suffer from mental illness are depicted as 
idle, spoiled, or just plain hysterical. Black men are demonized and pathologized. 
. . . When a black woman suffers from a mental disorder, the overwhelming 
opinion is that she is weak. And weakness in black women is intolerable. (p. 20) 
 
Listing various clichés about mental illness, Danquah highlights how racism and sexism intersect 
in the experiences of Black women, effectively denying them the right “to be seen as vulnerable 
and emotionally complex” (p. 21). Indeed, she has witnessed firsthand how Black women are 





“built into the structure of their lives” in a patriarchal, white supremacist society (p. 19). Thus in 
the American social imaginary, Black women’s survival through adversity is so ubiquitous as to 
be invisible—for Danquah, people of all races are “unable to see beyond the ornamentation that 
is placed on black women’s lives” in order to grasp Black women’s individuality, the real 
atrocity of any harms inflicted on them, and the absolute legitimacy of their pain (p. 21). The 
consequence of this is that vulnerability of any kind is, in Black women, unduly stigmatized.  
Whereas mental illness in other persons may inspire admiration, pity, fear, or other strong 
feelings, Danquah finds that Black women’s psychic pain is downright taboo. And suffering the 
unspeakable means suffering alone and indefinitely, as Danquah knows too well: “I prolonged 
the pain [of my depression] with silence, mostly because I was afraid—of being misunderstood 
or ostracized, of losing friends, of losing respect” (p. 18). Although stigma is not the root cause 
of Danquah’s depression, Willow Weep for Me implies that internalized self-shame is itself a 
traumatizing force, because it separates persons in distress from the supportive relationships and 
resources that would facilitate their healing. But per the Survivor topos, the trauma of stigma 
also has its own character-building lessons to confer: it was only through Danquah’s many years 
of shame and secrecy, the text suggests, that she could develop the remarkable talents for 
honesty and self-assurance that ultimately compelled her to write this memoir. That Danquah’s 
triumph over mental illness may be all the more poignant for her simultaneous survival through 
systemic oppression (e.g., on the basis of race, class, and gender) is inferable both in her analyses 
cited above and all throughout her memoir. Depression may have achieved great prominence in 
popular media of the 1990s, but a narrative like hers was distinctly different from the blockbuster 
memoirs and other texts that hitherto defined cultural discourse about mental illness. Authors 





their disorders, but Danquah senses that she struggled even more; they were inspired to share 
their stories to help others, but she seems to have been inspired even more.11 Thus by the end of 
Danquah’s memoir, the narration conspicuously shifts its focus from her traumatic past to her 
empowered—and empowering—future purpose in mental health advocacy. 
Unambiguously, Danquah’s memoir depicts her decision to write and publish her life 
story as a mission to spread awareness about trauma and mental illness (especially in Black 
women). According to Danquah, she wanted to “[call] attention to the necessity of the long-
overdue inclusion of black women in discussions about depression,” hoping her title’s allusion to 
the tragedy of Billie Holiday’s life might “reflect the courage, devotion, and resilience that it 
takes to contend” with severe mental health challenges (p. 262). Moreover, the text implies that 
Danquah’s personal history makes her uniquely qualified and motivated to give direct emotional 
support to fellow sufferers—not only Jade, but also Paula, Eugene’s mother Patricia, and her 
friend Scott—whose struggles with depression are also explored in progressively more detail 
towards the end of Willow Weep for Me. Danquah places a premium on experiential, empathic 
knowledge of other peoples’ pain: “There is a comfort that comes from talking to someone who 
is or has ‘been there.’ It provides you with a lens through which you can examine your own inner 
struggle” (p. 213). No matter what hardships her loved ones may have endured, Danquah’s 
extensive expertise as a Survivor (i.e., the multiplicity of her own traumas) seems to ensure that 
 
11Danquah’s 2001 essay “Writing the Wrongs of Identity,” a sort of companion piece to Willow 
Weep for Me, is explicit on this point. She writes: “For a period of time after clinical depression 
became the literary topic du jour, it seemed as if most of the work I read about the illness was 
written by white Jewish women from Boston who had, at some point in their lives, been treated 
at McLean” (p. 173). This sentence presumably refers to Kaysen and Wurtzel, at least—both are 





she can relate, and she will know what to say.12 In point of fact, readers learn that at her time of 
writing, Danquah is essentially leading a support group for other women in distress: “One 
Saturday a month, I host a meeting in my home for women of color. At these meetings, we sit for 
hours and entrust each other with our problems, our lives” (p. 258). Perhaps this is, finally, the 
most persuasive benefit to her construction of Survivor ethos in this text. If depicting depression 
as an outcome of trauma proves that Danquah is not innately weak, and depicting trauma as a 
source of good character endows her with special rhetorical authority, then vesting the Survivor 
with the responsibility to help other Survivors proves that she is altruistic. 
Conclusion: Speaking Up, Writing Down 
It is a conceit of the memoir genre that authors must choose one particular identity or 
experience to serve as the lens through which, in the writing of their life story, all others will be 
viewed. For Danquah and Willow Weep for Me, that lens is indubitably depression: the many 
traumas recounted within are all (apparently) united in their ability to shed light on her central 
experience of mental illness. Thus in this chapter, I have argued that Danquah’s rhetorical 
choices throughout her narrative—namely, her enactment of a Survivor persona—can be read as 
her response to widespread stigma against depression, arguing for her worthiness to address an 
audience that might otherwise dismiss her as “crazy.” So do people with mental illness really 
draw benefits from the belief that trauma is a source of special strength, wisdom, or other 
positive qualities? Danquah implies that they do. Reflecting on the whole of her life in the final 
lines of Willow Weep for Me, she notes: “I love who I am. And without those past depressions, I 
wouldn’t be the same person. Having lived with the pain, having felt/heard/seen and tasted it, I 
 
12For example, despite the notable differences in gender, race, and age between Danquah and her 
friend Scott, the text emphasizes their common ground in childhood loss, substance abuse, and 






know now . . . there is beauty on the other side” (pp. 266-67). One need not argue that Danquah 
is grateful for her traumas, per se, in order to observe how statements such as these assume that 
trauma can transform a person in desirable ways. Through her discussions of her calling as a 
writer, in particular, Danquah further alludes to the power of self-definition (and strategic 
communication) in relation to her personal past. She writes: “through poetry I could authenticate 
my experiences [and] relay them to others in an acceptable manner. I learned that people trusted 
words that were written more than they trusted words that were spoken. . . . my words, my 
feelings, were suddenly credible” (p. 129). Just as speaking out in therapy enabled her to process 
her life story, furnishing her with a range of valuable insights, sharing those insights with other 
people gives Danquah an opportunity to sway her audience (and herself) towards the most 
favorable analysis of that story—one in which she is “acceptable” and “credible.” 
Clearly, Danquah has found meaning both in her continuous survival through difficult 
circumstances and in her decision to write about them from the perspective of a Survivor. But as 
a strategy for defending one’s rhetorical authority in public forums, rather than as a means of 
privately coping with mental illness, is Survivor ethos still effective? Readers of Willow Weep 
for Me might be receptive to Danquah’s arguments—despite her publisher’s claim that this book 
is not a depression memoir, it is unlikely to be read by those with no interest whatsoever in the 
illness—but the text implies that those directly affected by her actions might not. For example, 
Danquah recalls how she “disgusted” a researcher at the Smithsonian Institute with her failure 
(while depressed) to complete her portion of a research project for which she had been hired: 
I wanted to find a way to let her know that I was not a flake or a fraud. . . . In the 
years that followed, I would feel like this many times, like if people only 
understood what was really going on, they would be more sympathetic. These 
feelings were quickly obliterated by the realization that when it came to 





not looked upon as a legitimate illness. Most employers really don’t give a damn 
if you’re depressed, and neither do landlords or bill collectors. (p. 144) 
 
This passage points to a significant flaw of the Survivor topos. Engaging with this topos as a 
means of building ethos assumes, at least in Danquah’s case, that cultural reverence for the 
Survivor is more powerful than mental illness stigma. Practically speaking, it assumes that one’s 
inability (e.g.) to fulfill a contract might be excused on the grounds that one’s actions are not a 
reflection of one’s character but rather of the hardships one has survived (“what [is] really going 
on”). If taken to an extreme, Survivor ethos could even be leveraged to argue that one’s supposed 
failures are actually a testament to one’s good character, for they stem from the same process of 
survival that inevitably yields positive traits in equal measure. And after all, it is through such 
failures that one learns to be as “sympathetic” and “understanding” of others’ shortcomings as 
Danquah suggests she would have been if she were in her supervisor’s position.  
Unfortunately, in Danquah’s actual experience, none of these assumptions hold. The 
paradox of the Survivor topos is that it must always imagine suffering as a condition of the past, 
and the details of that suffering are only relevant insofar as they accentuate the positive attributes 
that developed in their wake. The appeal of a mental illness memoir, too, is often that the author 
is “recovered,” and it is only by virtue of that recovery—conditional as it may be—that they are 
able to narrativize their life through sustained creative and intellectual labor on a book-length 
writing project. But a person who is actively exhibiting symptoms of depression, it could be 
argued, shares more qualities with a so-called “victim” than with the Survivor. Because the 
Survivor topos emphasizes the role of external events in the development of both mental illness 
and good character, it also seems to demand external action on the part of the Survivor to 
validate the existence of those traits. Even if their audience knows what they have endured, 





traumas will fail unless that character is demonstrated through concrete action. In other words, 
until a depressed person is able to act like a non-depressed person—hold down employment, pay 
rent, pay bills, and so on—those who are depending on them might not “give a damn” as to why 
they can or cannot do certain things. In this sense, Willow Weep for Me suggests that the 
Survivor’s rhetorical authority can only be granted in retrospect, by those not directly affected by 
negative aspects of the Survivor’s traumas (e.g., by their mental illness symptoms), and/or 
through their seemingly eternal obligation to validate their good character through good deeds. 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest through my analysis in this chapter that Danquah is 
somehow ignorant or wrong for enacting a Survivor persona in Willow Weep for Me. Nor do I 
mean to suggest that either Danquah or her readers should consider her lucky for having been 
exposed to such extraordinary anguish in her life. As in each of my four case studies, I am 
interested both in honoring the profound significance of Mad Genius rhetoric for those who draw 
upon it (authors and readers alike) and in exploring the full range of its implications for real 
persons with mental illness. This includes implications that are harmful: for example, does the 
Survivor topos reinforce the notion that mental health problems in persons who have experienced 
trauma are more legitimate than those in persons who have not? By depicting the Survivor as 
uniquely qualified and motivated to help other Survivors (e.g., through acts of speaking out), 
does this topos thus suggest that only persons who have been through trauma are responsible for 
preventing or responding to traumatic events? And above all, if the popularity of the Survivor 
topos hinges on its universal applicability—for any person who is still alive could, conceivably, 
claim a Survivor persona—then how does it benefit any specific stigmatized group? If the 










CHAPTER 4: BROKEN PROMISE: THE EX-GIFTED KID ON PROZAC 
They live among us, or so they think. They could be scraping a shopping cart past us at 
the grocery store, answering calls and e-mails from a windowless office adjacent to our own, or 
flipping through old magazines in the chair beside us at our dentists’ waiting rooms. If they are 
reluctant to reveal themselves to us, it is because they suspect their unusual thoughts and 
behaviors will be misunderstood. Perhaps they do not even understand themselves. Scientists 
cannot decide exactly how to find them or what should be done with them—some question 
whether they actually exist at all. Yet search the archives of any popular social media website 
from the last four years or so, and you are bound to encounter thousands of people identifying 
themselves (openly or anonymously) as one of these elusive creatures. 
Who are they? They are former “gifted” children who have grown up to be depressed, 
burned-out adults.1 Years ago, their giftedness was identified via IQ testing in their primary 
schools, or else attentive caretakers recognized their talents and recommended them for special 
learning opportunities. Wholly dependent on local educational policies and their families’ 
financial resources, they may have been placed into Gifted and Talented programs, permitted to 
complete a standard program at an accelerated pace (i.e., by skipping a grade), enrolled at private 
institutions, or otherwise accommodated. Some were subject to intense pressures and impossibly 
high standards from adults; others’ gifts were taken for granted by those who held the onetime 
common-sense belief that gifted kids grow naturally into successful adults with little need for 
 
1Were it not very tedious for me to do so, I would place scare quotes around all instances of the 
word “gifted” in this project. Readers should approach this term with the same amount of caution 





intervention. Perhaps they fell into perfectionism, “superhuman striving,” overextension, and 
other behaviors that facilitated high achievement for a short period of time—yet that illusion of 
triumph soon gave way to mental and physical exhaustion, leading them to burn out before they 
could realize their full potentials (Kaplan & Geoffrey, 1993, p. 247). Or perhaps they withdrew 
from ambitious pursuits at an early age, denying their talents and interests so as to shed the 
burden of others’ expectations. Who knows? They might even be successful in others’ eyes, and 
the only persons deeply disappointed in them are themselves. But whether they be “burnouts,” 
“copouts,” or something else, all former gifted children were once told they were special: more 
sensitive, intelligent, or creative than their non-gifted peers (Kaplan & Geoffrey, 1993, p. 249). 
To serve the traditional aims of gifted education programs in the United States—and justify the 
allocation of government resources toward the same—they were urged to use their specialness to 
solve the country’s greatest social and political problems (Jolly & Robins, 2016, p. 147). So how 
exactly were their gifts supposed to translate into concrete rewards for themselves or others? No 
one could foretell. The possibilities for gifted children are, unfortunately, endless. 
Surely this tragic tale does not apply to every child who ever bears the gifted label. It 
must be possible for some fully-grown gifted kids to retain fragments of their past abilities. But 
according to a longstanding, exceedingly popular cultural cliché—that which I have dubbed the 
“Ex-Gifted Kid” topos, the most complicated offshoot of Mad Genius rhetoric—a majority of 
former gifted children do not succeed at parlaying their raw potential into bona fide achievement. 
Why? Because they are too mentally ill. Regardless of the age at which they start to lose their 
minds (so to speak), the notion that gifted children must eventually suffer severe psychological 





a “gifted ex-child” or simply a “gifted adult.”2 The archetypal Ex-Gifted Kid leads a remarkably 
unremarkable life: despite the exceptional abilities they once displayed, they have made no major 
contributions to human knowledge or culture, and it seems unlikely that they ever will. For as 
long as they may live, the Ex-Gifted Kid can only wonder why their gifts were wasted, how this 
outcome could have been prevented, and what extraordinary future they would have reached if 
circumstances had been different. In short, the Ex-Gifted Kid may conclude that they are 
doomed—that they were always doomed. For at its core, the Ex-Gifted Kid topos posits that 
some persons’ genius and madness are both innate and, ultimately, inseparable mental traits.  
In this chapter, I build a case study on the rhetorical functions of the Ex-Gifted Kid topos 
as it influences one of the most infamous accounts of mental illness in recent history: Elizabeth 
Wurtzel’s 1994 memoir Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America. As I have done in the 
preceding chapters, I argue that Wurtzel enacts an Ex-Gifted Kid persona in her memoir, 
showing how her lifelong giftedness and depression are inextricably intertwined all throughout 
her life story. Emphasizing that the pain an Ex-Gifted Kid endures (and inflicts upon themselves) 
is far worse than any pain they might inflict on others, Prozac Nation indirectly challenges the 
notion that persons with mental illness are burdensome, even wicked individuals. But more so 
than any other memoir analyzed in this dissertation, Prozac Nation—and the topos it engages 
with—is also characterized by its self-awareness, ever vacillating between self-deprecating irony 
and genuine expressions of emotion from the author. For this reason, my study also constructs a 
meta-level feminist critique of Wurtzel’s Ex-Gifted Kid persona, exploring how her ambivalent 
relationship with her giftedness is shaped by her experiences of broader cultural sexism. Read 
from a feminist viewpoint, Prozac Nation seems to depict a range of classic “gifted girl” 
 





dilemmas—as indexed by feminist psychologists of the 1970s and beyond—in which a 
precocious young girl internalizes others’ ambivalent reactions to her abilities and interests. 
Insofar as mainstream American culture celebrates achievement while also opposing these 
qualities to normative femininity, the text suggests, girls who are gifted as Wurtzel was will be 
punished for displaying their gifts even as they are also rewarded. It is the impossibility of being 
both gifted and a girl (i.e., both powerful and vulnerable, both genius and mad) in the world of 
Wurtzel’s childhood that seems to draw her towards the Ex-Gifted Kid topos in her adulthood. 
I begin my study with an overview of The Ex-Gifted Kid topos as it is currently 
circulated in viral images on Instagram and other social media platforms. Connecting modern 
engagement with this topos to the history of gifted psychology in the United States, I call for 
further analysis of Ex-Gifted Kid personae in autobiographical narratives of mental illness. To 
contextualize my reading of this topos from a feminist perspective, specifically, I briefly survey 
some of the most influential twentieth-century feminist psychology research on giftedness and 
“gifted girl” experience. Next, I examine the critical context of Prozac Nation, consciously 
departing from existing scholarly studies of this book and dwelling on popular press reviews that 
(unintentionally) highlight the tension between Wurtzel’s giftedness and her depression over her 
lifetime. Situating my case study within these seemingly settled perspectives on Wurtzel’s 
memoir, I read Prozac Nation backwards from Wurtzel’s adulthood to her childhood, exploring 
how the text intertwines her depression with her troubled giftedness across these life stages. 
Lastly, I sketch an interpretation of Wurtzel’s recovery as a dissolution of the Ex-Gifted Kid’s 
ironic self-awareness into spontaneous, authentic emotional expression: fury towards the people 






Early Ripe, Early Rot: A Primer on the Ex-Gifted Kid Topos 
In the title of a November 2018 think piece for The Outline, philosopher Tom Whyman 
poses a peculiar question: “How Bad Should We Feel for Burnt-Out Gifted Kids?” According to 
Whyman, the recent surge of interest in so-called “Gifted Kid Burnout”—a set of stereotypes 
about childhood giftedness fairly similar to that which I call the Ex-Gifted Kid topos—can be 
attributed to one specific image that went viral on several social media platforms in the late 
2010s (para. 4). This image, shown in Figure 2, was first created and posted to Instagram by user 
@angstyfairy in July 2017. Given that the frequency of Google searches for the phrase “Gifted 
Kid Burnout” spiked sharply from zero in 2016 to a local peak of popularity in late July 2017, 
and it has been steady since this time, I too am inclined to credit @angstyfairy for directing new 
attention to this old offshoot of Mad Genius rhetoric (Google Trends, 2021). Designed to mimic 
the distinctive five-by-five grid of cards used in the lottery game Bingo, the “Gifted Kid Burnout 
Bingo” meme catalogs twenty-four qualities and objects that supposedly characterize the persona 
of a former gifted child. Although the @angstyfairy account gives little identifying information 
about the teenage girl who manages it, it is clear that this particular meme is autobiographical: 
@angstyfairy’s original caption for this post reads, “lmao this is messy and it is really just a 
bingo of me cuz i am such a cliche gifted kid burnout but lmk if u play cuz that would mean we 
prolly share some very covetable personality traits” (2017).3 By @angstyfairy’s own admission, 
the portrayal of childhood giftedness in her autobiographical meme is self-consciously complex, 
critical, and contradictory. The Ex-Gifted Kid persona is depicted as both deeply personal and 
laughably “clichéd,” while the characteristics she ascribes to herself—and her fellow burnouts, 
 
3All spelling and punctuation appear exactly as in the original post. “lmao” is an abbreviation of 
the phrase “laughing my ass off,” which is often used ironically in contemporary text/internet-





who she hopes will identify themselves by “playing” this Bingo game—are both “messy” and 
“covetable.” And evidently, in the years since @angstyfairy first created this post, thousands of 
internet users have indeed recognized themselves in her narrative of childhood giftedness. 
“Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo” has inspired all of the following contemporary media: coverage in 
blog posts such as “I Feel Personally Attacked by This ‘Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo’ Meme” on 
The Mary Sue (Hale-Stern, 2017), follow-up memes by other internet users (e.g., “Gifted Kid 
Figure 2 
 








Burnout Bingo: The Sequel,” apost54, 2018; “Recovering Gifted Kid Bingo,” CMDRReservoir, 
2018), a lengthy definition for “Gifted Kid Burnout” on Urban Dictionary written by user 
giftedkidburnout (2018), the indie rock song (and music video) “Gifted Kid Burnout” recorded 
by British band Shemp (2019), and countless discussion threads on Twitter and Reddit. 
Although the “Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo” meme implicitly addresses a contemporary 
audience, it reads as an inventory of some of the most enduring stereotypes about gifted children 
from the twentieth century onwards. Items such as “need for constant validation,” “refusing to 
ask for help,” and “losing interest and quitting anything that doesn’t come easily to you” 
condemn giftedness for alienating its victims from their own minds, suggesting their capacities 
for spontaneous curiosity and motivation are destroyed by their fear of acknowledging their 
limitations. Additional Bingo squares build on the claim that the Ex-Gifted Kid is “always 
looking for a new form of escapism” with examples of their preferred methods for coping with 
their burnout, ranging from the somewhat adaptive (“interest in psychology” or “reads wikipedia 
articles in free time”) to the seemingly maladaptive: “risk-taking behavior,” “always making 
excuses,” a marijuana leaf, and a tumbler of liquor captioned “time to drink.” And in the top/left-
most corner of the grid—the first square an English-reading audience would view, and perhaps 
the first square @angstyfairy generated for this image—is an item so essential to an Ex-Gifted 
Kid persona that it clearly needs no explanation: the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. That former gifted 
children are predisposed towards psychological dysfunction may be the most notorious of all 
stereotypes attached to this group. It is no wonder, then, that nearly every square of the “Gifted 





To the untrained eye, former gifted children might be nearly indistinguishable from their 
non-gifted peers—they are highly educated or not, gainfully employed or not, in committed 
romantic relationships or not, and so on. But privately, according to the Ex-Gifted Kid topos, 
former gifted children suffer from a variety of mental health issues. Across the history of gifted 
psychology research in the United States, scholars have theorized that gifted children experience 
chronic social isolation due to their inability to relate to non-gifted peers, and the combination of 
their precocious sensitivity and intense pressures to succeed—both internal and external—has 
been linked to high stress and, indeed, burnout (see Bernardo, 1990; Cross & Cross, 2018;  
Fimian et al., 1989; Johnson, 1985; Neihart & Yeo, 2018; Quart, 2006; Winner, 1996; etc.). 
These troubles do not supposedly improve as these children mature; they grow ever more severe, 
leading to the “common belief” that gifted persons are more prone to clinical depression and 
suicide than non-gifted persons (Cross & Cross, 2018, p. 603). For evidence of the theorized link 
between childhood giftedness and mental illness—and of the need for further scholarly inquiry 
into this topic—scholars frequently point to true stories of high-achieving adolescents who 
stunned their communities by attempting or completing suicide (see Bernardo, 1990, p. 30; Cross 
& Cross, 2018, p. 601; Neihart & Yeo, 2018, p. 498; Quart, 2006, pp. 140-45). Personal 
anecdotes like these are deployed to emphasize that gifted youths’ special needs are not just 
educational, but also psychological—the implication is that caretakers must be vigilant lest they 
overlook the signs that a seemingly happy child is headed towards a tragic, untimely death. 
As is illustrated in the “Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo: The Sequel” meme by Reddit user 
apost54, shown in Figure 3, narratives of Ex-Gifted Kid experience that followed @angstyfairy’s 
have only strengthened the idea of a link between childhood giftedness and mental illness. 





NPD, and/or social anxiety,” is “Interested in sociology/psychology as a twisted attempt to 
understand” themselves, is “likely a compulsive user” of “alcohol/weed/smoking/vaping” (and 
“Doesn’t give up their harmful vices”), is “Nihilistic as fuck,” and overall distinguishes 
themselves as a “Poster child for mental health issues.” Similarly, the top Urban Dictionary 
definition for “Gifted Kid Burnout,” as added by user giftedkidburnout in January 2018, reads: 
Figure 3 
 








when children who were once considered the “gifted” or “smart” kids in class 
grow up to underperform academically and (likely) socially. the kid who actually 
liked doing homework and got all A’s when they were nine but by sixteen aren’t 
doing well in school and often feel crushing disappointment. . . . have problems 
socializing, have poor mental health, and resort to drinking/drugs/other forms of 
escapism. usually really smart, but still do poorly/average in school. (2018) 
 
This definition, like @angstyfairy and apost54’s memes, both reflects and reinforces the qualities 
that are most essential to a contemporary Ex-Gifted Kid persona. Ex-Gifted Kids were once 
considered special—and may still be, deep down—and found fulfillment through intellectual 
stimulation and high achievement. But nowadays, they can scarcely experience anything but 
“crushing disappointment,” “poor mental health,” social isolation, and the compulsion to escape. 
Despite the recent explosion of the Ex-Gifted Kid topos on contemporary social media 
and increasing psychological research on gifted children since the late-twentieth century, the 
tendency to connect child giftedness to adult dysfunction is not at all new in American culture. 
Duggan and Friedman (2014) stress that the earliest and most famous longitudinal study on high-
IQ children to date—conducted from 1921 to the present—was conceived in large part because 
early American psychologist Lewis Terman wished to reform the dominant societal perceptions 
of gifted children during his lifetime (p. 488). In Terman’s (1954) view, gifted children’s talents 
had been needlessly wasted in the United States due to the “prevailing belief” that such youths 
were “usually psychotic or otherwise abnormal” and “sure to burn themselves out quickly or to 
develop postadolescent stupidity” (p. 222). Judged against an old adage of “Early ripe, early rot,” 
gifted children’s precocious development was usually perceived as aberrant and undesirable by 
the non-gifted majority (Sears, 1979, p. 75). Hence, Terman widely publicized his findings that 
the hundreds of high-IQ children participating in his study were in fact “popular, well adjusted, 





genetic superiority (Winner, 1996, p. 212).4 As a result of Terman’s long and influential career, 
the notion that gifted children are not just emotionally healthy, but rather exceptionally 
emotionally resilient gained leverage with experts in the decades that followed (see Bland et al., 
1994, p. 77). And to date, numerous researchers still insist that cultural clichés about mentally ill 
gifted children are simply that: clichés. For these scholars, it is faulty assumptions and anecdotal 
evidence—not empirical research—that keeps the Ex-Gifted Kid topos firmly planted in the 
American social imaginary (Solano, 1987; Southern et al., 1989; Subotnik et al., 2011).  
Needless to say, countless individuals who are labeled as gifted in their childhoods do 
grow up to be perfectly content adults. As a predictor of adult success, the socially-constructed 
trait of “giftedness” has never proven to be as impactful as are the socioeconomic privileges 
children access (or not) through their families of origin (Duggan & Friedman, 2014; Freeman, 
2010; Olszewski et al., 1987; Winner, 1996). There also exist plenty of adults with mental illness 
who have never borne the label of giftedness nor connected their symptoms to any extraordinary 
talent they exhibited in their youths. If the Ex-Gifted Kid topos were promoted solely by non-
gifted persons, then, it might be suspected as a form of societal retaliation against gifted children 
out of envy, anti-intellectualism, or simple fear of the unknown. As Quart (2006) observes: 
The dictionary’s second definition for gift also gives some insight into why 
[children] with the range of qualities that commonly earn the term gifted are 
subject to resentment from those who feel they have not been deemed gifted. . . .  
a “gift” may not be reciprocated and may even be undeserved. (p. 4) 
 
@angstyfairy’s “Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo” meme surely paints an unflattering portrait of its 
subjects: for example, in its emphasis on Ex-Gifted Kids’ feelings of innate superiority to others 
(“thinking you’re destined for greatness” and “thinking you’re better than everyone else”) in 
 





contrast to the reality of their struggles with mental illness, substance abuse, and professional 
failure (i.e., “having nothing to show for” their gifts). Yet the basis of this meme’s appeal lies not 
in mocking others, but rather in mocking oneself—it was popularized by individuals who openly 
(even proudly) identified with its content, sharing the meme to their own social media pages. 
Hence, the recent prominence of autobiographical narratives that borrow from the Ex-Gifted Kid 
topos—of which “Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo” is just one example—indicates that former gifted 
children do themselves eagerly embrace Ex-Gifted Kid personae. This topos speaks most to 
adults who are highly conscious that they once were gifted, that they are currently mentally ill, 
and that there may be a powerful connection between those traits. In other words, it seems that a 
crucial component of its popularity is self-proclaimed Ex-Gifted Kids’ self-awareness. 
Perhaps the reasons why a meme about burned-out young adults went viral in the late 
2010s are obvious. Following the first federal study of gifted education in 1972—a “watershed 
moment” in U.S. gifted education—and the passage of the Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented 
Students Education Act in 1988, many more Millennials (born 1981-1996) were labeled as gifted 
and placed into gifted education programs than were members of any previous generation (Jolly 
& Robins, 2016, p. 132). Millennials comprise a majority of Instagram users, and this generation 
has now firmly entered adulthood, obviously reckoning with their perceived failures along the 
way (Statista, n.d.). As a simple framework through which to process and share one’s life story, 
the “Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo” meme has captivated thousands of young people who have been 
gifted, mentally ill, disappointed, and/or amused at their own mediocrity. But as Whyman notes, 
the rapid circulation of this meme by persons who joked that they felt “personally attacked” by 
its content—often marking off squares in @angstyfairy’s original image to represent their 





[people] will remember encountering it, or indeed embodying it” long before they played this 
Bingo game (2018, para. 4). Although “Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo” coined a provocative phrase 
and culled together a set of items that were concise, relatable, and humorously self-deprecating, 
@angstyfairy did not invent the set of stereotypes cited in her meme. On the contrary, her 
personal narrative of giftedness clearly draws from (and drew out) a collective Ex-Gifted Kid 
persona that dates back to the very inception of “giftedness” as a social construct. 
Wherever there are children who have been told they are destined for greatness, there will 
be adults who recognize their failures to fulfill that prophecy and search for the reasons why. But 
what specific conditions might encourage someone to draw connections between their childhood 
giftedness and their current psychological distress? What is the rhetorical significance of their 
doing so? The distinct popularity of social media content—akin to short, informal life writing—
generated by self-proclaimed Ex-Gifted Kids indicates to me that autobiographical texts can shed 
light on these questions. However, no studies known to me have drawn from self-referential 
writing by persons diagnosed with mental illness (and/or giftedness) to analyze the effects of the 
Ex-Gifted Kid topos on their stories. Hence, I choose to ground my case study in this chapter in 
Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Prozac Nation, one of the most widely-read mental illness memoirs in 
twentieth-century American literature. With a depth of analysis and breadth of cultural influence 
far exceeding that which is possible in a single viral image, Prozac Nation illuminates the 
complex journey through which one young woman came to recognize her depression, her 
giftedness, and the apparently complicated link between the two. In what follows, I give context 
for my decisions both to read Prozac Nation through the lens of the Ex-Gifted Kid topos and to 
analyze the influence of broader cultural sexism over Wurtzel’s narrative persona. By glancing 





scholarly responses to the text, I aim to recover Prozac Nation’s distinct sociohistorical setting in 
a post-feminist American society—one that laments “the disappearance of the gifted female” 
while continually devaluing high-achieving women (Olshen & Mathews, 1987, p. 251).5 
What Happens to the Gifted Girl? The Costs of Feminine Achievement 
To analyze the Ex-Gifted Kid topos from a feminist perspective, it is necessary to review 
how feminist scholars across the history of American gifted psychology have understood what 
Noble (1987) calls “The Dilemma of the Gifted Woman” (p. 367). Analyses of gender and 
giftedness can be traced back to early twentieth-century psychologist Leta Stetter Hollingworth, 
a contemporary of Lewis Terman. Through her groundbreaking 1914 paper, “Variability as 
Related to Sex Differences: A Critique,” Hollingworth highlights the sociocultural stakes of the 
so-called “variability hypothesis” that prevailed with (male) giftedness experts at that time (p. 
510). Put simply, this hypothesis posits that men’s intelligence is more widely variable than 
women’s, thus individuals of exceptionally high/low intelligence are naturally more likely to be 
male. Support for this hypothesis was drawn from the experts’ recognition that, across the history 
of Western civilization, more men than women had attained eminence in the public sphere. 
Hollingworth, however, emphasizes that “throughout almost the whole course of history,” 
traditional gender norms had “predestined” women for domestic work rather than more 
competitive pursuits (p. 526). Unconvinced by a colleague’s attribution of “woman’s failure” to 
“a difference in instincts connected with reproduction,” Hollingworth writes: 
Surely we should consider first the established, obvious, inescapable, physical 
fact that women bear and rear the children, and that this has always meant and 
still means that nearly 100 per cent of their energy is expended in the 
performance and supervision of domestic and allied tasks, a field where eminence 
 
5I use the phrase “post-feminist” here strictly to refer to a historical era that followed the rise of 
second-wave feminism in the United States. I do not (necessarily) mean to suggest an era in 





is impossible. Only when we [have] exhausted this fact as an explanation should 
we pass on to the question of . . . differences in intellect or instinct. (p. 528) 
  
In Hollingworth’s view, unequal gender socialization—and its impact on men and women’s 
relative freedoms to pursue eminence—seems a more likely explanation for the disparity in their 
achievement than innate intellectual differences. Delineating various methodological flaws, 
logical fallacies, and social biases that sustain the variability hypothesis, Hollingworth envisions 
a future time at which “public expectation” of gender roles will shift such that women might 
“vary from their [roles] as men do, and yet procreate” (p. 529). Although women had long been 
“hindered by individual prejudice, poverty, and . . . legal measures,” Hollingworth asserts, “in 
another century the solution to this problem will have been found” (p. 529). 
Nearly six decades after Hollingworth first studied the relationship between gender and 
giftedness, Horner (1970) notes that—despite the gradual removal of “legal and educational 
barriers” to women’s achievement in the public sphere—“there remains a psychological barrier” 
that is “considerably more subtle, stubborn, and difficult to overcome” (p. 46). In her influential 
1970 essay “Femininity and Successful Achievement: A Basic Inconsistency,” Horner argues 
that even the most “otherwise achievement-motivated and able women” continually choose not 
to pursue stimulating, competitive careers due to their perceptions that “success. . . will be 
followed by negative consequences” (p. 47). Betty Friedan’s 1963 book The Feminine Mystique, 
one of the most famous second-wave feminist texts, had also raised considerable awareness 
about the loss of women’s intellectual gifts several years before. Observing “new dimensions to 
old problems” throughout her years of research for this book, Friedan cites “the discrepancy 
between women’s tested intellectual abilities in childhood and their adult achievement” as one of 
many damaging situations produced (and normalized) through widespread societal sexism (2001, 





shifted dramatically throughout the twentieth century with the emergence of findings from 
Terman’s famous longitudinal study. It is widely acknowledged, too, that the 1957 Soviet launch 
of Sputnik marked a pivotal moment in the appropriation of federal funds towards gifted 
education in the United States (e.g., through the National Defense Education Act of 1958). But 
although politicians’ and scientists’ concerns over “the space race” had led some to call women 
“America’s greatest source of unused brainpower,” Friedan observes, academic research on 
gifted girls and women remained exceedingly rare (2001, p. 60). Indeed, Joesting and Joesting 
begin their 1970 review of psychological literature on “Future Problems of Gifted Girls” by 
stressing the difficulty of mining existing studies for data on their topic (p. 82). According to 
these scholars, “adequate data for meaningful research on talented women [was] unavailable” at 
the time, because the topic had seldom been studied—they draw primarily from “a few studies of 
gifted girls that [had] been included in studies of the gifted of both sexes” (p. 82). 
Following the Marland Report on U.S. gifted education in 1972 and the Jacob K. Javits 
Gifted and Talented Students Education Act of 1988, the 1970s and 1980s saw major increases 
in the implementation of IQ testing and gifted education programs in American primary and 
secondary schools. Hence, whereas most scholarly inquiry into female giftedness prior to this 
period had focused on adult women, feminist psychologists directed more and more attention 
towards the hardships of young gifted girls. Silverman’s (1986) oft-cited chapter in Critical 
Issues in Gifted Education delves deeply into “the Strange Case of the Disappearing Gifted 
Girl,” investigating why—if IQ testing in primary schools generally identifies equal numbers of 
gifted girls as it does of gifted boys—there were still so many more eminent adult men than 
women (p. 43). In other words, as her study is titled: “What Happens to the Gifted Girl?” (p. 43). 





in their adulthoods? Olshen and Matthews (1987) echo Silverman while calling for an 
“intervention strategy” to prevent the loss of giftedness in girls, observing that “The problem of 
the gifted female can be simply stated: she is evident early in life and then disappears” (p. 251). 
A common question arose among late-twentieth century feminist psychologists: Who or what is 
to blame for the widespread vanishing of young girls with special talents? 
The answer for Silverman and her contemporaries was that, despite the expansion of 
women’s professional opportunities, the gifted girl is often discouraged from developing her 
talents due to society’s disparagement of successful adult women. It became a commonplace 
among feminist scholars of the 1970s and 1980s to study how achievement had been constructed 
as “unfeminine” in American cultural discourse (see Fox, 1977; Grau, 1985; Horner, 1970, 1972; 
Joesting & Joesting, 1970; Noble, 1987; Olshen & Matthews, 1987; Silverman, 1986; etc.). Such 
scholars argued that, because gender norms had long constructed professional achievement as a 
masculine domain—and achievement is thought to be the logical outcome of giftedness—the 
gifted girl is socially conditioned to conceal her own gifts for fear of being labeled abnormal and 
unlikable. Hence, Noble (1987) indicts society’s “long-standing history of ambivalence toward 
highly capable women” for fostering excessive self-doubt and social dependence in young gifted 
girls (p. 368). According to Noble, when caretakers claim to support all children’s success while 
subtly undermining, discouraging, or ignoring the achievements of young girls, the gifted girl 
loses faith in her abilities (p. 368). Forced to choose between cultivating her (as-yet unknown) 
talents and maintaining interpersonal relationships that are vital to her survival, she will likely 
fall into her socially prescribed role. Consequently, Noble urges psychologists and educators to 
work together to affirm gifted girls’ special abilities while also preparing them to face special 





at the challenge of being both gifted and female, the majority of gifted women will continue to 
disappear” (p. 375). More specifically, Silverman (1986) exhorts caretakers to protect the gifted 
girl’s freedom to explore her interests and cultivate her talents, arguing that “To the extent that 
independence is drummed out of little girls, these girls lose their giftedness” (p. 67).  
Of course, feminist thinkers have often argued that all girls and women—regardless of 
innate ability—can be driven “mad” by society’s ambivalence to their talents. Nonetheless, 
Silverman affirms that gifted girls suffer more than their non-gifted peers, because they have 
“more to lose” (p. 67). And importantly, in its calls for parents, teachers, therapists, and other 
significant adults to nurture young gifted girls’ interests, past research on gender and giftedness 
highlights the gifted girl’s basic vulnerability to other people’s whims. It is a point that seems 
self-evident yet bears explicit mention: gifted children, like all children, have little power over 
their own lives. Even those gifted girls who do desire to reject societal expectations in favor of 
high achievement are unlikely to succeed at doing so without their caretakers’ support. That is, 
although gifted children’s talents are assumed to come from the inside, they cannot actually use 
them without an adult’s permission on the outside. By the time a gifted child grows old enough 
to assert their independence and subsist on their own resources, it may seem too late for them to 
realize their past potential—they may already be too discouraged, too disappointed, or too 
depressed. In other words, they may already be an Ex-Gifted Kid. It is with these established 
gifted girl dilemmas and vulnerabilities in mind, then, that I now pivot to a reading of Elizabeth 
Wurtzel’s Ex-Gifted Kid persona in Prozac Nation. Explicating how my study intervenes in 
current critical assessments of Wurtzel’s story, I focus my particular analysis on the intertwining 






Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America 
In the field of American life writing, Elizabeth Wurtzel was surely one of the most 
unpopular-popular people of the past 25 years. Having gained some recognition as a music critic 
in New York City during the early 1990s, Wurtzel became a subject of intermittent controversy 
at the age of 27 with the publication of her first book, a 350-page memoir titled Prozac Nation: 
Young and Depressed in America. Soon after the memoir’s release, a former colleague accused 
Wurtzel of myriad disreputable behaviors while working at The Dallas Morning News, revealing 
that she had been fired for plagiarism (Adams, 1995, p. F1). Prozac Nation’s film adaptation was 
infamously withheld by its distributors for five years, never to receive a U.S. theatrical release—
it is widely believed Miramax stalled the film due to “inflammatory comments” Wurtzel made in 
February 2002 about the September 11 attacks on New York City (Vinciguerra, 2003, p. ST6). 
Wurtzel’s later book projects—Bitch: In Praise of Difficult Women (1998), The Bitch Rules 
(2000), and More, Now, Again: A Memoir of Addiction (2001)—further cultivated her “bad girl” 
public persona and, like her first book, received mostly negative reviews despite selling well 
(Lerhman, 1998, p. BR11). By the 2010s, Wurtzel was a regular contributor to such high-profile 
American periodicals as The New York Times, Harper’s Bazaar, and New York, still drawing 
frequent criticism for her politically charged essays. Hence, a 2013 post to the popular feminist 
media blog Jezebel concluded that—despite Wurtzel’s early success—“Unfortunately now, when 
she pours her heart out onto the page she just makes a fucking mess” (Morrissey, para. 2). For 
fans and detractors alike, Wurtzel remained a polarizing figure until her death in January 2020. 
Prozac Nation recounts Wurtzel’s life story from early childhood up to age 26 as 
organized around her experiences of chronic depression and, eventually, her recovery through 
medication and therapy. In contrast to some other mental illness memoirs of the era—such as 





relationships with her parents, characterizing them as a “hysterical, exhausted, overwrought” 
mother (p. 5) and “deadbeat” father (p. 27) too preoccupied with “their own untrammeled, 
unfettered, unresolved, and unexamined emotional immaturity” to prioritize their daughter’s 
needs (p. 77) (Wurtzel, 1995). A majority of the book addresses Wurtzel’s college years at 
Harvard University, thus her academic activities and budding career in music journalism drive 
much of the plot.6 Readers learn that Wurtzel was a remarkably accomplished young woman: she 
mentions an internship she held at New York during her high school years, a prestigious college 
journalism award she won from The Rolling Stone for her work with The Harvard Crimson, a 
summer reporting job she held at The Dallas Morning News, a semester she persuaded Harvard 
professors and administrators to approve her for independent study in London, and so on. Prozac 
Nation is also characterized by its so-called “rock and roll aesthetic”—nearly every page of the 
text contains some reference to contemporary pop culture (especially music), the author’s sexual 
exploits, or her heavy use of drugs and alcohol (Bullard, 2002, p. 287). 
As one might expect in a memoir titled Prozac Nation, the antidepressant drug Prozac 
plays an important role in Wurtzel’s recovery from her mental illness. Prozac was discovered in 
1972 by researchers at pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly—it was the first in a popular class of 
antidepressants now commonly known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), and 
following its approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in December 1987, it was the 
first drug to be marketed directly to American consumers for the treatment of depression 
(Herzberg, 2010). According to Prozac Nation, Wurtzel’s psychiatrist first prescribed her Prozac 
 
6Regarding Prozac Nation’s emphasis on her academics, Wurtzel has stated: “It was originally a 
book about Harvard; it wasn’t even about depression. But everything in it was about being 






in the spring of her junior year of college (i.e., in early 1988), making Wurtzel “one of the first 
people to be put on Prozac after the FDA approved it” (p. 18). Prozac was already on its way to 
becoming a 1990s cultural icon and one of the world’s most recognizable medications before 
Wurtzel published her memoir, thus Prozac Nation rose to prominence in part due to its 
groundbreaking descriptions of biological psychiatry from the perspective of a real-world 
patient/consumer who had “been taking [Prozac] longer than anyone else on earth, save for a few 
laboratory rats in cages” (Wurtzel, 1995, p. 342). Although the memoir ponders a vast range of 
social, political, and familial conditions that affected Wurtzel’s experiences of mental illness, it 
is Prozac she ultimately credits for stabilizing her most acute depressive symptoms. Accordingly, 
a majority of scholarship that cites Prozac Nation—that which does not openly deride Wurtzel, at 
least—has foregrounded Wurtzel’s reliance on this drug, comparing her memoir against other 
prominent Prozac-related texts of the 1990s and exploring its possible feminist significance. 
Red Herring: Scholarly Context of Prozac Nation 
As an author of creative non-fiction literature, Wurtzel’s scholarly significance has often 
been disputed. Zimmerman (2007), for example, asserts that “it might seem like overkill to treat 
a gossipy book like Prozac Nation with [critical] seriousness” in a scholarly study of depression 
narratives (p. 471). Criticizing Wolpert’s (1999) use of quotations from Prozac Nation in his 
own memoir of depression, Zimmerman wonders why “an intellectual, a research biologist, who 
is trying to write a serious book” to be “published by an intellectually respectable press” would 
deign to engage with Wurtzel (2007, p. 471). Likewise, Cheever (2000) footnotes her discussion 
of Prozac Nation in an analysis of depression narratives to claim that the “banality of Wurtzel’s 
observations” makes readers wonder “why Wurtzel needs to make every assertion of identity 





also ambivalently footnotes Wurtzel, confirming that her use of the phrase “Prozac nation” is an 
allusion to “Elizabeth Wurtzel’s rambling and self-absorbed, but clairvoyant Prozac Nation” (p. 
238). Long after Wurtzel first left her mark on American reading cultures, those who cite her 
work in academic contexts still feel moved to express disdain for its content—to acknowledge 
Wurtzel’s relevance to one’s research apparently necessitates an apology to one’s audience. Even 
so, few would deny that Wurtzel’s bestselling memoir has been impactful in contemporary 
American literature. Memoir scholars, for example, often mention Prozac Nation as typifying the 
highly confessional narrative style that emerged during the “memoir boom” (Gilmore, 2010, p. 
676; see also Smith & Watson, 2010, p. 147; Watson, 2002, p. 180; Yagoda, 2010, p. 228). 
Most scholarly readings of Prozac Nation have taken Wurtzel’s story as a case study in 
the overall medicalization of mental illness in American psychiatry, wondering how emerging 
scientific knowledge about the brain can be reconciled with humanist notions of self and identity. 
Published only a year after Kramer’s (1993) landmark book about the cultural impact of SSRIs, 
Listening to Prozac, Wurtzel’s memoir offers firsthand insights into “the problem of defining the 
self” during a historical era in which “the psychological and biological have become increasingly 
difficult to separate” (Fracassa, 1999, p. 23). Westerbeek and Mutsaers (2008) thus read Prozac 
Nation alongside several other autobiographical works about depression in the “age of Prozac” 
(p. 26), wondering “to what extent and in what way do [authors] intentionally relate their identity 
to the disease?” (p. 30). Several scholars have suggested that Wurtzel blurs the line between her 
illness and her personal identity—by weaving each and every one of her life experiences into the 
broader tapestry of illness, she arguably depicts depression “not as a hindrance to or a vehicle for 
realizing the self,” but rather “as the self itself” (Cheever, 2000, p. 350). Others suggest that 





personal identity—through the author’s seemingly positive portrayal of Prozac at the end of the 
book. Fee (2000), for one, argues that Wurtzel’s final dependence on Prozac collapses her 
memoir’s earlier complexity into “a straightforward recovery tale . . . a culturally dominant mode 
of story-telling” (p. 85). In describing Prozac as a revolutionary medical technology that finally 
relieves her mental illness where therapy had failed to do so, Wurtzel may risk rendering the 
sociocultural factors of her depression (and thus Prozac Nation itself) irrelevant. 
Prozac Nation’s supposedly de-contextualized vision of depression would surely clash 
with social constructionist theories of psychiatry—the most extreme of which might envision 
Prozac as a weapon of social control—and a glance at so-called “anti-psychiatry” research is 
useful in illuminating the critical context of Wurtzel’s book. Famed psychiatrists Thomas Szasz 
and R. D. Laing can be credited with raising the American public’s distrust of psychiatric 
practices in the 1960s, but in the 1990s, psychiatrist Peter Breggin became the most vocal critic 
of Prozac and other SSRIs with his bestselling books Toxic Psychiatry (1991) and Talking Back 
to Prozac (1994; co-written with Ginger R. Breggin). Talking Back to Prozac weaves SSRIs into 
a long history of psychiatric abuses against non-conforming persons; Breggin and Breggin 
advocate for the “obviously psychological and spiritual condition” of depression to be treated 
with “dedicated involvement of caring human beings” rather than mind-altering drugs (1994, p. 
308). Just as Szasz famously described the tranquilizers used in 1960s psychiatry as “chemical 
straitjackets” (1970, p. 278), Breggin and Breggin’s work refers to “the SSRI chemical-lobotomy 
syndrome” (1994, p. 250), and Breggin elsewhere compares Prozac to antipsychotic drugs that 
are used “primarily for the control of patients,” because both “produce an [effect] that makes 
these often-difficult patients more docile” (1991, p. 18). By popularizing “Prozac backlash” in 





Wurtzel to ponder the sociocultural ramifications of SSRIs from the perspective of a patient 
(Glenmullen, 2000). As a result, their works are often cited in/around analyses of Prozac Nation 
(see Bullard, 2002; Gardiner, 1995; Kumlu, 2013; Metzl, 2003; Udovitch, 1994). Although 
Breggin’s early anti-Prozac research preceded the publication of Prozac Nation, his reliance on 
case studies from his own clinical work to support his arguments clearly anticipated the power of 
personal narratives like Wurtzel’s to influence future cultural discourse about depression. 
Criticisms of Prozac’s social functions have also been advanced (albeit to very different 
ends) by contemporary feminist scholars, affecting Prozac Nation’s reception as a work of 
unexpected political significance. For instance, Blum and Stracuzzi (2004) examine an archive of 
83 mass media articles about SSRIs published during the first 12 years of their use in American 
psychiatry, finding “Prozac talk” to be superficially gender neutral yet rife with “latent messages 
of increased requirements for body disciplining for women” (p. 273). According to these authors, 
the popular press had feminized both the detrimental effects of depression and the supposedly 
positive effects of Prozac—Prozac talk is found to be “reinforcing rather than lessening gender 
boundaries” (p. 273). Although Wurtzel is one of few authors in their archive who shows hints of 
“feminist skepticism” towards biological psychiatry, her sustained use of psychiatric medication 
is cited as evidence that her “suspicions were short lived” (p. 282).7 Metzl (2003) seems to share 
this interpretation of Wurtzel’s text, dismissing Prozac Nation and other “high-profile members 
of the Prozac literary family” for defining women’s distress largely in terms of their relationships 
to men and for proposing a chemical, rather than political, solution to their problems (p. 176). 
According to Metzl, Prozac Nation—along with both Listening to Prozac and Talking Back to 
 
7Officially, this study’s engagement with Prozac Nation was limited to an excerpt from 






Prozac—paints Prozac problematically as “an agent that restores heterosexual normativity and 
stability. . . . once cured, [depressed] women return to the men in their lives” (p. 177). 
The notion that Prozac’s most vocal proponent and opponent in the 1990s—Kramer and 
Breggin, respectively—actually converge in their gendered portrayals of the drug’s effects was 
first articulated by Gardiner (1995) in her prescient book review “Can Ms. Prozac Talk Back?: 
Feminism, Drugs, and Social Constructionism,” which reads Prozac Nation alongside Listening 
to Prozac and Talking Back to Prozac. According to Gardiner, both psychiatrists liken the drug 
to “a type of liberal feminism” that “detach[es] women from traditional roles and fit[s] them for 
contemporary corporate life” (p. 508). Whereas Kramer celebrates the transformative power of 
Prozac, Breggin “extols women’s traditional virtues” and decries the psychiatric establishment’s 
attempts to destroy them—but both focus their arguments on women’s romantic relationships 
(Gardiner, 1995, p. 508). However, in contrast to other criticisms of Prozac Nation, Gardiner 
finds Wurtzel to be “conflicted and contradictory” about her depression and the role of Prozac in 
her recovery (p. 509). It is primarily with passages from Prozac Nation that Gardiner builds her 
discussion of the four major issues (“confusion[s]” and “ambivalence[s]”) her review raises 
regarding future feminist input on the “debate about psychoactive drugs” (p. 512). Even more 
charitable to Wurtzel is Dean’s (2007) study of women’s narratives that reveal “the limitations of 
strictly material and strictly discursive explanations” for depression (p. 24). Dean advocates for a 
solution to this phenomenological issue—whether depression is chemical or cultural—that would 





reference to an “in-between” is explicitly drawn from Wurtzel’s text, and her conclusions are 
partly modeled off of Wurtzel’s own reflections at the end of Prozac Nation.8 
If, as some have suggested, Prozac Nation reinforced the sexist notion that “madness” 
means violating feminine gender norms and “recovery” means fulfilling them—especially via 
biological psychiatry—then this blockbuster memoir could indeed have dangerous implications 
for real women with mental illness. Fortunately, Prozac Nation is not quite guilty of these 
charges. Revisited nearly 30 years after it was written, Wurtzel’s portrayal of depression may not 
seem as medicalized as it once did; likewise, the sociocultural aspects of her illness might seem 
more complex. In truth, the first 12 (of 14) chapters of Prozac Nation contain no mention of 
Prozac whatsoever. The drug’s conspicuous absence in most of Wurtzel’s story led one reviewer 
to call Prozac a “red herring” that “makes only a brief appearance” in the memoir that bears its 
name (Harris, 1994, p. 62). When Prozac is finally introduced into the plot of Wurtzel’s memoir, 
it is praised not for its provision of quick-and-easy relief, but rather because its stabilizing effects 
help to integrate a decade’s worth of incomplete solutions—“all the therapy, all the traveling, all 
the sleeping, all the drugs, all the crying, all the missed classes, all the lost time”—into one slow, 
vaguely perceptible “recovery process” (1995, p. 329). At no point in this process does Wurtzel 
morph into an ideal daughter/girlfriend/mother, nor is it clear that she wants any such 
transformation to occur.9 On the contrary, Wurtzel’s 1995 afterword to Prozac Nation 
 
8To preface a section titled “Searching for an ‘In-Between’: Reframing Women’s Depression 
with Material-Discursive Models,” Dean reproduces the following passage from Prozac Nation: 
“In-between. There’s a phrase that is far too underappreciated. What a great day it was, what a 
moment of pure triumph, to have discovered that there are in-betweens.” See Dean, 2007, p. 38. 
 
9Metzl (2003) supports his assessment of Prozac Nation with the passing claim that “Wurtzel 
comes to appreciate ‘real love’ only after she takes medication” (p. 177). Reading Metzl’s 
citation in context, though, reveals that the “love” Wurtzel refers to in this passage (from the 





emphasizes the enduring instability of her relationships even after years of taking Prozac: “I still 
wonder if I’ll ever do the things that grown-ups do—you know, like falling in love, staying in 
love, having a healthy enough relationship to feel like it could turn itself into a possible home” 
(p. 362). This statement reflects Wurtzel’s awareness of social pressures to seek a “home” by 
“falling in love” and forming a “healthy relationship,” but her characterization of these tasks as 
“the things that grown-ups do” implies both that she is personally unprepared to pursue them 
and, more importantly, that she feels doing so is arbitrary. Clearly, current scholarship on Prozac 
Nation has not exhaustively explored the text’s feminist significance—and as a survey of 
Wurtzel’s treatment in the 1990s popular press reveals, this memoir’s portrayal of Wurtzel’s 
giftedness (in relation to her depression) has also been misapprehended. 
Critics Have Their Savage Say: Popular Press Responses to Prozac Nation 
Few studies of Prozac Nation fail to mention the contrast between its great commercial 
success and its negative reception by media critics. American reading audiences made Prozac 
Nation a bestseller, but Wurtzel’s story—and indeed, Wurtzel herself—was eviscerated in 
journalistic reviews. Two months before the memoir’s September 1994 release, a critic for 
Kirkus Reviews wrote what would be the first of many public denunciations of Prozac Nation, 
accusing Wurtzel of taking “narcissistic pride” in her depression and engaging in “one-
upmanship” with respect to other mentally ill people (1994, para. 1). The review concludes: 
[Wurtzel] wants it both ways: to be at once the Head Loony and a representative 
voice. But her nihilism offers nothing new. . . . By alternately belittling and 
belaboring her depression, Wurtzel loses her credibility: Either she’s a brat who 
won’t shape up or she needs the drugs. Ultimately, you don’t care which. An 
 
writes: “the depression created an atmosphere in which I was too stuck inside myself to 
appreciate. . . the real love that my mother tried to show me” (Wurtzel, 1995, p. 357). 
Importantly, this passage does not confirm whether Wurtzel feels her mother’s love at present, 






excruciating portrait of, even cause for, depression. This most certainly is not an 
examination of a generation’s collective psyche. (Kirkus Reviews, 1994, para. 1) 
 
Schoemer (1994) of Newsweek echoed these sentiments in her own review two weeks before 
Prozac Nation’s release, comparing it to “the self-absorbed rantings of an adolescent” and 
describing Wurtzel’s writing as “so rife with hyperbole, so devoid of context, that it’s virtually 
impossible to identify with her” (para. 2). Over time, numerous reviewers repeated Kirkus 
Reviews’s quip that Prozac Nation was as—or more—likely to induce depression in readers as it 
was to relieve it (see Goldberg, 1994; Harris, 1994; Marlan, 1996; Shrader, 1994; Tucker, 1994; 
Werner, 1994; etc.). On the other hand, at least five critics predicted that Wurtzel would inspire 
violent impulses in her readers: to “shake” her (Kakutani, 1994, p. C19), to throw her book 
across the room (Goldberg, 1994, p. G3; Harris, 1994, p. 62; Sullivan, 1994, p. 31), and even “hit 
her with a Nerf bat” (Udovitch, 1994, p. 97). Journalists soon started to invoke a critical 
consensus on Prozac Nation, emphasizing how each new review of the book had confirmed 
others’ earlier assessments. Goldberg’s (1994) review “Prozac Nation: Downer of the Year, 
Maybe Decade,” for instance, states that the book’s “fingernails-on-the-blackboard tone . . . 
explains the astounding amount of negative press the book has so far received” (p. G3). 
To accompany an interview with Wurtzel published five months after the release of 
Prozac Nation, Deardorff (1995) of the Chicago Tribune inserted a sidebar simply titled “Critics 
Have Their Savage Say” (p. F1). As illustrated in Figure 4, this graphic cites excerpts from five 
other journalists’ “scathing opinions” of Prozac Nation, wondering at the fact that Wurtzel was 
“still standing” after being panned so harshly (p. F1). Across these and other reviews, the 
complaints lodged against Wurtzel are noticeably consistent—she is charged with narcissism, 
self-pity, grandiosity, and brazen opportunism in appointing herself the “poster child” of 





common as descriptors of her behavior: according to the critics, Wurtzel’s “self- important 
whining” (Kakutani, 1994, p. C19) seemed merely “to be pouring new whining into old 
wineskins” (Gardiner, 1995, p. 510); Wurtzel had proven that “depressives should just stop 
whining already” (Corrigan, 1994, p. 8) and that “Wendy Whiner, the classic kvetch from the old 
 ‘Saturday Night Live’ sketch, can’t hold a candle to Weepy Wurtzel” (Goldberg, 1994, p. G3); 
Prozac Nation itself, then, was labeled as “The Vintage Whine of Generation X” (Shrader, 1994, 
p. A6), “Elizabeth Wurtzel’s Unofficial Guide to Whining” (Werner, 1994, para. 3), “a self-
seeking whinge about teen dispirit for the ‘twentynothings’ of the slacker generation” (Moir, 
1995, p. T10), and “one long whine, a tedious tome, a depresso-manifesto, a celebration of self-
pity and thinly disguised narcissism” (Sullivan, 1994, p. 31).10 Perhaps Prozac Nation never had 
 
10Wurtzel reportedly chose “Prozac Nation” as the title of her epilogue before, at the bequest of 
her editor, giving this title to the memoir as a whole. In a 1994 interview with Vice, Wurtzel 
stressed that her original title (I Hate Myself and I Want to Die) was “totally personal,” observing 
that “no one ever sets out to do something like be the voice of a generation . . . nobody sets out to 
do that” (Sifre and Ettlinger, 2009, para. 7). Hence, throughout her lifetime, Wurtzel consistently 
denied positioning her memoir as anything other than her own individual story of depression. 
Figure 4 
 










a hope of earning positive reviews—beyond their implicit reinforcement of mental health stigma, 
Muzak (2008) notes, these critics’ personal attacks against Wurtzel also reflect the “distrustful 
and hostile culture” that women often face “when they attempt to relate and examine their 
experiences of depression” in patriarchal societies (p. 101). Yet one cannot help but wonder why 
Wurtzel’s story, in particular, provoked such a venomous response. What led so many reviewers 
to characterize an adult woman’s narrative of her lifelong, life-threatening depression as the mere 
whining of a narcissistic brat? On what grounds did they invalidate her account? 
A closer look at Prozac Nation’s reviews quickly points to Wurtzel’s academic and 
professional accomplishments as a driving force behind many critics’ animosity. To her 
detractors, it seemed nigh impossible that a young woman who earned such impressive grades, 
awards, and internships could have possibly been depressed—or at least, not as depressed as she 
had claimed to be. Wurtzel’s achievements were cited in preface to extensive sarcasm: one critic 
asserted that her “series of triumphs” was meant “to remind us that no matter how low the author 
felt, she was still more successful than many of us” (Tucker, 1994, p. BR 11); another stated that 
Wurtzel was “inordinately fond of reminding her readers [she] pretty much had it all, . . . even 
more determined to tell us none of this ever brought her any joy” (Goldberg, 1994, p. G3); yet 
another claimed that although Wurtzel had been severely depressed in college, “None of this 
seems to affect her job performance, or her schoolwork when she returns to Harvard. As Ms. 
Wurtzel repeatedly lets us know” (Shrader, 1994, p. A6). Reading Prozac Nation as an ode to the 
author’s personal success, these reviewers all but accused Wurtzel of exaggerating her illness to 
make her achievements all the more extraordinary to the rest of “us.” Still others felt Wurtzel had 
understated her abilities, claiming that “through all the horror . . . she [had not] dropped a clue 





p. 62) and mocking her for what they construed as false modesty: “Gosh, Liz: No ambition? Just 
dumb luck? Back to Low Self-Esteemville” (Sullivan, 1994, p. 31).11 Regardless of how much 
Prozac Nation actually discusses the author’s education and career—too much for some critics’ 
taste, too little for others—the mere fact of Wurtzel’s achievements seemed to invalidate her 
expressions of unhappiness in their eyes. Put simply, critics dismissed Wurtzel’s depression 
because they felt that her highs should have counteracted her lows and, moreover, that her ability 
to reach such heights proved that she was never really all that low in the first place. 
Case Study: Prozac Nation and the Ex-Gifted Kid Topos 
The tension between Wurtzel’s various achievements and her depression in Prozac 
Nation should not be read as a weakness of the text, as many critics interpreted it to be, but rather 
as a defining aspect of the story Wurtzel tells about her illness—and thus deserving of further 
scholarly inquiry. Popular press reviewers highlighted Wurtzel’s giftedness in order to justify 
their skepticism about her depression; they did this in part because they assumed achievement 
and mental illness to be mutually exclusive conditions. Such assumptions fail to consider, among 
other things, the longstanding prominence of Mad Genius rhetoric (if not the Ex-Gifted Kid 
topos, specifically) in American cultural discourse about mental illness. For this reason, it is 
productive to read Prozac Nation for more general insights into the Ex-Gifted Kid topos as it is 
circulated in autobiographical media. But the reviews cited above are not simply skeptical or 
confused over Wurtzel’s descriptions of depression, perhaps reflecting the authors’ limited 
knowledge of the illness. Rather, in veritably weaponizing Wurtzel’s achievements and engaging 
 
11The specific moment of Prozac Nation to which Sullivan refers here occurs in chapter seven, 
which Wurtzel opens as follows: “Summer of 1987. Dallas, Texas. . . . I have finished my 
sophomore year at Harvard. Somewhere down the road I managed to pick up the 1986 Rolling 
Stone College Journalism Award for an essay I wrote about Lou Reed for the Harvard Crimson, 






in ad hominem attacks, these reviews evoke a classic paradox of female giftedness: either neglect 
one’s talents and suffer personal distress, or pursue one’s talents and be rejected by a misogynist 
culture. The fact that exceptional achievement has been problematized for women (as a class) in 
Wurtzel’s cultural context inevitably informed her life experiences, her narration of them, and 
others’ reactions to her story. These critics thus inadvertently identified Prozac Nation as a 
valuable resource for the study of female giftedness in a post-feminist context. Through the close 
readings below, I show how Prozac Nation explicitly—but contradictorily—intertwines 
Wurtzel’s giftedness with her mental illness at various life stages, interpreting Wurtzel’s 
depression as both a cause and an effect of her remarkable achievements. In the process, I read 
Wurtzel’s Ex-Gifted Kid persona in this text as a rhetorical response to her experiences of both 
mental health stigma and, more implicitly, societal ambivalence towards talented young women. 
Symbolism and Meaning: Achievement as a Symptom of Depression 
Reflecting on the sociocultural context of psychiatry in the epilogue to Prozac Nation, 
Wurtzel compares herself against various other archetypal figures of drug abuse (both legal and 
illegal) who had previously shaped modern Americans’ perceptions of mental illness and its 
treatments.12 Her narration sharply differentiates between those affected by the “depression 
breakout” of the 1990s and depression’s stock characters of the past, who she claims were 
“stereotyped as wasted, dissipated, and middle-aged, or else young and going nowhere fast” (p. 
337). For Wurtzel, one of the most “striking elements” of contemporary depression is its 
prevalence among promising young people like herself (p. 337). She writes: 
 
12Specifically, the stock characters she mentions are: “The Miltown and Valium addicts of the 
fifties and sixties, the housewives reaching for their mother’s little helpers, the strung out junkies 
and crackheads who litter the gutters of the Bowery or the streets of Harlem or the skid row of 






What is fascinating about depression this time—what is unique about this Prozac 
Nation—is the extent to which it is affecting those who have so much to look 
forward to and to hope for, who are, as one might say of any bright young thing 
about to make her debut into the world, so full of promise. These are people about 
whom one cannot say that life is over, that it’s already too late, but rather young 
people for whom it has just begun. (p. 337) 
 
Here Wurtzel indicates that the high incidence of depression in Generation X may demand a 
paradigm shift in cultural understandings of both depression and youthful “promise”—or at the 
very least, it might call for the addition of a new stock character to her list. Whereas depression 
had often been perceived as an affliction of adults for whom it was “too late” to intervene 
because their lives had already been “wasted,” Wurtzel observes an ever-expanding cohort of 
depressed young people for whom the causes of the illness cannot be so easily explained. 
Likewise, although cultural discourse about talented youths often presumes that such persons 
should be eagerly, hopefully awaiting the opportunity to “make [their] debut into the world,” 
Wurtzel wonders why it seems that the opposite is true at her time of writing.  
Obviously, Wurtzel’s statements here are informed by personal experience: she herself 
was once a “bright young thing” whose depression manifested early in life. This passage from 
Prozac Nation’s epilogue thus implies that Wurtzel’s story can shed light on the “fascinating” 
contradiction to which she refers, yet her paragraph—and so her discussion of this topic—
unfortunately ends here. To analyze how Prozac Nation argues for a meaningful (if complex and 
ever-evolving) connection between the author’s depression and giftedness, I choose to read this 
memoir backwards from Wurtzel’s adulthood to her childhood, tracing her extreme ambivalence 
towards suicide during college back to others’ earlier ambivalence towards her achievements. 
While it may seem unusual to structure my case study this way, doing so allows me to examine 
first how prevailing interpretations of Prozac Nation may misrepresent Wurtzel’s portrayal of 





giftedness as both a cause and an effect of her lifelong distress. Illuminating Wurtzel’s struggles 
to externalize her inner madness/genius as an adult as well as her struggles not to internalize 
societal sexism as a child, Prozac Nation apparently draws on the Ex-Gifted Kid topos while also 
clarifying the sociocultural factors that may make it appealing to this specific author. 
As Wurtzel enters young adulthood in the plot of Prozac Nation, the narration highlights 
her increasing awareness of the double binds in which she is entangled as a high-achieving 
young woman suffering from depression. Though Wurtzel does not analyze her giftedness from a 
feminist perspective, the text repeatedly incriminates various adults in her life for simultaneously 
rewarding and punishing her personal accomplishments. In one especially pertinent passage, she 
remembers fantasizing about the sympathetic press coverage she might receive if she should die 
by suicide (specifically, by drowning herself in a Harvard swimming pool)—a far cry from the 
harsh criticisms she actually inspired after writing Prozac Nation. She writes: 
[I knew] for sure that any death at my age would be considered a tragedy, surely worthy 
of a full-length feature in some publication, maybe the Boston Phoenix or New York. . . . I 
knew perfectly how the story would go: She was so full of potential, Harvard, a dancer, a 
writer, blah blah blah. And then the reporter would try to figure out what it says about our 
society when a promising young person with so many options chooses to do herself in. I 
could see it all: My life would suddenly be infused with all sorts of symbolism and 
meaning that it simply did not have as long as I was alive. (p. 144) 
 
By this point of Prozac Nation, although Wurtzel has shown symptoms of depression since her 
early childhood, her parents’ and doctors’ concerns about treating her severe distress have been 
fairly minimal. Her narration asserts that, as long as she was alive and apparently thriving during 
her years at Harvard, those around her failed to perceive any emotional depth (“symbolism and 
meaning”) lurking beneath her seemingly “promising” demeanor. In effect, her talents were more 
of a liability than an asset, pigeonholing her as a highly skilled student, dancer, writer, and so on 





was actually in desperate need of psychiatric help. Her adolescent self was certain, though, that if 
she died a tragic premature death, the loss of her potential would suddenly be mourned by the 
same sort of people who failed to nurture her when she was still alive. With noticeable irony, she 
imagines a reporter who might have lovingly documented her gifts for posterity and pondered 
“what it says about our society” that even someone as exceptional as she could die by suicide. 
This passage’s disaffected tone (“blah blah blah”)—which reverberates all throughout 
Prozac Nation’s discussions of Wurtzel’s suicidality in her college years—conveys Wurtzel’s 
frustration over others’ failures to recognize her mental illness. Whereas, if she had died by 
suicide, a reporter might have described her as inexplicably “choo[sing]” this outcome over 
“many options” available to her, the young Wurtzel viewed suicide as the only possible outcome 
of her situation. That is, it seemed inevitable that she would die by suicide if she never accessed 
effective treatment for her depression—and her experiences had also convinced her that suicide 
was the only way she could compel other people to take her depression seriously. Elsewhere in 
Prozac Nation, Wurtzel recalls how she once wished “for a real ailment, . . . to be a junkie or a 
cokehead or something—something real” (“an alcoholic, an anorexic, a bulimic, or a drug 
addict”) (p. 68), believing this would be preferable to her situation because “people who did self-
destructive things . . . got lots of attention, [and] they got to be rescued” (p. 69). Reflecting on 
the clash between her own need to be rescued and her disinclination to self-destruct, she notes: 
Yes, of course, there were mental hospitals . . . but I couldn’t hope to end up in one of 
those places unless I made a suicide attempt serious enough to warrant oxygen or stitches 
or a stomach pump. Until then, I would remain woefully undertreated by a Manhattan 
psychiatrist who could offer only a little bit of help amid the chaos of my home life. I 
used to wish—to pray to God for the courage and strength—that I’d have the guts not to 
get better, but to slit my wrists and get a whole lot worse so that I could land in some 






All throughout Wurtzel’s life, others have wrongfully perceived her above-average level of 
achievement as a mark of excellent mental health, yet Wurtzel could not fathom her depression 
getting better without serious familial support and medical interventions (“real help”). Her 
parents merely exacerbated her distress through their constant fighting (“chaos of my home life”) 
rather than attempting to relieve it; her sporadic talk therapy sessions with a psychiatrist were 
“woefully” insufficient to relieve her despair. Her narration therefore emphasizes that, as far as 
she could tell as a young adult, only persons who credibly threatened to take their own lives 
could ever “hope to” receive the type of medical attention she needed—her depression would be 
invisible in those places “unless” and “until” she externalized her pain in a similar fashion. As a 
consequence, she spent much of her adolescence wishing for an outcome she believed to be not 
only unavoidable, but bizarrely desirable: for the “courage and strength” to engage in severe acts 
of self-harm. In other words, she prayed for the ability to be unable to survive. 
Wurtzel’s simultaneous attraction and aversion to suicide in her young adulthood seems 
like an understandable response to her situation, yet as both of the above passages reveal, her 
ambivalence towards life/death also posed abundant problems. Above all, she could not possibly 
pinpoint the moment at which a suicide attempt would become “serious enough” to secure vital 
resources yet not so serious that it might actually kill her (p. 70). If she had died, any subsequent 
recognition of either her misery or her gifts would certainly have been useless to her then. Even 
worse, as she was all too well aware (“I knew perfectly. . . . I could see it all”), such recognition 
still would have hinged on others’ gross misunderstandings of her death as a tragic mystery 
rather than the logical conclusion of her undertreated depression (p. 144). Although she dreamed 
of relinquishing her high-functioning status—and even risking her own life—in order to get 





if she had never achieved anything special at all. Indeed, Prozac Nation’s account of Wurtzel’s 
college years indicates that she was faced with two impossible options: die by suicide, or else 
expunge her lifelong giftedness from her personal history so that others might finally see her 
depression. That she resigns herself to an “empty and aching” life—deferring suicide, staring 
into pools, and bewildering psychiatrists ad infinitum—hints that she is grasping for a third 
option in which her depression and giftedness could be reconcilable in others’ eyes (p. 145). 
Despite Wurtzel’s intense unhappiness over the course of her adulthood, Prozac Nation 
stresses that she resisted the urge to self-destruct; the complete loss of her life and/or livelihood 
was not acceptable to her. On the contrary, while reflecting on her high level of functioning 
during her college years, Wurtzel affirms that she has “always been a coper” (p. 133) who could 
manage to “do what little must be done to scratch by” even at her lowest points (p. 134). She 
recounts, for example, a time when she responded to an especially acute depressive episode by 
resolving to work harder in her next semester at Harvard, asking herself, “Hadn’t I always 
retreated to the splendid isolation of my studies?” (p. 125). According to much of Prozac 
Nation’s narration, the answer to this question is clearly yes—Wurtzel frequently identifies her 
schoolwork as a means of escaping her depression. Not only are her studies a welcome 
distraction in the short-term, gratifying her innate intellectual curiosity, but they also provide a 
flicker of long-term hope for her to “get out of this rut of a rotten life” and improve her situation 
“at some unspecified time in the future” (p. 97). Furthermore, the text positions Wurtzel’s 
willingness to be a “perfect little Ivy League daughter” as a necessary condition for her 
(hypercritical) mother’s affection and her (absentee) father’s attention (p. 137). Observing that 
“unconditional love has been absent from [her] life,” Wurtzel muses: 
I know that if I’m not being the person [my mother] wants me to be, if I’m not the 





broke, depressed, and desperate, she just doesn’t love me the same way. She 
doesn’t want to know about it. She doesn’t want to know if I have sex or if I have 
a tattoo. She wants only the girl she wants. (p. 256) 
 
Here and elsewhere in Prozac Nation, Wurtzel depicts her academic/professional achievements 
as a means of staving off unhappiness. In the face of her life-threatening mental illness—for 
which she had been denied legitimate medical treatment—her work gave her something to do, a 
feeling of being loved by others, and the hope that it might someday change her life for the 
better. In short, she strongly implies that her personal success is directly attributable to her 
mental illness. As a consequence, Wurtzel describes Harvard as an “anchor” without which she 
would “disintegrate and float into the ozone layer”—her intense attachment to this institution is 
as much a symptom of her despair as it is a remedy (p. 254). Whereas those around her can only 
interpret her accomplishments as a negation of depression, her narration establishes that these 
two aspects of her identity are inextricably linked. For Prozac Nation’s readers, too, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to guess which one’s development preceded the other. 
As illustrated by Wurtzel’s memories of her adolescence, the journalist who would 
romanticize her gifts and ponder the sociological “symbolism” of her suicide is scarcely better 
than the journalist who would attack her gifts as evidence of her narcissism and dishonesty. Both 
visions fail to capture the relationship between Wurtzel’s depression and her achievements as 
understood by Wurtzel herself; they also overlook the significance of Wurtzel’s sociocultural 
context as a determinant of the narrative persona she constructs in her memoir. My reading of 
Prozac Nation through the lens of the Ex-Gifted Kid topos indicates that Wurtzel’s parents’ and 
doctors’ distortions of her achievements—that is, their assumptions that her work is either 
unrelated or antithetical to her mental illness—exacerbates her depression by leading them to 





reflections on her education and career, I have suggested that her achievements can be read as 
symptomatic of her worsening depression throughout her adolescent years. What remains to be 
discovered, though, is the extent to which Prozac Nation also indicts sociocultural factors—
specifically, sexism against gifted girls and women—as a cause of the author’s mental illness. To 
delve more deeply into the influence of feminine gender norms on Wurtzel’s Ex-Gifted Kid 
persona, I look no further than the earliest chapters of her memoir. Through their emphasis on 
the author’s intrinsic potential versus the ambivalence of her extrinsic environment, these scenes 
from Wurtzel’s childhood formulate a mythos of depression as thwarted gifted girl identity that 
follows her through the remainder of her memoir, albeit not (I hope) the remainder of her life. 
Becoming Strange: Depression as Thwarted Achievement 
Spanning 1967 to 1994, the events of Prozac Nation overlap with an era in which second-
wave feminism ostensibly liberated women from Wurtzel’s generation to seek educations and 
careers inaccessible to their mothers. Indeed, the influence of traditional gender norms on 
Wurtzel’s mother’s life—as Wurtzel understands it—is stated fairly plainly in the text: 
back in the early sixties, marriage was the only way she could get out of her parents’ 
house. She’d gone to Cornell to be an architect, but her mother told her that all she could 
be was an architect’s secretary, so she majored in art history with that goal in mind. . . . 
out of college, she moved back home and was expected to stay there until she moved into 
her husband’s house. . . . one day while she was riding the escalator, . . . she passed my 
father, who was riding down. They were wed less than a year later. (p. 25) 
 
Like Wurtzel herself, Wurtzel’s mother once enrolled at a prestigious university in hopes of 
studying a creative field and pursuing an intellectually stimulating career. But according to 
Wurtzel, her mother quickly resigned herself to an unfulfilling job and an unhappy marriage, 
because those options were “all she could be,” “the only way” she could live, and altogether 
what “was expected” of her. Wurtzel’s ability instead to study her desired field and launch a 





marriage—reflects the significant social and political progress that had occurred in the United 
States between her mother’s youth and her own. So, too, does the matter-of-fact language with 
which she summarizes her mother’s life story and nods to the time period (“back in the early 
sixties”) as a sweeping explanation for her mother’s choices. That Wurtzel’s mother was obliged 
to sacrifice her own fulfillment in order to maintain essential social supports (i.e., to please her 
parents and attract a husband) seems unremarkable to Wurtzel: the text implies that such a 
situation is both typical for a woman of her mother’s age and, by her time of writing in the 
1990s, atypical enough for young women that Wurtzel is not personally threatened by it. 
As the passage above suggests, Wurtzel’s familiarity with key themes and figures of 
second-wave feminist thought is on prominent display throughout her memoir—her narration 
ranges from lengthy meditations on divorce, rape, and abortion to curiously brief allusions to 
feminist cultural artifacts. For example, at one point of Prozac Nation, Wurtzel describes her 
past inability to go of old memories as follows: “I wasn’t just the madwoman in the attic—I was 
the attic itself” (Wurtzel, Prozac Nation, 138).13 But despite Wurtzel’s seeming feminist 
consciousness, the generational effects of gender socialization are palpable in her portrayal of her 
relationship with her mother throughout Prozac Nation. In the previously-cited passage about her 
mother’s love, for instance, Wurtzel’s assertion that her mother “doesn’t want to know if [she 
has] sex or if [she has] a tattoo” noticeably ties her mother’s approval to her perceived femininity 
(p. 256). Furthermore, just as Wurtzel’s grandmother encouraged Wurtzel’s mother to give up 
her professional ambitions and attach herself to men (as secretary and wife), Wurtzel’s mother is 
shown to fixate on her daughter’s marriageability as a measure of her current/future wellbeing. 
 
13As both Gardiner (1995) and Millard (2007) have noted, this single sentence in Prozac Nation 
can be interpreted as an allusion to Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847), Jean Rhys’s Wide 





Wurtzel recalls her mother advising her to “be peppy and bright for boys” because “No one 
wants anyone who’s down like you” (p. 197), that her mother’s concerns about the onset of her 
depression receded when Wurtzel started dating her first boyfriend (“she pretty much decided 
that, having managed to attract this mensch, I must not be such a mess”) (p. 100), that her mother 
“considered suicide” after finding birth control pills in Wurtzel’s bedroom (“Don’t I know that 
I’m not supposed to have sex unless I’m married?”) (p. 106), and so on. Clearly, Prozac Nation 
invites a reading of the conflicts young gifted women face between their personal ambitions and 
their encounters with environmental sexism—what are the consequences of living in a society 
that simultaneously rewards and punishes their deviation from gender norms? 
Long before Prozac Nation details the author’s impressive education and career—before 
her depression fully emerges within the timeline of this book—Wurtzel recalls her years as a 
highly precocious young girl. Aptly titled “Full of Promise,” the first chapter of Prozac Nation 
stresses Wurtzel’s nascent potential for greatness through several lengthy lists of the talents, 
interests, and ambitions she exhibited in her childhood. For example, she notes:  
I’d been the class bully, I’d been popular, I’d been in Pampers commercials at six 
months, had done Hi-C and Starburst ads later, had written a series of pet care 
books at age six, had adapted “Murders in the Rue Morgue” into a play at age 
seven, had turned construction paper and Magic Markers and tempera paint into 
an illustrated chapbook called Penny the Penguin at age eight. (p. 16) 
 
In Wurtzel’s view, there were no limits to her “overwhelming sense of invincibleness” as a child: 
she easily surpassed the other children at her primary school, winning school-wide (and later 
national) scholastic competitions and being placed into a special class with two other apparently 
gifted students (p. 40). Importantly, Wurtzel’s narration is quick to clarify that her giftedness 





athletic pursuits (e.g., “I taught myself to play tennis”) to visual arts and creative writing (p. 40). 
Sharing that she was “alone with babysitters a fair amount of time” as a child, she writes: 
It didn’t much matter. . . because I was always perfectly content to be left alone 
with one of my many odd projects, whether it was breeding grasshoppers that I’d 
brought home with me from day camp, or writing an illustrated series of books 
about different kinds of animals, or just sitting around with my math workbooks 
and zooming ahead through multiplication and division when everyone else in 
first grade was still learning how to add and subtract. (p. 39) 
 
It is noteworthy that Wurtzel’s memoir never makes reference to IQ testing, although this 
practice has been the most common method for identifying gifted children in primary schools 
throughout American history. On the contrary, Wurtzel’s specialness seems to have been evident 
since birth—in addition to her revelation that she was “in Pampers commercials at six months” 
(cited above), for example, she mentions that she gave a name to each of her 30 pacifiers as an 
infant and “stay[ed] up all night playing” elaborate games of make-believe with them while her 
parents slept (p. 16). In summary, Wurtzel’s self-proclaimed “golden girl” (p. 16) image was so 
central to her early childhood that when she eventually showed symptoms of severe depression, 
she notes, “no one in her right mind would ever have believed I’d come to this” (p. 39). 
As Prozac Nation progresses into Wurtzel’s pre-teen years, the author considers a 
plethora of explanations for her transformation from a precocious young girl into a depressed, 
suicidal adolescent. While doing so, she puts significant scrutiny on her relationships with her 
parents, who amicably “separated and divorced before [she] was two” yet grew ever more 
adversarial as they struggled to co-parent their only child (p. 29). That Wurtzel’s pain in this 
regard was not unique is not lost on her: she locates herself within “a generation of children of 
divorce” (p. 77), observing that “The more children of divorce [she has] met over the years, the 
more common and trivial [her] own family history starts to seem” (p. 34). Nonetheless, her 





family. Through Wurtzel’s allegations of neglectful behavior on her parents’ part—especially in 
her memories of being abandoned in spaces of rigid conformity—Prozac Nation illuminates the 
author’s gradual victimization in her childhood by a logic of (ab)normality and (un)likability that 
is transparently sexist. As a result, Wurtzel’s narration not only elucidates the sociocultural 
conditions that may have inspired her to link her depression to her giftedness; it also gestures at 
the process through which her depressed Ex-Gifted Kid persona might eventually be put to rest. 
From an early age, Wurtzel remembers being absorbed with her own mind, affirming that 
“[her] inner resources were so thorough and complete that [she] often had no idea what to do 
with other children” (p. 39). Implicitly, the text highlights Wurtzel’s innate self-sufficiency—her 
ability to rely entirely on her own “inner resources” for fulfillment—as a means of justifying her 
retreat from interpersonal relationships (i.e., with “other children”). As noted above, Wurtzel 
asserts throughout Prozac Nation’s first chapter that she was “always perfectly content to be left 
alone,” suggesting that her various intellectual interests were independently chosen and she 
neither needed nor wanted others’ encouragement to pursue them (p. 39). Accordingly, the text 
emphasizes the sense of bewilderment and betrayal Wurtzel felt when, as a young child, she was 
cast out of her home and sent to sleepaway camp for several summers: “I walked around [the 
camp], . . . wondering what I had done wrong to make my parents banish me. What had I done to 
deserve this and how could I undo it?” (p. 79). Despite her parents’ good intentions, the extreme 
distress young Wurtzel felt during her exiles at summer camp led her to interpret their actions as 
a sort of punishment for her independence. Still saddened by these memories as an adult, 
Wurtzel defends her childhood habits as those of a “good kid” who was misunderstood: 
I was such a good kid, I really was. I didn’t need anyone to entertain me, I was so 
resourceful. Left alone I would have probably read the collected works of Tolstoy, 
or at least Tolkien. I might have sketched on my pad or written another one of the 





God, I was genuinely happy being alone. Which is, I’m sure, the exact reason that 
I was sent to sleepaway camp and forced to deal with other kids my age. (p. 79) 
 
Once again, Wurtzel underscores the breadth and depth of her intellectual interests as a young 
child, indicating that she would have been far happier—and, it seems, healthier—if she had been 
given the freedom to entertain herself instead of being “forced to deal with other kids.”  
In the past, Wurtzel notes earlier in Prozac Nation, she had instinctively learned to 
“compensate” for her parents’ neglect and hostility towards each other by “being adorable and 
charming in the way of precocious little girls, by doing so well in school, by being stubborn and 
domineering, by being so fucking persistent” (p. 39). But as Wurtzel approaches adolescence in 
the plot of Prozac Nation, her appeals for solitude as a balm for her unhappiness—hinted at in 
her earlier interjection that “By God, I was genuinely happy being alone”—are more and more 
explicit, plaintive, and futile (p. 79). For example, Wurtzel recalls how she begged her mother to 
let her stay home from camp after a year in which she had started cutting herself and eventually 
attempted suicide for the first time. Recounting that discussion, Wurtzel quotes herself: 
‘Mommy, how can you do this to me? I am so sick and crazy and in such a 
precarious state of mind and you know it, and I can’t believe you’re still sending 
me away like this. How can you do this? . . . You make it sound like I can’t do 
stuff on my own all summer. How bad would it be for me to just hang out and 
read and see movies? How bad?’ (p. 83) 
 
Here Wurtzel suggests that, although her parents once tolerated her mental life (neither 
encouraging nor discouraging her), their actions increasingly suggested to her that she was “bad” 
for preferring independent, intellectual pursuits over socializing with peers. Alternatively, they 
seemed to think that something “bad” would happen to her if she continued to take pleasure in 
learning and achievement. But in Wurtzel’s view, her ability to pursue her interests was taken 
away at the exact moment when it might have been most valuable to her. To Wurtzel’s younger 





who were so close to me couldn’t see how desperate I was, or if they could they didn’t care 
enough to do anything about it” (p. 82). When Prozac Nation’s account of Wurtzel’s childhood 
is read with an eye to gifted girl dilemmas, though, it becomes clearer how her giftedness was 
undone by gender socialization that forbade intellectual independence in a “normal” young girl. 
Wurtzel’s caretakers’ reactions to her giftedness shifted, according to Prozac Nation, 
quite consistently with trends observed by feminist psychologists in the 1970s and beyond: as 
she grew older, the adults in her life disregarded her gifts, rejected her autonomy, and pressured 
her to prioritize interpersonal relationships over intellectual fulfillment. In particular, the text 
depicts Wurtzel “being left in a lot of different odd places” by her parents for the presumed 
purpose of forcing her to socialize and limiting her access to her inner life (p. 84). Across Prozac 
Nation’s early chapters, Wurtzel mentions being sent to five different sleepaway summer camps, 
“synagogue nursery school” (p. 27), “day camp” (p. 39), “organized trips to amusement parks 
and museums” on weekends and holidays (p. 84), and an “after-school place” where “other kids 
would play Monopoly or basketball or pinball while [she] sat in the corner and . . . read” (p. 84-
85). As previously noted, Wurtzel identifies her introversion as “the exact reason” why she was 
“forced to deal with other kids” despite her rapidly declining mental health (p. 79). From her 
perspective, there can be no illusion that her parents abandoned her in such spaces because they 
genuinely believed she would enjoy interacting with peers—she asserts, “I’m sure. . . . This was 
yet another bid at making me normal” (p. 79). That Wurtzel’s withdrawn personality was not 
normal for a pre-teen girl is a sentiment vaguely echoed by numerous other characters in Prozac 
Nation: her friends (p. 45), rabbi (p. 48), teacher (p. 57), camp director (p. 85), and so on.14 Yet 
 
14Most notably, Wurtzel recalls an afternoon when a teacher kept her after class for several hours 
and asked her “lots of questions [she didn’t] know the answer to” (p. 57), including “strange, 





in emphasizing young Wurtzel’s powerlessness against her parents’ wishes, the text suggests it is 
depression—not normative femininity—that arose from the sacrifice of her giftedness. 
Halfway through the third chapter of Prozac Nation (“Love Kills”), Wurtzel reflects at 
great length on her parents’ decision to send her to summer camp and, more importantly, the 
powerful impact this experience had on her mental health. Designating summer camp as the 
place where “it all went wrong” and where her “spirit broke—and broke and broke and broke,” 
Wurtzel speculates that “Everything ended for [her] at camp” (p. 79). She explains: 
I stopped writing my books, stopped collecting grasshoppers, stopped feeling 
pretty, stopped wanting to know what makes lightning and rainbows and tsunami 
winds if it isn’t God, stopped wanting to know if there was a God, stopped asking 
questions that all the adults were too tired to answer anyway, stopped wanting to 
want anything at all anymore, knowing for sure that I could never have it, that I’d 
been expelled from that place where possibility still existed. (pp. 79-80) 
 
Listing a range of activities and interests that all “stopped” while she was exiled at summer 
camp, Wurtzel emphasizes the great losses she sustained as a young girl due to her parents’ 
restriction of her independence. Individually, none of her childhood pursuits (e.g., “writing [her] 
books” or “collecting grasshoppers”) might have been absolutely essential to a young girl’s 
psychological wellbeing, but collectively, they represented young Wurtzel’s entire reason for 
living: her ability to cultivate her personal talents was, she implies, what kept her “wanting to 
want anything at all. When she was denied that ability, then, it felt to her like being denied 
“possibility” itself. Further elaborating on Wurtzel’s thwarted giftedness, Prozac Nation erupts 
 
this world, and I wonder where he’s getting that from. He barely knows me. It sounds like he’s 
suggesting I kill myself. . . . He asks, so are you one of those girls who likes fast guys with fast 
cars? I don’t say what I am really thinking, which is that I’m only twelve so I don’t know” (p. 
57). Notice how Wurtzel’s narration conveys her discomfort in being both 1) criticized for her 





into a moment of rage that is wholly uncharacteristic of the ironic, cynical, self-aware Ex-Gifted 
Kid persona Wurtzel cultivates throughout most of her memoir’s narration. Wurtzel writes: 
what I feel as I think of summer camp is completely ugly: I want to kill my parents for 
doing this to me! I want to hack them to death for this because I was the best little girl in 
the world and instead of making me feel good about all the things that were good about 
me, they sent me away and I never really found my way back home! I was special! I had 
promise! And instead they threw me away and tried to make me ordinary! They threw me 
away with a bunch of normal kids who thought I was strange and made me feel strange 
until I became strange! And after all these years, I still despise them for doing this to me! 
The tears come down, not like rain, but like blows. (p. 80) 
 
This passage is one of several in Prozac Nation that overtly connect Wurtzel’s depression to her 
thwarted childhood giftedness, paradoxically suggesting that the latter caused the former—
despite the fact that much of Wurtzel’s memoir suggests the opposite (i.e., that her achievements 
resulted from her unhappiness). Calling attention to her memoir’s retrospective quality, Wurtzel 
condemns her parents’ preoccupation with “mak[ing] her ordinary” when she was a young girl, 
emphasizing that she “still” feels strongly about this topic. As in most descriptions of her youth, 
Wurtzel does not dispute the fact that she deviated from the norm; her childlike exaggeration of 
her specialness (“the best little girl in the world”) rather serves to highlight the absurdity of her 
parents’ ambivalence towards her gifts and thus the legitimacy of her anger. Now conscious of 
the extraordinary girl she once was, Wurtzel hints at the sense of belonging, acceptance, and 
“home” she felt in her early childhood independence—not just in the freedom she had to pursue 
her interests, but also in her freedom from the social rejection of “normal kids.” The text’s 
repeated interjections that Wurtzel “was special!” and “had promise!” suggest that, if the adults 
around her had only made her “feel good” about her uniqueness instead of making her feel bad 
(“strange” and abnormal), Wurtzel could have claimed the bright and happy future rightfully 
owed to her. Yet according to this passage, Wurtzel’s parents did something far worse than 





exclamations that “they threw me away. . . ! They threw me away. . . !” accuse them of actively 
discarding her potential and, along with it, her entire life and livelihood. Simply put, the text 
conveys that it was Wurtzel herself—not just her giftedness—who was permanently lost. 
Conclusion: Recovering the Ex-Gifted Girl 
Critics of Prozac Nation might cite the above passage as proof of Wurtzel’s “whiny” 
outlook—on the surface, she seems to blame summer camp for triggering her depression—but 
doing so forfeits a useful opportunity to bear witness to her childhood pain and her means of 
coping (or not) in the intervening years. The emotion in this passage stems not from Wurtzel’s 
hatred of the “ordinary” per se, but rather from her estimation of the extra-ordinary future she 
may have lost. Judging that her parents made choices based on predetermined social norms 
instead of her actual best interests, Wurtzel indicates that she “never really found [her] way 
back” to her authentically gifted self. External pressures brought her to a nadir as a pre-teen (her 
“spirit broke”), but she never did become normal: she “became strange.” The ambiguity of the 
word “strange” is significant here, as is the lack of a clear antecedent for Wurtzel’s use of the 
pronoun “this” (“for doing this to me,” “for this,” “for doing this to me”). Contextually, Wurtzel 
seems to refer to her mental illness, but her language choices also hint at the futility of seeking 
justice for an Ex-Gifted Kid. That is, Wurtzel cannot clarify what her parents did to her, because 
she does not know what she has lost. Not only “strange” to others, she is also strange to herself, 
and it seems she always will be—even the most extreme violence imaginable towards her parents 
(e.g., “hack[ing] them to death”) can never restore her lost potential. What is more, as she 
observes elsewhere in her memoir, she cannot even be sure whether anything was lost at all: 
maybe my mother did the right thing: By treating me like a normal kid, like her 
perfect baby, maybe she kept me from falling down further. After all, by forcing 
me to participate in real life, she might have prevented me from indulging and 





intractable than the one I was experiencing. I have no way of knowing what might 
have happened had she viewed the situation differently. I’ll never know. (p. 52) 
 
Confronted with her own anger, disappointment, and anxiety over the circumstances of her life, 
Wurtzel admits that she will never know exactly how those around her affected her depression—
she cannot be sure, for example, what kind of person she would be if her parents had not been so 
ambivalent towards her childhood giftedness.15 Hence, it seems that whenever she thinks her 
“completely ugly” thoughts, her furious ruminations can only collapse into speechless, almost 
involuntary grief (“the tears come down”). Perhaps the Ex-Gifted Kid’s greatest problem is that 
she has too much self-consciousness and, ultimately, too little self-knowledge. 
This chapter has examined Prozac Nation for insights into the Ex-Gifted Kid topos, 
exploring Wurtzel’s portrayal of both her depression and her giftedness as innate and ultimately 
inextricable traits. I have aimed to illustrate the exigency of scholarly analyses of the Ex-Gifted 
Kid topos, the suitedness of Prozac Nation to such a project, and key opportunities for expanding 
on existing scholarship (especially feminist scholarship) on this memoir. Through Wurtzel’s 
enactment of an Ex-Gifted Kid persona—and an Ex-Gifted Girl persona, specifically—Prozac 
Nation presents a disquieting conflict between the author’s giftedness and others’ perverse 
attempts to mold her into a “normal” girl. That popular press reviewers implicitly reinforced this 
conflict, failing to realize the irony of their attacks, suggests to me that the Ex-Gifted Kid 
persona enacted in this narrative calls for serious scholarly inquiry. Hence, my analysis resists 
prevailing responses to Wurtzel’s story and reclaims its significance as a case study in the 
 
15Wurtzel acknowledges the limits of her own perspective at numerous points of Prozac Nation. 
For example, in another passage about camp: “I could not think that [my mother’s] life was hard, 
that she had her own problems, that she needed a break, that there were so many things I 
wouldn’t understand about how difficult it was to be Mommy. I believed then that the pain I was 





complex relationship between madness, genius, and gender in a post-feminist United States 
context. I find that Wurtzel provides a deceptively pessimistic response to the question, “What 
Happens to the Gifted Girl?” According to Wurtzel, the gifted girl is depressed, perhaps because 
the depressed girl is also gifted. But needless to say, Prozac Nation’s story culminates in the 
writing of a bestselling memoir rather than the Ex-Gifted Kid’s demise. Indeed, the refraction of 
Wurtzel’s past through the perspective of her adult “recovered” self suggests her Ex-Gifted Kid 
persona is as much a rhetorical response to societal sexism as it is to mental health stigma. As a 
means of coping with extreme psychological distress, though, its uses may be limited. 
Like all variants of Mad Genius rhetoric, the Ex-Gifted Kid topos rests on controversial 
assumptions: it assumes that some (but not all) children’s minds hold exceptional intrinsic 
potential for achievement in adulthood, and it also assumes that such potential can be wasted, 
damaged, or even permanently lost. As Prozac Nation reinforces these assumptions, then, 
readers are invited to attribute Wurtzel’s perceived faults in her adulthood to extrinsic factors 
beyond her control while nonetheless believing in the unique intrinsic “promise” she may yet 
fulfill someday. Steeped in radical self-compassion, such a narrative holds obvious appeal for 
any young woman struggling to survive suicidal depression and prove—to herself and others—
that her life is one worth living. Actually moving forward with that life, however, requires her to 
reckon with the present: to mourn her disadvantages, to appreciate her advantages, to work as 
hard as she can, and to hope for the kind of random luck that generally facilitates exceptional 
achievement. Or perhaps she will decide her self-worth need not rely on her ability to achieve at 
all, dropping her attachment to this cultural cliché and seeking genuine self-knowledge and 











CONCLUSION: TELL US HOW YOU REALLY FEEL 
As I neared completion of this project in February 2021, I stumbled upon a prime 
example of Mad Genius rhetoric’s undying popularity in American culture. While double-
checking a minor fact from my fourth case study—the Google Trends analysis of searches for 
“gifted kid burnout”—I discovered that something I had written in this chapter was no longer 
true. Whereas I had previously identified the peak popularity of that phrase as having occurred in 
July 2017, the date when the original “Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo” meme was created, I was 
somewhat startled to see that the search volume had spiked sharply upwards in January 2021. As 
Figure 5 illustrates, the peak popularity of this phrase is now twice what it was before. I soon 
learned that the concept of Gifted Kid Burnout had gone viral on TikTok, a video-based social 
media platform popular with members of Generation Z (born 1997-2012), a month earlier 
(Thorpe, 2021). Thousands of teenagers have now filmed themselves lip-syncing to an audio 
track from a video first posted to TikTok by user @aokaycos on December 14, 2020. In this 
video, @aokaycos gestures as if speaking into a phone and says, “I can’t talk right now—I’m 
doing sad gifted kid burnout shit” (2020).1 The video then cuts to @aokaycos holding up a 
heavily marked-up academic planner, and text added to the top-left corner of the frame reads: 
“The sad ✨gifted kid burnout sh!t✨ in question: Writing in a planner all of the assignments that 
I have no motivation to do while crying—” (2020). Subsequent videos show users lip-syncing to 
 
1To be clear, @aokaycos’s video was inspired by a TikTok trend from early December 2020 in 
which users had lip-synced to an audio by user @makeupbychelseax. In her original video, 
@makeupbychelseax (also speaking into a mock phone) says, “I can’t talk right now—I’m doing 





@aokaycos’s audio and engaging in their own “sad gifted kid burnout” activities, many of which 
are drawn verbatim from the “Gifted Kid Burnout Bingo” meme. Clearly, the Ex-Gifted Kid 
topos is alive and well in contemporary internet culture—it won’t be going away anytime soon.  
This is not the first time I have been confronted with the real-world stakes of Mad Genius 
rhetoric while working on this project. In the time since I first started studying mental illness 
memoirs, several beloved celebrities have died by suicide—including actor/comedian Robin 
Williams in 2014, musicians Chris Cornell and Chester Bennington in 2017, fashion designer 
Kate Spade in 2018, and chef Anthony Bourdain in 2018—eliciting numerous allusions to the 
Tortured Artist topos in press coverage of their deaths. After I presented a paper on the Brainiac 
topos at a conference in 2019, one attendee remarked that she had struggled to contextualize 
Jamison’s arguments while discussing An Unquiet Mind with her students (many of whom are 
Figure 5 
Google Trends Analysis of “Gifted Kid Burnout,” 2014-2021
 





creative writers), telling me, “I have personally seen how much damage this book has done to 
young people with mental illness.” I can relate: when I teach An Unquiet Mind in my own 
courses, I too find it difficult to push back on certain aspects of the narrative without destroying 
my students’ enjoyment of a book that genuinely inspires them. And I would be remiss not to 
mention that, as a volunteer support group facilitator at the Compass Center in Chapel Hill (for 
survivors of domestic violence), I hear the Survivor topos woven into clients’ disclosures on a 
weekly basis—and I am sure I have reinforced this topos, consciously or not, through my own 
words from time to time. When contemplating the awesome power Mad Genius rhetoric wields 
over real people’s mental health, I am sometimes reminded of Brickman’s (2004) study of the 
“delicate cutter” figure (i.e., “the white, suburban, attractive teenage girl” who self-harms) in 
popular media (p. 87). Brickman begins and ends her analysis with an influential 1997 New York 
Times article about self-harming, emphasizing how it features an ordinary teenage girl named 
Jill—a popular cheerleader who secretly self-harms—in both its content and “in a full-page 
portrait facing the title page” (p. 88). Jill is simultaneously a symbolic figure, “unwittingly an 
accomplice in [the] mythmaking” this article enacts, and a “very real body facing examination” 
from others who might help or hurt her (Brickman, 2004, p. 105). Hence, Brickman observes that 
“While it may seem simple enough to show how” popular media promotes certain cultural 
narratives about mental illness, “the image of Jill reminds me of why one must do so” (p. 105). 
While researching for this project, it has been my pleasure to learn who my interlocutors 
are and, even more intriguingly, what they think about each other: for example, to read how 
Marta Caminero-Santangelo (who published The Madwoman Can’t Speak: Or, Why Insanity is 
Not Subversive in 1998) reviewed Susan J. Hubert’s 2003 book Questions of Power: The Politics 





anti-theoretical self-presentation,” stating that although Hubert “belabors the point that she 
wishes to take the narratives on their own terms,” in reality, “her theoretical biases (strongly 
influenced by the antipsychiatry school) are made quite clear” (p. 729). If Hubert had “made her 
agenda explicit from the start,” Caminero-Santangelo asserts, then her argument “would have 
been, at least, far more refreshing than the always dubious claim to theoretical neutrality” (p. 
730). It is obvious to Caminero-Santangelo that Questions of Power is a critique of psychiatry, so 
she seems to wonder why Hubert even bothered with her pretense of open-mindedness—if she 
were not invested in her project’s findings, why would she have begun it in the first place? And 
anyway, as Jane Ussher muses in Women’s Madness: Misogyny or Mental Illness?: 
All of us who write about madness bring our own baggage, our own perspectives, 
our own politics, our own pain. Many may pretend otherwise, but we cannot leave 
it behind us. The least we can do is make it evident. (p. 9) 
 
Needless to say, strong opinions about Mad Genius rhetoric are both a likely prelude to extensive 
research on this topic and an outcome of the same. Although I have noted throughout this project 
that I am interested in how and why Mad Genius rhetoric exists rather than whether it does or 
should exist, I cannot claim that my project is disinterested in the widespread circulation of these 
topoi in popular media. It’s not, and I’m not. My case studies are clearly not a defense of the idea 
that madness is linked to genius—or that people with mental illness basically benefit from the 
enduring popularity of Mad Genius rhetoric. It is fascinating to me, though, that a topic I have 
been studying for years can still be made so alien to me: I am absolutely not a part of TikTok’s 
primary demographic, for instance, and my ability to understand Mad Genius rhetoric from these 
modern teenagers’ perspectives is as limited as my ability to know exactly what it meant to the 
memoirists I have analyzed throughout this project. Nonetheless, there are a number of 





This dissertation has shown that the concept of Mad Genius—that is, the supposed link 
between “madness,” or apparently problematic mental states (now often classified as psychiatric 
illness), and exceptional gifts of creativity, wisdom, intelligence, beauty, or other talents—is not 
simply a scientific hypothesis or a sociological problem. It is also a rhetorical construct, invoked 
by persons with varying relationships to madness/genius for the purpose of making arguments 
about their own or others’ minds. Moreover, through my four case studies, I have illustrated how 
Mad Genius rhetoric consists of more than one distinct topoi that are distinguishable by (at 
minimum) the differing relationships they posit between supposedly “good” and “bad” mental 
phenomena. These are 1) the Tortured Artist, which posits that genius leads to madness; 2) the 
Brainiac, which posits that madness confers genius; 3) the Survivor, in which madness and 
genius are thought to share a common source in external trauma; 4) the Ex-Gifted Kid, in which 
madness/genius are thought to be innate and inextricably intertwined. Through analyses of 
contemporary pop culture archives—a burgeoning pop culture wiki (TV Tropes), a widely-read 
pop science publication (Psychology Today), chart-topping (pseudo-)autobiographical songs by 
famous women artists (e.g., Gaynor’s “I Will Survive”), and viral images circulated on social 
media sites like Instagram—I have demonstrated not only the prominence of these four Mad 
Genius topoi in American cultural artifacts, explicating each one’s discrete features, but also 
their applicability across different time periods, genres, and rhetorical situations. 
It is clear that the Tortured Artist, Brainiac, Survivor, and Ex-Gifted Kid topoi have 
significantly shaped cultural discourse about mental illness; furthermore, it is primarily through 
auto/biographical narratives that they have been circulated. For this reason, this project examined 
how Mad Genius rhetoric is taken up in creative, book-length, explicitly autobiographical works 





psychiatric condition. Arguing that Susanna Kaysen (Girl, Interrupted), Kay Redfield Jamison 
(An Unquiet Mind), Nana-Ama Danquah (Willow Weep for Me), and Elizabeth Wurtzel (Prozac 
Nation) each enacts a Mad Genius persona in the narration of her life story, I shed light on the 
ubiquity of Mad Genius rhetoric in the popular genre of mental illness memoirs. In addition to 
their provision of therapeutic benefits for persons with mental illness, who may draw on Mad 
Genius rhetoric for a positive interpretation of an otherwise negative situation, these Mad Genius 
personae seem to be an effective means of arguing against widespread mental health stigma. Yet 
my case studies have also pointed to the constraints and/or possible harmful effects of each Mad 
Genius topoi, wondering whether the benefits they bring to individual persons with mental 
illness are outweighed by the risks they pose to mentally ill people as a class. 
My chapters have differentiated between the Tortured Artist, Brainiac, Survivor, and Ex-
Gifted Kid topoi primarily on the basis of the relationships they pose between madness and 
genius—which (if any) is thought to precede the other, and whether the connection between 
them has internal or external origins. However, I have also suggested a few other means by 
which we might distinguish between Mad Genius topoi: the specific mental health stigmas to 
which they respond, the classic rhetorical strategies that might be associated with each one, the 
methodological problems they highlight in existing Mad Genius research, the sociohistorical eras 
in which they might be more/less prevalent, and the problematic messages they implicitly convey 
about mental illness. Is it possible that each of these components of Mad Genius rhetoric is partly 
shaped by the others? Although I am loath to oversimplify my findings—my project aims to 
make current conceptions of Mad Genius more, not less, nuanced—I do see some resonance 
between the stigmas, strategies, methods, timing, and problems of each topos. For the purpose of 
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about Mad Genius topoi as they are invoked in the memoirs I analyzed in my case studies. These 
are channels through which future research on mental health rhetoric (MHRR) and mental illness 
memoirs might continue studying how/why firsthand accounts of mental illness consistently 
draw connections between the authors’ psychiatric symptoms and their exceptional abilities.  
Again, I wish to stress that Table 4 is not an exhaustive inventory of all potentially 
meaningful facets of Mad Genius rhetoric. It is likely that other Mad Genius topoi, as well as 
even narrower subsets of some broader topoi, also exist in addition to those that I have studied in 
this dissertation. For instance, my research suggests to me that Mad Genius personae enacted by 
persons whose psychiatric diagnoses are tied to specific behaviors—as in eating disorders, 
substance abuse disorders, and so on—may be distinctly different from the Tortured Artist, 
Brainiac, Survivor, and Ex-Gifted Kid topoi. Eating disorders have often been culturally (and 
thus textually) linked to remarkable beauty, glamour, spirituality, and/or the sublime; this 
phenomenon has already been tentatively explored in past scholarship on memoirs of anorexia 
and bulimia (see Lintott, 2003; Thomas et al., 2006). Such memoirs may suggest that madness 
and genius share a common origin in an individual’s outward actions—that is, that repeatedly 
engaging in certain behaviors can cause someone to develop both mental illness and mental gifts 
where they did not exist before. The rhetorical functions of a Mad Genius persona in this context 
could be to challenge the belief that person with mental illness are shallow individuals who 
passively submit to external pressures (e.g., societal beauty norms) or their own base urges, 
emphasizing instead their profound tenacity and self-discipline. That I have not delved more 
deeply into these preliminary ideas is an unfortunate limitation of this project, and it will be a 





As I discussed at length in my analysis of the Survivor topos, a majority of current 
MHRR has highlighted how societal stigma leads to the denial of mentally ill people’s rhetorical 
authority, often citing the task of building ethos as a primary concern in firsthand accounts of 
mental illness. With the exception of Pryal’s (2010) study of the “mood memoir” genre—in 
which the “creative genius trope” (as she calls it) is identified as a possible means of building 
ethos before audiences who value exceptional creativity (p. 496)—such research usually assumes 
that audiences’ preexisting perceptions of mental illness are exclusively negative. A person’s 
rhetoricity is therefore thought to be severely, permanently damaged when they self-identify as 
mentally ill in a public forum. Accordingly, it is taken as a given that mentally ill rhetors do not 
take pride or pleasure in being mentally ill; they must always speak from an anti-illness, pro-
recovery perspective. Yet this current scholarly trend overlooks the possibility that some people 
have genuinely positive perceptions of mental illness, implicitly erasing the effects of Mad 
Genius rhetoric on the telling and reception of mentally ill people’s life stories. Even if one finds 
it implausible that a non-mentally ill person would form positive judgments about someone 
else’s genius on the basis of their madness, it is clear that mentally ill people themselves do form 
such judgments about their own and others’ minds. Given the high incidence of mental health 
problems in most human populations, one would be hard-pressed to find an audience (of any 
communication) that is not at least partially comprised of mentally ill people. Hence, one of my 
project’s contributions to MHRR is to analyze not only how Mad Genius rhetoric is enacted by 
mentally ill writers, but also to open new discussions about what it means to mentally ill readers. 
In comparison to the glut of research that treats Mad Genius as a scientific phenomenon, 
trying to prove/disprove its existence through empirical means, few scholars have examined the 





Genius as a social construct often takes a negative view, vehemently denying that madness is 
linked to genius and criticizing those who entertain this idea (see Schlesinger, 2009, 2012, 2014). 
Although my project does not promote Mad Genius rhetoric, I have also labored not to denounce 
the Tortured Artist, Brainiac, Survivor, and Ex-Gifted Kid topoi outright. To say that these topoi 
are only rhetorical tools, neither inherently helpful nor hurtful to those who embrace them, would 
be unacceptable to me. Still, it cannot be denied that persons with mental illness enthusiastically 
consume artifacts that circulate Mad Genius topoi—and often perceive themselves as benefiting 
from doing so. These truths are written into the artifacts themselves: for example, Ellen Forney’s 
bestselling graphic memoir of bipolar disorder, Marbles: Mania, Depression, Michelangelo, and 
Me (2012), is heavily informed by the author’s admiration of Kay Redfield Jamison. Focusing on 
Forney’s onetime reluctance to medicate her illness—due to her fear of losing her creativity—
Marbles depicts Forney reading An Unquiet Mind (a “hugely important” book to her) (p. 90), 
reproduces Jamison’s appendix of artists from Touched With Fire (which Forney calls “Club van 
Gogh”) (p. 45), and cites lengthy passages of Jamison’s past research articles (p. 209). And just 
as Forney credited Jamison for aiding in her recovery, now countless other persons credit Forney 
for helping them, writing (e.g.) Amazon reviews of Marbles that attest to its value:  
[Forney] puts everything I couldn’t describe into words and drawings. This book 
has been a huge deal for me especially as I pursue the Neverending medical 
journey of medicating that [she] discusses often in the book. Very inspiring to 
‘keep pushing’. I’m also considering buying a second copy to leave at my 




Honoring the centrality of creative cultural artifacts in real people’s experiences of coping with 
severe psychic pain, my project has illuminated the basis of mental illness memoirs’ appeal for 
certain readers—while also cautioning against the harms they might do to others. 
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 In the absence of widespread mental health stigma, would Mad Genius rhetoric still be 
appealing to persons in distress? When Kaysen, Jamison, Danquah, and Wurtzel published their 
memoirs in the 1990s, American society wasn’t what it was when they were first experiencing 
mental illness in the 1960s to 1980s—and speaking publicly about mental illness now is less 
taboo than it was in the 1990s. Cultural discourse vacillates between biological, psychological, 
and social explanations for mental illness, but it is generally understood that social factors affect 
which people and behaviors are most likely to be (or be labeled as) mentally ill. Nonetheless, the 
stakes of diagnosing and treating mental illness are always obvious: it is literally a life-or-death 
matter, and the notion that human life should be preserved at all costs is sacrosanct to many. As 
long as mental illness threatens people’s lives, Mad Genius topoi may prevail, persuading ill and 
non-ill people alike that mentally ill persons’ lives are worth living. In this sense, the appeal of 
Mad Genius seems to be less about the stigmatization of madness than it is about the valorization 
of genius. What I mean is, the “goodness” of genius is not like the “badness” of madness—to 
argue that the former positively offsets the latter only makes sense if one is convinced that genius 
confers material benefits (e.g., under capitalism) in the same way that madness wreaks material 
harm. So, although Mad Genius rhetoric may help to keep some people alive, my case studies 
remind us that it doesn’t necessarily make their lives any better. That is, it poses no meaningful 
challenge to systemic ableism and other biases that abound wherever the value of humans’ minds 
is bartered and sold: Kaysen’s hospital, Jamison’s lab, Danquah’s newspapers, Wurtzel’s 
university, and so on. In a world that did not imagine some mental traits to be more valuable than 
others—nor assume that being more valuable than one’s fellow humans is inherently good—I 






Inventory of Influences on the Mental Illness Narrative (Donohue-Smith, 2011, pp. 145-46): 




Age, gender, education, race/ethnicity. 
 
Level of distress. 
 
Nature and severity of behavioral disturbances. 
 
Do symptoms cause distress/conflict in relationships. 
 
Perceptions and interpretations of their symptoms. 
 
Individual beliefs about the nature of mental illness. 
 
Prior episodes of mental illness. 
 
Beliefs about usefulness of therapy. 
 
Prior utilization of mental health services. 
 





Family members’ beliefs about mental illness. 
 
Response to client and his/her symptoms. 
 
Attitudes toward treatment. 
 
Willingness/ability to participate in treatment. 
 
Level of emotional/instrumental support they can provide.  
 
Composition of the family; stage in the family life cycle.  
Impact on lives of family members (e.g. siblings, children).  
 
Family history of diagnosed mental illness. 
 






Degree of engagement with community supports (e.g. church, friends). 
 
II. Community/neighborhood characteristics 
 
Sociodemographics: (e.g. race/ethnicity, age, income, education).  
 
Community resources (e.g. library, recreation, transportation). 
 
Mental health services (accessibility; availability). 
 
Neighborhood “climate”: (e.g. crime rates, condition of homes, parks). 
 
III. Therapist characteristics 
 








Professional knowledge and skill: “art and science.” 
 
Empirically based practices. 
 
Able to establish rapport. 
 
Sensitive to nonverbal cues; timing. 
 
Respectful and empowering. 
 
Ethics and professionalism. 
 
Professional self-identify in the practice setting. 
 
IV. Agency characteristics 
 
Agency “identity” (philosophy/mission). 
 
Agency “climate” (staff morale, longevity). 
 
Support for continuing education of staff. 
 






Number of clients (waiting lists, case loads). 
 
Proportion of time dedicated to administrative activities (e.g. documentation, 
insurance, accreditation). 
 
Reimbursement policies and funding sources. 
 
V. Cultural and societal influences 
 
General societal attitude toward mental illness and treatment.  
 
Representations of mental illness in the popular media. 
 
Dissemination and application of research findings. 
 
Mental health/mental illness as national funding priory receiving.  
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